

Integration policies in Europe

A comparison between France and the Netherlands

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a comparative study between French and Dutch integration models. It attempts to answer the question which model is more effective in integrating immigrants. The period selected for this study is the 1980s and the 1990s, when the French integration model was assimilationist and the Dutch model was multicultural. The first part of the data analysis consists of discourse analysis of policy documents in order to determine the characteristics of both the French integration model and the Dutch integration model. The second part of the data analysis attempts to answer the research question by using the theories of policy effectiveness and the three different dimensions of integration: structural, cultural and social integration. These dimensions are then divided in six sub hypotheses, which are subsequently measuring the degree of integration through participation rates, unemployment rates, education levels, language proficiency, naturalizations and exogamy.

The results of this thesis are mixed. On the one hand, the French assimilationist integration model seems to enhance the relative participation rate of immigrants, to reduce their relative unemployment rate and to enhance their proficiency in French. On the other hand, the Dutch multicultural integration model seems more effective when measured through the level of education of immigrants, their rate of naturalization and the rate of exogamy. Indeed, on these three indicators, immigrants in the Netherlands score higher. At the end of this thesis, the limitations of this research will be developed.

INTRODUCTION

The recent terrorist attacks in France and in Belgium have revived the immigration and integration debate. Indeed, Muslim extremism is, according to some politicians and citizens, caused by the lack of integration of Muslim immigrants or their children. Even though some academics argue this is not necessarily the case (Malik, 2015), the debate about radicalization has also revived the discussion about integration models. Countries across Europe have different integration models, while we observe that immigrants are not equally integrated across these countries. The main integration models mentioned in the literature are the assimilationist model, the multicultural model and the exclusionist model. This thesis aims to determine which integration model is more effective in integrating immigrants. It will be a comparative study between France and the Netherlands during the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, France had an assimilationist integration model while the Netherlands had a multicultural model. The proponents of the assimilationist integration model expect immigrants to adapt to the dominant culture of the host country. In contrast, the defenders of the multicultural model give the immigrants the freedom to retain their own culture and habits.

To answer the research question of which model is more successful in integrating immigrants, the main hypothesis will be that the assimilationist model is more effective. This thesis will look at policy effectiveness measured through structural integration, cultural integration and social integration. Policy effectiveness will be measured using the foundationalist approach, meaning that effectiveness is defined as the degree to which the policy achieves the goals for which it is designed by measuring the results in an objective way. The indicators of integration that will be used to measure policy effectiveness are participation rate, unemployment rate, education level, language proficiency, naturalization and exogamy. These indicators will form the six sub hypotheses of this thesis.

The findings are mixed. They suggest that the assimilationist model leads to better integration through higher levels of participation rate and language proficiency and lower levels of unemployment among immigrants. The multicultural model however, seems to enhance the education level, the naturalization rate and the rate of exogamy.

This thesis is academically relevant because there has not been a comparative analysis between the French and the Dutch integration policies yet. This thesis is socially relevant for a number of reasons. First, because the Netherlands and France are both immigration

countries with a relatively high proportion of non-Western immigrants. It is in the best interest of society as a whole that these immigrants are well-integrated and contribute positively to the economy. This is even more important in an era of economic stagnation in which unemployment and lack of education pose a burden on government budgets. Evidence about the effectiveness of integration policies could hence lead to a better allocation of resources. Second, according to a significant portion of natives, terrorism is linked to a lack of integration. Even though there is a heated (academic) debate about whether this is true or not, providing evidence about integration and the link with integration policies is an important contribution to this debate.

This thesis will be divided in the following sections. First, the literature review will summarize the academic debate about integration models. Second, the theoretical framework will define the concept of policy effectiveness. It will then explain the three dimensions of integration that will be used to answer the research question. Third, the section on methods and data will explain the method of discourse analysis and the statistical data that will be used to answer the research question. Fourth, the data analysis will show the evidence presented by the data. This section will be divided in three parts. The first one will review the integration model of France. The second will explain the integration model of the Netherlands. The third part of the data analysis section will consist of a statistical comparison between the two countries using figures about integration. Fifth, a section on validity will discuss the limitations of this thesis. The main limitations are the use of different definitions of immigrants by both countries and the comparability of the data. Sixth, the conclusion will offer an answer to the research question.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Integration models

Integration models differ according to countries. It is determined by factors such as history, the nature of immigrant populations, culture and politics. This thesis will assess the impact of two different integration models on the integration of immigrants. The first model is assimilationist and an example of it is France. The second model is multicultural. Examples are the Netherlands, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries (Carrera, 2006: 2; Entzinger, 1994: 74). Some authors (Carrera, 2006: 2; Carrera, 2005: 116; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005: 8) also distinguish a third, exclusionist model. This model, of which Germany, Austria and Flanders used to be typical examples, puts emphasis on the role of the migrant in the labour market. In this model, immigrants are seen merely as a cyclical shock absorber to counter temporary workforce shortage (Entzinger, 1994: 73). Their access to citizenship is usually limited as acquisition is mostly granted through *jus sanguinis* (Carrera, 2005: 116). Modern day examples of exclusionist countries include the Gulf countries.

France is seen as a republican and more assimilationist country while the Netherlands has more of a multicultural approach when it comes to the politics of integration (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012: 237; Bertossi, 2011; Carrera, 2006: 2; Carrera, 2005: 116; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005: 8; Giugni & Passy, 2004: 59). Some authors believe this difference in integration policies is path dependent, resulting from historical events such as pillarization in the Netherlands (Ersanilli, 2012: 343; Entzinger, 1994: 78; 81) or the French Revolution in France (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012: 239; Bertossi, 2011: 1563).

Assimilationism in France

What is assimilationism?

France is a typical example of the assimilationist (sometimes also called republican) model of immigrant integration (Entzinger, 1994: 74; Giugni & Passy, 2004; Safi, 2006: 5; Roussier-Fusco, 2003: 29). This model was adopted from 1974, when France set stricter immigration procedures (Entzinger, 1984: 203). 1974 is considered as the end of the “30 glorieuses”, a period of strong economic growth (Vie Publique, 2015).

The French assimilationist model of integration imposes immigrants to assimilate to the French culture. It is the principle of equality that forms the basis of this model. This implies that the state makes no distinction between individuals on the basis of “ethnicity, race, or religion” (Oberti, 2008: 56). This also implies that interest groups based on these criteria have no place in the French decision making process (Oberti, 2008: 56). Moreover, the principle of *laïcité* implies that religious beliefs should not be expressed in public (Oberti, 2008: 56). This principle laid the ground for the prohibition of the veil in schools and the prohibition of the niqab in public. The model also assumes that “social and cultural segregation” is harmful for equality.

Assimilationism demands a high degree of both cultural and structural convergence (Entzinger, 1984: 35). Most of the time, the minorities have to adapt to the norms and values of the majority (Entzinger, 1984: 36; Giugni & Passy, 2004: 58; Simon, 2003; Safi, 2006: 5; Safi, 2008: 269). Entzinger (1984: 36) recognizes that assimilation is a long process that is unlikely to be achieved in the time span of one or two generations.

Safi (2006: 3-4) distinguishes between two forms of assimilationism: convergent assimilationism, in which the responsibility to assimilate rests mainly with the immigrant, and segmented assimilationism, in which other actors and institutions can play a role.

Proponents of the assimilationist model see immigration as a permanent phenomenon, unlike proponents of the exclusionary model. They hence believe that immigrants have to be included in society as fast as possible, but they have to integrate according to the rules, values and norms of the host country. This model is usually successful for immigrants that are willing to adapt, but is less effective for immigrants that want to retain their own identity (Entzinger, 1994: 74).

Naturalization is seen as the final goal of the assimilationist integration policy (Entzinger, 1984: 202; Simon, 2003). This could explain why France has a higher naturalization rate than Germany (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005: 8).

The question whether assimilationist policies have been successful has been raised by some academics. Prost (2009: 623) argues that in France, despite some minor differences (immigrants being slightly more religious and conservative than the local population for instance), immigrants can be considered as assimilated.

Critics on the assimilationist model

However, in practice the assimilationist model has many flaws. Despite the fact that the policy is supposed to be egalitarian, and that immigrants should not be discriminated against, there was a strong differentiation between African migrants and European migrants (mainly from Portugal and Spain) in France (Entzinger, 1984: 204). The last group was subject to “threats of deportation, segregation and repression” (Verbunt, 1984 quoted in Entzinger, 1984: 204).

Another important critique to the French integration model is the problem of housing (Simon, 1998). Immigrants have for generations been hosted in “dormitory towns”, where a high concentration of poverty and unemployment formed an obstacle to successful integration (Prost, 2009: 620). Other authors accuse the assimilationist model of being “ethnocentric”.

Proponents of the assimilationist model often consider deviance from French norms and habits as handicaps instead of a potential enrichment of the host society (Safi, 2006: 5).

Finally, Malik (2015) argues that the assimilationist policy of France contributed to the creation of a divisive society. This could be due to the fact that immigrants who refuse to comply with the assimilationist expectations of the French government and of some French citizens are stigmatized.

Multiculturalism in the Netherlands

What is multiculturalism?

Multiculturalism refers to the respect of diversity, in particular cultural and religious diversity (Ersanilli, 2012: 343). Malik (2002) defines it as “the public recognition and affirmation of cultural differences”. Multiculturalism respects the cultural difference between immigrants and the native population, and does not expect immigrants to abandon their identity, as it is the case with the assimilationist model (Entzinger, 1994: 74). In the multicultural model, emphasis is put on the well-being of immigrants (Entzinger, 1994: 78).

The *minderhedennota* of 1983 can be considered as a trendsetting document for integration policies of the 1980s and the 1990s in the Netherlands. According to Entzinger (1994: 80), it has three major goals: to promote multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic minorities, to promote equality before the law and to reduce social and economic

inequalities by promoting equality of opportunity. The first of these elements received most attention from the Dutch government (Entzinger, 1994: 81).

The *ontwerp minderhedennota* is also a relevant document, as it has been one of the principal documents to deliver the input for the final *minderhedennota*. Even though this document seems overall to promote the multicultural approach to integration, according to Entzinger (1984: 123), the government stated in it that solving arrears in terms of development or well-being of immigrants was more important than pluralism in society.

Examples of multicultural policies

In order to achieve the first goal of the multicultural policy, being the promotion of multiculturalism and the emancipation of minorities, the Dutch government adopted a number of policies. First, it introduced the teaching of the mother tongue of immigrants in primary schools (Entzinger, 1994: 78, 81). Second, it allowed for the establishment of Muslim and Hindu schools (Entzinger, 1994: 81). However, this could be explained by the Dutch emphasis on freedom of religion and the absence of *laïcité* in the Dutch educational system. Third, the *ontwerp minderhedennota* advised for access for minorities to the media, adapted vocational training for (children of) immigrants and for the use of interpreters in health care (Entzinger, 1984: 123).

The Dutch government also promoted the creation of minority organizations, which took the shape of sports associations or languages courses (Entzinger, 1994: 82). Moreover, the Ministry of the interior created the *adviesorganen* (advice committees) in which different immigrant groups could be represented and could express their views regarding policies concerning them (Entzinger, 1994: 81; Tweede Kamer, 1992).

An example of the effort to achieve equality before the law is the fact that immigrants were allowed to vote and be elected in municipal elections (Entzinger, 1994: 83).

Despite all these efforts, the battle for equality of opportunity was not considered successful. Even though immigrants had a better housing situation, they were still lagging behind in education and employment. Factors that contributed to this failure were the fact that (children of) immigrants dropped out of school prematurely, their poorer knowledge of Dutch and discrimination from the part of employers (Entzinger, 1994: 84).

When it became clear that some immigrants would not return to their country of emigration, forced return was briefly discussed but was seen as being immoral (Entzinger, 1994: 78). Indeed, immigrants were seen as having contributed positively to the Dutch economy and society (Entzinger, 1994: 78). Similarly, the feeling of guilt about the Dutch colonial history explained why citizens from the former colonies were not forced to return home (Entzinger, 1994: 78).

Criticisms on the multicultural model

Although the multicultural model may sound desirable in theory, in practice multiculturalism sometimes leads to segregation (Bertossi, 2011: 1567) and a lack of integration, which can be seen through high unemployment figures for immigrant populations (Entzinger, 1994: 74). This means that multiculturalism can lead to more inequality (Scheffer, 2010).

At the same time, Entzinger (1994: 85) blames the minorities policies of the government of the 1980s for not being successful and for attracting even more immigrants that are not likely to be well integrated, at least from an educational point of view.

An important limitation of the application of the multicultural model of integration is that policy makers have tried to put immigrants and minorities in “boxes” and failed to recognize the many differences among them (Malik, 2015). Similarly, they have taken religious leaders or community spokespersons as the representatives of entire groups. This has led to the alienation of an important group of immigrants who do not identify with these leaders. As a result, the multicultural model ignores the voice of a majority of immigrants, while this is exactly what the model tries to avoid.

Finally, multiculturalism is sometimes applied in a way that encourages self-censure and suppression of criticism concerning failure of integration. Indeed, the right to preserve one’s culture is often accompanied by the duty of others to respect all kinds of religious and cultural practices. Sometimes, respect is imposed for these behavioural differences and this can lead to the censure of criticisms of these practices (Malik, 2002).

The limits of integration models

In the past two sections, the assimilationist model and the multicultural model have been presented as two distinct and “perfect” models. However, there are a number of limitations to this.

First, there often seems to be a difference between theory and practice, in this case between public discourse and actual integration policies (Entzinger, 2014, 693; Oberti, 2008: 59). For instance, citizenship policy regimes are not always concomitant with citizen tests (Michalowski, 2011: 749). This might be because citizenship and integration are sensitive issues and subject to political bargain. It could also be due to the fact that integration involves a lot of different aspects such as education, employment and legal issues (such as freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination). In the Netherlands for instance, seven ministries were involved in the integration policy and it proved difficult to coordinate them all (Groenendijk 1981: 537; cited in Entzinger, 1984: 121). Sometimes, there is also a difference between the integration model and realities on the ground. In France for instance, the republican model is supposed to defend equality of opportunity. However, the model does not shield immigrants from discrimination (Oberti 2008: 59). Finally, there seems to be an integration paradox, holding that foreigners who are the best integrated feel the most discriminated against because they can perceive discrimination better, due to language proficiency, more contacts with natives and higher expectations (Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic & De Vroome, 2015: 1842).

Second, caution is needed when assigning fixed models to particular countries, because models or words such as “republican” can be used and understood in different ways by different actors (Bertossi, 2011: 1574). Moreover, integration policies can change over time (Entzinger, 2014; Carrera, 2006: 2; 19; Carrera, 2005: 116). Indeed, in the Netherlands, it has evolved from cultural preservation in the 1980s, to participation in the 1990s and assimilation in the 2000s (Entzinger, 2014). Cultural preservation was chosen in the 1980s mainly because immigration was seen as a temporary issue and the immigrants were expected to return home (Entzinger, 1994). It was believed that it was better for the immigrants to preserve their cultural norms and values in order to facilitate reintegration in their countries of origin. Other authors state it has evolved from a multicultural model towards an assimilationist one (Carrera, 2006: 9). Nowadays, the Netherlands has a stricter immigration and integration policy, despite having been more tolerant in the past (Entzinger, 2014: 694). Bonjour (2013) refers to the *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* of 1998 as an example of this more assimilationist policy. In addition, the more recent emphasis on individual responsibility for integrating is an example of this shift (Bonjour, 2013: 844).

Third, the government is not a unitary actor and the opinion of political parties and even politicians within these parties vary significantly about the issue (Bonjour, 2013). In the Netherlands, one major point of disagreement between parties used to be about the responsibility for the financing of integration courses (Bonjour, 2013). While the Freedom Party (PVV), the Conservative Liberals (VVD) and the Christian Democrats (CDA) stated that immigrants have to pay their integration courses themselves, the Liberal Democrats (D66), the Socialist Party (SP), the Social Democrats (PvdA) and the Greens (GroenLinks) believed immigrants are a vulnerable groups and need state assistance to pay for the courses (Bonjour, 2013: 846). Thus, even if the government adopts a certain policy, this does not mean that every citizen or even every policymaker agrees with this position. Similarly, in France, right wing and left wing political parties respond differently to the lack of integration of immigrants or their overrepresentation in criminality. While the Right advocates for a strict maintenance of the legal order and states that criminality should be punished severely, the Left argues that there should be more understanding for the difficult conditions in which (children of) immigrants have to live (Prost, 2009: 625).

Fourth, the problem of subsidiarity is an important element to take into account when discussing the politics of immigration and integration in European Union member states (Carrera, 2006:1). Indeed, there can be a conflict between decision making at the national level and at the European level. This means that national policies can be influenced by European guidelines. However, other authors argue that integration policies are still mostly designed at the national level and that it is wrong to blame the European Union for failing integration models, as Brussels does not have a substantial influence on this issue (Prost, 2009: 618).

Fifth, not all immigrants are integrated similarly in a country. Safi (2006) points out that even in a single country at a single point in time, immigrants from different nationalities integrate very differently, despite being ruled by the same integration model. There even seems to be differences in how men and women are integrated. For instance, South Europeans, Asians and immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa intermarry more often than Turks or immigrants from North Africa (Safi, 2006: 20). This shows that integration models do not always determine how immigrants are integrated.

Sixth, the multicultural and assimilationist model are often presented as antonyms, but according to Malik (2015), they also have a lot in common. Both models treat immigrants, especially immigrants of Muslim origin, as one distinct and homogeneous group. According

to Malik (2015), this kind of behaviour towards Muslim immigrants contributes to their feeling of alienation and is a factor of radicalization, even though both models stimulate this in a different manner. Similarly, anti-immigration parties in both the Netherlands and France, as well as in other European countries, show that natives are also disappointed by either integration model.

The shift in integration models in both countries

The previous section explained that one of the limits of assigning fixed integration models to countries is that these models are evolving. This section will explain how the integration model changed in the Netherlands and in France in order to justify the period that this thesis will investigate.

Shift in the Netherlands

At the turn of the 21st century, integration models have changed in both countries. While France made a departure from its strong assimilationist tradition, the Netherlands adopted a significantly more assimilationist model. The *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* of 1998 marked the beginning of this more assimilationist policy (Bonjour, 2013). This law gave immigrants more obligations, such as the potential obligation to follow an integration program (Wiebenga, *et al.*, 2005: 50; Carrera, 2005: 117). Such a program contained Dutch language courses and societal and professional orientation (Wiebenga *et al.*, 2005:50). These integration classes were first provided by the ROC, a semi-governmental organization, and were free of charge for the participants (Bonjour, 2013: 840). Integration became an obligation for immigrants, but the financial cost was born by the state. This changed in 2006, when the law was revised and the task of providing the courses was privatized. From then on, immigrants had to pay for the courses themselves even though financial means were provided by the state, such as loans or the reimbursement of 70% if the exam was passed within 3 years (Bonjour, 2013: 841).

There was a consensus among most of the Dutch political parties about the need to be more assertive in terms of sociocultural convergence and create a more homogeneous Dutch society (Bonjour, 2013: 848-849).

Another aspect of the stricter immigration and integration procedure is the stricter conditions for expulsion. The *Vreemdelingenwet 2000* stipulated that from then on, when a residence permit is refused to an immigrant, the person has thirty days to leave the Netherlands (Wienbenga *et al.*, 2005: 51).

A factor that can explain the shift in the integration model of the Netherlands is the (changing) perception of the Islam. A number of Dutch politicians initiated the debate about integration, which led to a changing paradigm about the integration model. For instance, Ayaan Hirsi Ali stated that the Islam is not compatible with Western liberal values (Aydemir & Vliegthart, 2016: 73). Such values include tolerance towards homosexuals or acceptance of abortion and euthanasia. This claim is confirmed by research finding that non-Western immigrants are usually more conservative than locals (Ersanilli, 2012: 339).

An aspect that also dramatically changed at the turn of the century is the role played by science in the design of integration policies in the Netherlands. Scientists used to be consulted extensively during the 1980s and 1990s but in the 2000s, their knowledge was only used selectively (Timmermans & Scholten, 2006: 1111; Entzinger & Scholten, 2015). In the 2000s, politicians only used scientific evidence that confirmed the supremacy on the new, more assimilationist model of integration. Reports emphasizing the qualities of other approaches, such as the previous multicultural model, were dismissed. For instance, WRR reports that went against the view of the political parties in charge were simply ignored (Timmermans & Scholten, 2006: 1111).

Shift in France

In France, a shift in the opposite direction was found around 2003, albeit more modest. Indeed, the French immigration policy, despite remaining highly selective, opened somewhat (Simon, 2003). Moreover, more efforts were made to counter discrimination against (children of) immigrants, which can be interpreted as a sign of recognition of the difference between groups in society.

In France, the *contrat d'accueil et d'integration (reception and integration contract)* introduced in 2003 and made mandatory in 2007 is a manifestation of the shift in integration

policies. Indeed, it states that even though immigrants still have some duties, such as respecting the laws and the norms of the French republic, the French state also has obligations regarding the integration immigrants (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2012). Indeed, the state needs to provide the immigrants signing the contract languages courses and easier access to social services through help from a tutor (Simon, 2003). Simon (2003) however argues that this plan is not new, and that since 1993, 20 000 immigrants already benefited from it. According to him, the plan was only enlarged in 2003. Reforms in the law also show a small departure from a strict and assimilationist integration policy.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The previous section discussed the literature about integration models. It presented the differences between the assimilationist integration model and the multicultural integration model. This thesis aims to determine which model is more effective in integrating immigrants. In the theoretical framework, the concept of policy effectiveness will first be explained. Then, this section will show how policy effectiveness can be tested through three different dimensions of integration.

Policy effectiveness

Different perspectives

Policy effectiveness can be defined as the degree to which policies (in this case formulated by the government) are effective in achieving the goals for which they are designed. This thesis will thus assess the degree to which integration policies are successful in integrating immigrants. France and the Netherlands had an opposite approach regarding integration during the 1980s and 1990s, despite being two countries with similarities on a number of other relevant criteria. For this reason, this comparison is useful in providing insights into policy effectiveness.

McConnell (2010: 31) distinguishes three perspectives on the nature of policy success: the foundationalist, the anti-foundationalist and the realist perspective. The foundationalist perspective sees policy success as an objectively measurable fact: a policy is either successful or unsuccessful. According to proponents of this view success is a fact and not an interpretation (MacConnell, 2010:32). The foundational argument in turn can be divided in a number of subcategories: instrumental or bureaucratic, outcomes-based and universal human values. The instrumental approach refers to the exact execution of previously set objectives. The outcome-based approach measures success according to the degree to which the policy manages to achieve the intended outcome. The universal human values approach refers to the degree to which the policy defends broader values (MacConnell, 2010:32).

The anti-foundationalist view supports the opposite: whether a policy is successful or not is a matter of perspective and there is no universal answer for everyone. There exists no objective instrument to measure the effectiveness of policy.

Finally, the realist perspective is a middle ground between these two perspectives: a policy can be effective according to some standards but not everyone might agree that these standards are the right ones to measure effectiveness.

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will in a first part use the foundationalist approach to policy success. Indeed, for methodological purposes, this thesis needs to use a method and an instrument to measure the effectiveness of integration model. More specifically, this thesis will use the outcome based approach. In this case, the outcome will be the degree of integration of immigrants (measured by indicators that will be given later in this section).

In the last section of this thesis, the possible limitations will be explained. In that section, the realist perspective will be used. Indeed, we define policy success according to the six sub hypotheses mentioned later. Nevertheless, integration is a multidimensional concept that encompasses a high number of indicators. An example of an indicator that will not be measured in this thesis is the degree to which the assimilationist model of integration leads to a feeling of resentment from the part of the (children of) immigrants towards the French state and society. Indeed, there seems to be a feeling of exclusion from some children of immigrants, who sometimes turn this feeling into criminality or rejection of the French norms and rules. Thus, it could be possible that the assimilationist model does lead to higher levels of employment among immigrants or to higher levels of exogamy, but at the same time creates more resentment. According to the realist perspective on policy effectiveness, the assimilationist model of integration could be more successful in integrating immigrants than the multicultural model if we measure it through the indicators mentioned later, but it might be less successful if we take resentment into account.

Different dimensions

In addition to distinguishing three perspectives on success, MacConnell (2010) also mentions three dimensions of policy success, which are reflected through the chronological stages of policy making. First, he mentions process success (MacConnell, 2010: 40). This dimension relates to “preserving policy goals and instruments”, “conferring legitimacy”, “building a sustainable coalition” and “symbolizing innovation and influence” (MacConnell, 2010: 46).

Second, he points out program success (MacConnell, 2010:45). Program success includes “meeting objectives”, “producing desired outcomes”, “creating benefit for target group” and “meeting policy domain criteria” (MacConnell, 2010: 46).

Third, he explains the dimension of political success (MacConnell, 2010: 49). Political success means secure future electoral prospects, “controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of governing” and “sustaining the broad values and direction of government” (MacConnell, 2010: 46).

This thesis will focus on program effectiveness. Indeed, it will not focus on the policy formulation and implementation stage. The data that will be used are policy documents. The thesis thus uses the end product of the policy formulating process.

Hypothesis

Now that it is clear what will be understood under the concept *policy effectiveness*, the following broad hypothesis can be formulated:

H: the assimilationist integration model is more effective in integrating immigrants than the multicultural model.

To answer this hypothesis, the term integration needs to be defined. This will be the subject of the following sub-section.

Integration

Integration can be defined as the degree to which an immigrant participates in the host society. Integration is a concept that can be divided into various dimensions. Usually, authors distinguish three dimensions of integration: structural integration, cultural integration and social integration (Safi, 2006: 13; Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic & De Vroome, 2015: 1837).

Structural integration

Structural integration can be defined as the degree to which the immigrant participates in the economic life in the host country (Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic & De Vroome, 2015:

1837). Indicators include the enrolment and position of immigrants in educational institutions and on the job market (Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic & De Vroome, 2015), as well as their concentration in specific neighborhoods (Dagevos, 2001: 85).

Participation in education and employment are important aspects of integration for various reasons. First, school is an important institution of socialization that will also help the immigrant in the process of social and cultural integration (Dagevos, 2001: 86; Roussier-Fusco, 2003: 30). The same is true for work (Safi, 2006: 13). Socialization means that people are adopting certain norms and values. Indeed, these institutions require the immigrant to adopt certain norms and values in order to be able to function properly in them. For instance, punctuality is a valued norm in western societies, especially at work. Having to be at work at a specific time each day pushes the immigrant to adopt the norm of punctuality. Also, other habits that might be acceptable in foreign countries, such as eating with the hands, or kissing rather than shaking hands, will be sanctioned more at work than if the immigrant stays at home with his peers. Finally, work usually enables the immigrant to come in contact with locals, which again fastens the process of adoption of the local customs.

Second, having a job gives the immigrant an income and enables him to participate in the consumer society. A satisfying income can also help immigrants to acquire better housing (Safi, 2006: 13), which in turn could help them to get out of the poorer areas and give them access to the better neighborhoods, where they will potentially be in contact with more locals, thus enhancing their social integration. Finally, employment is seen as an important component of integration because unemployment can enhance the chances of immigrants being marginalized, as was the case in the Netherlands at the end of the 1980s (Entzinger, 2014: 696).

Third, a high level of education makes it easier for an immigrant to find a job and acquire a higher socio-economic level. Indeed, research conducted by the OECD proves that higher education leads to better integration in the job market. This is mainly due to the knowledge of different languages and the knowledge of how to “gather and process information” (OECD, 2001: 95). For this reason, a high educational level enhances the chances of an immigrant to be well-integrated.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of structural integration.

As this section explained that structural integration is usually defined through employment and education, H1 can be split into three sub hypotheses:

H1a: the French participation rate of immigrants is relatively higher than the Dutch one.

H1b: the unemployment rate among immigrants is relatively higher in the Netherlands than in France.

H1c: the education level of immigrants is relatively higher in France than in the Netherlands.

Relatively refers to “relative to the nationals”. Indeed, what counts here is the position of immigrants compared to nationals. If we would simply measure unemployment levels of immigrants in both countries we might rather measure the economic conjuncture instead of the degree of integration of immigrants.

Structural integration could also be measured though other indicators, such as participation in the politics of the host nation or criminality (Scheffers, 2010). For reasons of time and resources, not all indicators could be taken into account in this thesis. For this reason, the research limits itself to the most relevant and easiest to measure aspects of integration.

Cultural integration

Cultural integration refers to the degree to which the immigrant has adopted the culture of the host society. It is usually measured through the assimilation of values (Dagevos, 2001: 7; Entzinger, 2014: 694) or through the language proficiency of immigrants in the language of the host country (Dagevos, 2001: 7; Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic & De Vroome, 2015).

Dagevos (2001) refers to cultural integration as “social-cultural integration” but this thesis will refer to cultural integration as it distinguishes social integration as a third dimension of integration. Another indicator for cultural integration is whether immigrants have been naturalized or not. Naturalization is sometimes viewed as the ultimate goal of assimilation (Entzinger, 1984: 202).

The assimilation of values is difficult to measure on a large scale. It first requires the definition of those national values. This is often a tricky part as not everyone agrees on what these values are and it is also possible that nationals do not even conform to these norms and values. It is even more difficult to compare the results of assimilation to values in two countries as it involves equivalence issues that are not easily overcome. For this reason, this thesis will only test the influence of integration models on language proficiency and rates of naturalization.

Hence, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H2: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of cultural integration.

This hypothesis can be divided in two sub hypotheses:

H2a: immigrants in France speak better French than immigrants in the Netherlands speak Dutch.

A possible point of critique about the case selection is that an important number of immigrants arriving in France already speak French. This is mainly a result of the vast colonial legacy of France. French is still the official language in a number of African countries, most of them in West Africa. It is also spoken in some countries of Asia and the Middle East, such as Lebanon. For this reason, if the hypothesis H2a is confirmed, the issue just mentioned will bring important limitations to the validity of the result. Nevertheless, the “comparative advantage” of immigrants living in France can also be found back in the Netherlands. Indeed, an important number of immigrants to the Netherlands come from Surinam of the Antilles, countries in which Dutch is a principal language.

The second sub hypothesis is the following:

H2b: the naturalization rate of immigrants in France is higher than in the Netherlands.

Social integration

Social integration refers to the degree of participation in the social life of the host country (Di Saint Pierre, Martinovic & De Vroome, 2015: 1838). It is measured through the amount of interactions an immigrant has with the local population during his or her free time (Dagevos, 2001: 15; Safi, 2006: 13). This is again important for the adoption of norms and values and is thus linked to cultural integration.

Social interaction can be measured through surveys by asking immigrants whether they have local friends or how they would react whether their children had a relationship with a French or Dutch person (Dagevos, 2001: 15-16). Unfortunately, no database which compares social integration of immigrants in France and in the Netherlands according to this definition of social integration was available. More generally, social interaction is difficult to measure. Indeed, it is difficult to determine who counts as a friend and what counts as a social interaction. Moreover, it is problematic to determine if a social interaction is positive or negative. For instance, discrimination, such as insults from a native citizen, could be counted as social interactions and yet, they probably do not contribute to integration and rather alienate the immigrant from the host society.

Safi (2006, 13) proposes other ways to measure social integration, for instance through exogamy or an ethnic mix in contacts, in housing and at work.

Exogamy is easier to measure, and is considered as an important indicator of social integration (Safi, 2008 :269; Qian & Lichter, 2001: 290). Indeed, marrying a citizen from the host society can be seen as a form of social integration. There is usually no closer contact with someone from the host society as when an immigrant is married to a native. Moreover, mixed marriages lead to descent from mixed origin, which from a biological point of view means that immigrant populations will be integrated (Safi, 2008: 270). An example is the melting pot that resulted from the intermarriages of European immigrants in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century with different national and ethnic backgrounds. By intermarrying and having children from mixed origin, the European immigrants managed to integrate very well in the American society and create a homogeneous group of white Americans (Safi, 2008: 270). However, this homogeneity and distinction as white Americans was also facilitated by the arrival of immigrants from other ethnic groups from which the white Americans could distinguish themselves (Safi, 2008: 271). Moreover, Safi (2008: 271) mentions that a lot of counter examples exist, such as the Irish and Jewish communities in the United States, which despite have a high rate of endogamy are yet well-integrated in the American society. Similarly, the black Caribbean populations in the United Kingdom have high levels of exogamy and are still not well-integrated economically. This limitation will be

countered by the fact that different dimensions of integration will be combined in order to assess the effectiveness of integration models in integrating immigrants.

Hence, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H3: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of social integration.

The hypothesis is specified as follows:

H3a: the rate of exogamy among immigrants is higher in France than in the Netherlands

Link between the integration models

The previous subsection has distinguished between structural, cultural and social integration. In practice however, these dimensions are linked. As mentioned earlier, structural integration through high participation rates can help the immigrant to be more in contact with natives and thus favor social integration. Similarly, cultural integration, especially in the form of good language proficiency, gives the immigrant better chances of finding a job and thus to be structurally integrated.

According to some authors, social and cultural integration are prerequisites for structural integration (Dagevos, 2001: 137). However, others disagree and believe that self-exclusion can sometimes lead to better structural integration (Dagevos, 2001: 137). More generally, it is often difficult to determine which dimension of integration leads to the other.

For this reason, the different hypotheses should not be interpreted as measuring something fundamentally different but rather giving different indicators of the same concept. This thesis formulated six sub hypotheses in order to test the main hypothesis (*H= the assimilationist integration model is more effective in integrating immigrants than the multicultural model*) through different databases and thus enhance the strength of the result.

This section defined the concepts of policy effectiveness and integration. The next section will explain which method will be used to answer the research question and which data will be used to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses.

DATA AND METHODS

The previous section defined the concepts that will be used in this thesis: integration and effectiveness of policy. It also put forward the three hypotheses and six sub hypotheses that this thesis will attempt to answer. This section will explain which methods and data will be used to answer these hypotheses.

Most Similar Systems Design

The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) is a commonly used method in comparative research. It enables to test the explanatory power of one specific variable (Toshkov, 2016). By keeping all other relevant variables constant, variation in the outcome can be explained by variation in the only variable than is not held constant (Babb, 2012: 419).

The cases of France and the Netherlands are well suited to compare integration policies through a MSSD. Indeed, these two countries are quite similar on relevant variables such as population and culture. To clarify why these two countries have been chosen, the table for MSSD of Toshkov (2016: 6) has been applied to this case selection:

Variable	Case 1 (France)	Case 2 (Netherlands)
Main explanatory variable: integration model	Assimilationist	Multicultural
Possible confounding variable 1: immigration country	Yes	Yes
Possible confounding variable 2: level of development (The World Bank, 2016)	GDP/ capita in 2014: 42,725.7 (high income)	GDP/ capita in 2014: 52,138.7 (high income)
Possible confounding variable 3: culture	Western liberal (Christian) democracy	Western liberal (Christian) democracy
Outcome: degree of integration of immigrants	Unknown	Unknown

To make this case suited for MSSD, the time frame that will be used are the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, during this period, the integration model of France was assimilationist while the Dutch model was multicultural. At the turn of the century, both integration models changed and started to converge somewhat. Thus, the main explanatory variable wouldn't differ enough which explains why the current integration models were not chosen for this thesis. Moreover, the effect of integration models is not always immediately visible. A more objective assessment of the effects of integration models is usually visible only after some years.

Nevertheless, there exist a number of limitations to this research design. In social sciences, it is almost impossible to have a perfect MSSD. It would require two countries to be absolutely identical except for one variable. This is impossible to find. I believe that France and the Netherlands share a number of *relevant* confounding variables and that these countries are thus suited for a MSSD. However, some variables on which the countries differ might also play a role in the success of integration policies and are thus limitations to the possibility for generalization of this thesis. Such variables are demographics (total population, density of population, median age...) or political culture (confrontational versus consensual). The most problematic variable is that of language. Indeed, the likelihood of immigrants speaking French before immigrating is probably higher than the likelihood of immigrant speaking Dutch. This is mainly due to the colonial past of France. However, many immigrants to the Netherlands already speak some Dutch as it is a common language in Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, where an important numbers of immigrants come from.

Part one: Discourse analysis

The first step to assess the effects of different integration policies is to determine which integration model France and the Netherlands had during the 1980s and 1990s. In the academic literature, there seems to be a consensus that the French integration model used to be assimilationist while the Dutch integration model was multicultural. However, this has to be determined through an academic analysis of policy documents.

To analyze policy documents, two methods are often used by academics: content analysis and discourse analysis. Babb (2012: 201) defines content analysis as “the systematic counting, assessing and interpreting of the form and substance of communication”. Burnham

(2008: 259) distinguishes between two methods for conducting content analysis: a qualitative method and a quantitative method. The quantitative method is more objective and makes the research replicable (Burnham, 2008: 259). However, it does not take context into account, as it only counts the number of times a word or theme appears in the documents (Burnham, 2008: 264). The qualitative method in contrast pays more attention to the context in which concepts are mentioned and the importance that is given to them.

Discourse analysis also has a number of subcategories. Babb (2012, 356) distinguishes between functional discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. Functional discourse analysis is closer to the qualitative version content analysis. This method seems the most appropriate for this thesis. In the case of integration models it is important to take the context into account and to pay attention to which concepts are linked to each other. However, there needs to be a balance between objectivity and the possibility for interpretation, which is why critical discourse analysis is not suited for this thesis.

The first document that will be analyzed following the functional discourse analysis method is the *Minderhedennota* from 1983. The *minderhedennota 1983* is a relevant document for a number of reasons. First, because the date of publishing suits the aim of this thesis. Indeed, it was published at the beginning of the period that this thesis attempts to investigate. It can thus be considered as a trendsetting document for the integration policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, it deals with most of the concepts this thesis is interested in, namely education and employment.

The second document is the first annual report to the prime minister from the High Council for Integration. This report dates from 1991 and is thus a good reflection of the integration model of France in the 1980s and 1990s.

In the Dutch policy document this thesis will look for characteristics of the multicultural model. These characteristics include: emphasis on the rights of immigrants, supremacy of individual freedom (examples are freedom of religion, freedom to maintain one's culture, freedom to speak one's language or freedom to set up one's own schools), efforts to accommodate immigrants (such as teaching in mother tongue, financial help with housing, access to employment or other forms of integration), and right of representation for immigrants.

In the French policy document in contrast I would expect emphasis on the duties of immigrants (such as the duty to learn the language and adopt or abandon certain cultural practices), the reference to a single French identity, the emphasis on the responsibility of the immigrant to assimilate to this identity and the existence of sanctions if the immigrant refuses to do so.

During the data analysis process, the table below will be used to sum up the quotes that are relevant for each section. Each country will have two columns so that quotes contradicting the hypotheses can also be gathered. This will make the research falsifiable. My hypotheses for this part of the thesis are:

H4: the French integration model in the 1980s and the 1990s was assimilationist

H5: the Dutch integration model in the 1980s and the 1990s was multicultural.

I thus expect that the green columns will be fuller with quotes than the blank ones.

	France		Netherlands	
Model	Assimilationist Quote: “”	Challenges to the model	Multicultural	Challenges to the model
Recognition of cultural difference	No	Yes	Yes	No
Obligations or rights (for the immigrants)	Obligations	Rights	Rights	obligations
Representation	No	Yes	Yes	No

According to Babb (2012: 2012), content analysis is a relevant method but should be understood in a particular context. For this reason, it is better used in a multimethod design. This will be the approach used in this thesis, as content analysis is used as a way to prove what is commonly agreed on by academics about the integration model of France and the Netherlands.

Part two: statistical comparison of integration of immigrants

In the literature review, three forms of integration have been discussed: structural integration, cultural integration and social integration.

To test these hypotheses, one database from the OECD will be used. The OECD is usually seen as an objective and reliable source of data. The advantage for this thesis is that one source for both countries will be used. This way, problems of comparability and difference in definitions are limited, although they cannot be ruled out completely (OECD, 2001: 94).

A second advantage of this database is that it contains data from 1999 to 2001. This time frame is important as these years mark the departure from the traditional integration models of both France and the Netherlands. Thus, by analyzing numbers from these years, we can evaluate the effectiveness of integration policies *before* 2001.

For H2a and H3a, the hypotheses related to language proficiency and exogamy, no data from the OECD or other international organizations was sufficient to test the hypotheses. For these hypotheses, data from national sources had to be used. This makes the data somewhat less comparable than the data of the OECD but the results contribute to a complete answer of the main hypothesis. As it enables to take other dimensions of integration into account, it is still a valuable comparison.

The next part will explain which data sources will be used for each sub hypothesis.

H1: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of structural integration.

Employment and education are indicators of structural integration. Thus, structural integration will be measured through the employment rate of immigrants or their education level. It is important not only to compare the employment and education level of immigrants in France and immigrants in the Netherlands, but also to compare the figures of both groups to the employment and education figures of the native population.

H1 can be split into three subcategories:

H1a: the French participation rate of immigrants is higher than the Dutch one.

Data that will be used: *Trends in international migration 2001 (OECD)*

Table I. 14: Participation rate and unemployment rate of nationals and foreigners by sex in selected OECD countries 1999-2000 average (p. 55)

H1b: the unemployment rate among immigrants is higher in the Netherlands than in France.

Data that will be used: Trends in international migration 2001 (OECD)

Table I. 14: Participation rate and unemployment rate of nationals and foreigners by sex in selected OECD countries 1999-2000 average (p. 55)

Chart i.12 proportion of foreigners in total unemployment relative to their share in the labor force 1999-2000 average (p.61)

H1c: the education rate of immigrants in France is higher than in the Netherlands.

Data that will be used: Trends in international migration 2001 (OECD)

Table I.11. foreign and national adult population classified by level of education in selected OECD countries, 1999-2000 average, percentages (p. 42)

H2: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of cultural integration.

Cultural integration is usually measured through language proficiency. Databases on language proficiency of immigrants will determine whether this hypothesis is true. Another indicator for cultural integration is whether immigrants have been naturalized or not. Naturalization is sometimes viewed as the ultimate goal of assimilation.

Thus, H2 can be divided in 2 sub-hypotheses:

H2a: immigrants in France speak better French than immigrants in the Netherlands speak Dutch

Data that will be used: Rapportage minderheden 2003

Tabel 3.3 Beheersing en gebruik van het Nederlands, naar etnische groep, 2002 (p.54)

Fiches thématiques (INSEE)

3-maitrise de la langue française (p. 91)

H2b: the naturalization rate of immigrants in France is higher than in the Netherlands

Data that will be used: Trends in international migration 2001 (OECD)

Table a.1.6. Acquisition of nationality in selected OECD countries (p.283)

Eurostat (2016)

“Acquisition of citizenship by sex, age group and former citizenship”

H3: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of social integration

H3a: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of exogamy among immigrants

Data that will be used: Trends in international migration 2001 (p. 166)

Huwen en partnershipsregistraties; kerncijfers (CBS)

Possible points of critique:

Even though this method design incorporates various dimensions of integration and makes use of reliable data, a number of problems may exist.

First, measuring the education level of immigrants is different than measuring their enrolment rate in education. However, measuring the enrolment rate of immigrants, especially in higher education, does not necessarily measure the integration level of immigrants already present in France or in the Netherlands. Indeed, data on the presence of immigrants in higher education points rather to student migration. Student migration refers to the phenomenon that students migrate for the only purpose of studying and return to their country of origin once they obtain their degree. Student migration is thus different from the dynamic that this thesis wants to measure, being immigrant integration. It is difficult to exclude the phenomenon of student migration when studying the level of enrolment of immigrants in education. For this reason, it seemed more relevant to measure the educational level of immigrants even if they did not acquire their degree in the host country.

Second, some databases only list a particular subset of immigrants, such as the *Rapportage minderheden*. Moreover, the fact that immigrants from Surinam and the Antilles seem to speak better Dutch is mostly due to the fact that Dutch is a commonly spoken language in Surinam and in the Dutch west indies. However, this is probably also true for immigrants in France.

Third, sometimes, the selected years are not the same for both countries. For instance, the database on naturalization rates takes data from the Netherlands from 2001 and data from France from 1999. However, these dates can be considered as close enough to offer a reliable comparison.

DATA ANALYSIS

Policy document Netherlands

To analyze the *minderhedennota*, the method of discourse analysis, as explained in the section about methods, has been applied. The table listing the quotes from the policy document can be found in the Annex. Only the summary has been research in this thesis. This is due mainly to the time-consuming character of discourse analysis. Only a note on the teaching in the immigrants' own language and on government spending has been added from the first chapter of the *minderhedennota* in order to enhance the strength of the argument.

Before writing the results of the analysis, it is important to mention that some quotes were not as easy to classify as the table would suggest. Indeed, some quotes could have been placed in more than one box. For instance, the translation of important documents in the mother languages of immigrants can be seen as a recognition of cultural differences, but it could also be seen as a right to adequate information. In ambiguous cases, the quotes were put in the category that seemed the most relevant.

Recognition and acceptance of cultural differences

Language and cultural background

The first aspect in which the *minderhedennota* recognizes and accepts cultural differences is in the acceptance that immigrants do not (yet) speak Dutch. This can be seen through the fact that the Dutch government publishes information regarding integration procedures, business startup (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 180) and justice (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 183) in other languages than Dutch.

From an assimilationist perspective, it might seem controversial that someone who would like to start a business in the Netherlands does not speak Dutch, and that the government nor the immigrant seem to perceive that as a barrier. This is similar to the adjustment made in hiring practices to fit the cultural background of immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 181) or to positive discrimination towards immigrants in the job market (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 180).

Religion

A second aspect that demonstrates the Dutch government's acceptance of cultural differences is the room left for non-Christian religious practices. For instance, the government advocates for "the removal of barriers to religious obligations where possible" by for instance allowing the felling according to Muslim practices and respecting Hindu and Muslim funeral rituals (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 186). The *minderhedennota* does however state that the practice of religion has to respect the principle of division between the state and religion (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 186).

Provisions for religious practices also have to be available in prisons (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 183). Moreover, extra attention for schooling and mental assistance has to be provided to immigrants in prisons (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 183).

Health services

Likewise, in the health services, the *minderhedennota* recognizes the need to take into account cultural differences. This expresses itself for instance through the need for translators free of charge or for subsidized programs that pay attention to the needs of immigrants in the health sector (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182). However, some of the provisions, such as the fact that drug addicts should find support within their own communities (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182), could be interpreted as favoring segregation. This conforms to the claim made by Bertossi (2011, 1567) that multiculturalism can lead to segregation.

Police

The police is required to take "the multicultural character of society into account" when conducting their work (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182).

Social institutions

Finally, the Dutch state wants to promote reconciliation and good relations between immigrants and natives, through promoting the activities of social institutions (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 184) and raising awareness and providing information to both groups about each other with the aim to promote tolerance (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 185).

Rights

Intercultural teaching

Intercultural teaching includes teaching in the own language of immigrants and the allocation of extra resources to (children of) immigrants if they found themselves in a situation of arrears (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 176).

The *minderhedennota* considers it a right for children of immigrants to attain classes in their mother tongue. As it is considered a right, it will be the responsibility of the Dutch state to provide these classes to the children of immigrants. Moreover, the Dutch state believes it has to recruit teachers abroad- especially in Turkey and in Morocco- to ensure the quality of these classes (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 27). The Dutch state also wants to promote the purchase of books in the mother tongue of immigrants by libraries (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 189).

Another sign that the government takes the educational background of immigrants into account can be found in the effort made in comparing diplomas from different countries (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 181).

Intercultural teaching also finds a place in prisons, where staff is encouraged to learn a foreign language while inmates are encouraged to learn Dutch (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 183). This can be seen as encouraging mutual adaptation.

Freedom from discrimination

The *minderhedennota* refers to the need for immigrants to be free from discrimination (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 175, 183-184, 184). This has to be applied by the police (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182) and in the housing policy (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 179). Freedom from discrimination refers to a right immigrants enjoy. It also means they have to be treated equally with natives.

The *minderhedennota* advocates for the creation of an office that will defend the rights of immigrants who are discriminated (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 185). The fight against discrimination itself is not specifically a characteristic of the multicultural model. It is rather the importance that is given to it and the fact that the state creates and finances institutions against discrimination itself that can be seen as a component of the multicultural model. Indeed, emphasis on the respect for others rather than on the duty to integrate can be seen as a multicultural characteristic.

Finally, the *minderhedennota* emphasizes the need to respect international treaties aimed at banning racial discrimination (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 194).

Housing

The policy regarding housing can be seen as multicultural as it emphasizes the need to reduce the arrears of immigrants in this area. However, the *minderhedennota* advocates for a less active policy than in other areas such as education. While in education, minorities are granted the right to their own programs and facilities, when it comes housing the *minderhedennota* advocates a more neutral and anti-discriminatory policy. Indeed, it states that policies regarding housing for immigrants should take place within the same framework as those regarding housing for the disadvantaged natives (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 177). The nota also states that every applicant should be treated equally when applying for housing. This means that discrimination, positive or negative, is not tolerated (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 177). Only refugees are granted positive discrimination during the allocation of housing (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 177-178). In other areas, such as education, positive discrimination for immigrants in general is sometimes used. For this reason, it could be stated that housing is the domain in which the *minderhedennota* reflects the least the multicultural model of integration.

Emphasis on the well-being of the immigrant

The *minderhedennota* puts a lot of emphasis on the well-being of the immigrant. This is obvious through the frequent use of words such as “emancipatie” ([emancipation], 78 times throughout the whole text, twice p. 175, twice p. 185, three times p. 186, twice p. 187, eight times p. 188, p. 193), “emanciperen” ([to emancipate], Tweede Kamer, 1983: 175) and “ontplooing” ([unfolding], three times p. 175, p.180).

Allocation of resources

This document shows that a lot of public money is going to be allocated to the integration of immigrants. Thus, it seems that the Dutch state sees itself as responsible for the integration of immigrants. This is very clear in the application of the teaching in the immigrants’ own language. Other examples are the “Rijksregeling welzijn minderheden” (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182), “Tijdelijke bijdrageregeling” (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 193) and subsidies for research concerning the minorities policies (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 193).

Finally, the importance of integration policies in the Netherlands in the 1980s appears through the fact that even though the government cut spending in an important number of areas, the minority policy remained exempted from these savings (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 13). This shows the importance the Dutch government gives to integration policies and could be

seen as a recognition of the fact that successful integration of immigrants is considered as being a task of the state.

Representation

Politics

The *minderhedennota* emphasizes the need that immigrants are heard in politics. For instance, immigrants with a non-Dutch nationality should be able to vote in local elections from 1986 (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 187). The nota also states that immigrants should be able to influence the policy making process on issues concerning them (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 186, 192). The nota advocates for the creation of advisory bodies that could give advice to the government about issues concerning immigrants, even when the government does not explicitly asks for their advice (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 187).

Media

Besides being represented in politics, the *minderhedennota* also emphasizes the need of the different groups of immigrants to be represented in the media (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 186). This is linked to the idea that there are many cultural differences between immigrants and natives and between immigrants themselves.

The nota also demand more facilities where immigrants can expose their art (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 186). In addition, the *Nederlandse Omroep Stichting* (a Dutch public television channel) will provide more airtime for programs destined to immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 186)

Police

According to the *minderhedennota*, effort to recruit members of ethnic minorities to the police should be promoted (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182). The nota also argue that probation agencies should be better adapted to the needs of immigrants by for instance, hiring staff who knows and understand immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 182).

Immigrant organizations

Organizations which promote the rights of immigrants will receive funding from the state (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 185-186).

Criticisms of multiculturalism

In the summary, there don't seem to be many points that could be seen as contradictory to the multicultural approach. Indeed, the column on "challenges to the model" (Annex) is almost empty. In other parts of the text - which have not been analyzed completely for reasons of time - there are a couple of remarks suggesting that immigrants also have a responsibility to integrate (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 11).

The only topic on which the *minderhedennota* seems a bit less open and multicultural is the restriction on immigration (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 190) and the restriction on immigration after emigration (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 191-192). However, the authors of the *minderhedennota* explain that the reason of these restrictions is the aim to integrate current immigrants better (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 190).

Conclusion

It can be concluded quite easily that the *minderhedennota* reflect a multicultural integration policy. Indeed, cultural differences are accepted, immigrants have a number of financial and cultural rights, and they are represented in politics, the media, the police, and have their own organizations. Moreover, the state allocates quite a lot of resources to integration policies, meaning that the Dutch state considers itself as responsible for the integration of immigrants. This is concordant with the claim of Molleman (2006: 66) who mentions that in the beginning of the 1980s, the integration policy already cost 600 million of guilders while the country was in financially challenging times.

Policy document France

The first report of the High Council for Integration is of a different nature than the *minderhedennota*. Indeed, the *minderhedennota* is a proper policy document. The first report of the High Council for Integration is rather an advisory document. Even though this document is an advisory document, and not a policy document emanating directly from the government - such as the *minderhedennota* - it is comparable to the *minderhedennota*. First, because it is descriptive of the French integration model. The descriptive part and the advisory part are quite clearly separated which enables to make an objective assessment of the French integration model of the 1980s-1990s. Second, because even the policy advisory components point rather to a continuation of the current policy. This can be stated from the following quote:

“La politique française d’intégration se fonde sur des principes et des dispositions juridiques fondamentales que le Haut Conseil estime dangereux de modifier de façon substantielle dans les circonstances présentes, qui sont marquées par des débats passionnés, et une insuffisante information et préparation de l’opinion publique” (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 1991: 52). [The French integration policy is based on principles and fundamental judicial dispositions that the High Council estimates dangerous to substantially modify in the present circumstances, that are marked by passionate debates, and an insufficient information and preparation of public opinion]

This means that the High Council’s view stands quite close to the actual integration policy. Moreover, the High Council executes a mission that has been given to it by the first minister (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 1991: 59), which is a proof of its proximity with the government.

For these reasons, the first report of the High Council for Integration is suited to test the hypothesis whether the French integration model of the 1980s-1990s was indeed assimilationist.

Recognition and acceptance of cultural differences

Recognition of differences

The High Council for Integration recognizes the existence of different cultures in the French society. Some quotes in the text seem to refer to this as something positive. The term “brassage des populations” [melting pot] (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 1991: 27, 28, 39, 51 and 52) is mentioned several times and could be interpreted as a positive stance toward the mixing of cultures. Another example is the recognition that cultural differences can lead to an

enrichment of the French society (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 13 and 18). However, it is unclear what the term “brassage” exactly refers to. Moreover, other quotes (which will be referred to later) point to the importance of the respect for the French identity.

Similarly to the Dutch perspective, the French model recognizes differences among immigrants (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 15-16). However, while the Dutch model differentiates rather between nationalities, the French model emphasizes the difference of status between immigrants. Indeed, it distinguishes mainly between foreigners, immigrants, and persons with an immigrant origin (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 15-16).

French identity

Even though the report recognizes cultural differences between nationals and immigrants, and sometimes refers to this as a something positive, it also makes allusions to a fixed French identity.

Even though the “French identity” (or “national identity”) is not explicitly defined in this document, it is mentioned several times (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 52 and 53). In this aspect, this report differs from the *minderhedennota*. Indeed, the *minderhedennota* does not mention the existence of a specific Dutch identity.

This document recognizes the value of cultural differences but it emphasized that integration can only be successful if the immigrants adopt the French norms and values, sometimes called the “rules” of the society (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 18). Again, the document fails to formulate these norms and rules explicitly.

Moreover, the document seems to allude to the supremacy of the French identity, for instance by mentioning that becoming “français comme les autres” [“French like all others”] is a positive development (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 19).

Finally, the acquisition of the French nationality is mentioned as facilitating integration (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 19, 27 and 52).

Cultural difference as a barrier to integration

Although the High Council for Integration sometimes refers to cultural differences as an enrichment of the French culture, it also mentions that it could be harmful for integration. This is implied when keeping an original lifestyle might be a factor leading to poorer integration (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 17). The geographical concentration of immigrants is also seen as slowing down integration (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 47

and 64). Foreign children are not expected to integrate if they don't interact with French children. Finally, the Council states that the existence of cultural differences requires more efforts of integration (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 51).

Laïcité

The principle of laïcité is a recurrent theme in French politics. Laïcité refers to the separation of state and religion. The principle of laïcité is emphasized through the use of words such as "secular" (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 14 and 52).

Laïcité, and more precisely the application thereof, is an aspect in which the French integration model of the 1980s and 1990s differs fundamentally from the Dutch model. Indeed, where the Dutch state would finance Muslim and Hindu schools, this would be unthinkable in France.

No politics of the minorities

An important element to acknowledge is that the document mentions explicitly that the French approach to integration is fundamentally different than the Dutch approach, especially for its refusal to adopt a policy of the minorities (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 19).

In sum

The first report of the High Council for Integration shows that the French government recognizes the existence of cultural differences between immigrants and nationals. While it sometimes refers to it as an enrichment, it is often seen as a barrier to integration. For this reason, it can be asserted that the French government in the 1980s-1990s recognized cultural differences but refused to accept them.

Rights

Financial rights

One form of financial rights accorded to immigrants is social security. Examples are health care costs related to elderly, handicap, pregnancy and work related accidents (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 65). According financial rights to immigrants is seen by the Council as morally correct. Indeed, immigrants are seen as having contributed positively to the French economy (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 12).

Another reason why financial rights are provided to the immigrants is because of the principle of territoriality. This principle includes that every person living in France is entitled

to the same rights in terms of social security (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 65). Some rights depend however on the principle of reciprocity: French citizens abroad should also be entitled to social security in the country in which they live (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 65).

For these reasons, immigrants are entitled to the same financial rights as French citizens. In some cases this is even extended to illegal immigrants. For instance, residential permits are not requested for the inscriptions at school (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 22), and medical care is provided for illegal immigrants (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 66), as well as other forms of social aid (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 67).

The Council recognizes that even though the municipalities give attention to immigrants' problems, most of this role is taken up by associations (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 21).

Financial rights translate for instance through the right to adequate housing. The Council suggests that housing for immigrants should be renovated but that no more funds should be allocated to it than to other housing subsidies (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 64). In practice however, housing for immigrants is often poorly maintained (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 22).

Some limits nevertheless had to be imposed in order to avoid abuse. For instance, the *Revenu Minimal d'Insertion* (Minimum Insertion Revenue) is only granted to foreigners who have lived in France for at least three years (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 66). Other conditions also have to be fulfilled in order to access to some types of health care such as home care or elderly care (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 66).

Finally, social mobility among immigrants in France seems to be quite high. Indeed, 80% of white collars children of immigrants had a blue collar father (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 43).

Cultural rights

Although the French integration model grants the same financial right to immigrant as to nationals, immigrants are limited in their demands for cultural rights. This is often linked to the principle of *laïcité*. The reasons for the denial of those rights were already mentioned above: cultural difference is often seen as a barrier to integration. Thus, immigrants living in

France have fewer rights than immigrants in the Netherlands, especially when it comes to the acceptance and institutionalization of their religious practices.

Civic rights

Immigrants in France seem to have fewer civic rights than immigrants in the Netherlands. Indeed, in France, civic rights are only fully granted through the acquisition of the French nationality (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 53). This is probably why the acquisition of the French nationality is so often referred to as an instrument to facilitate integration.

An aspect in which the French integration model seems stricter than the Dutch one is that it seems to have a more restrictive immigration procedure. Indeed the document claims that 72% of asylum demands had been rejected in 1989 (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 35). This is similar to the emphasis put on border control (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 53 and 55). However, these are just the figures for one specific year and data is missing for the Netherlands. It is thus not possible to make a relevant comparison. What is important to mention is that the limitation of entries is not justified with the same arguments in France as in the Netherlands. While in the Netherlands, the argument used is that the situation for immigrants currently and legally staying in the Netherlands should be prioritized (see analysis *minderhedennota*), the French document refers rather to the high costs for social security in accepting all these refugees (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 55). However, it does mention its intention of providing the accepted refugees with a more humane asylum procedure (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991:56).

Moreover, the High Council mentions several times the harmful consequences of the “effet d'appel” (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: twice p.56), referring to the pull factor that illegal immigration and family reunification can play.

Another point on which the French integration policy differs from the Dutch one is its stance towards local elections. Foreigners are not granted the right to vote in local election as they do not possess the French nationality (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 53).

However, the High Council mentions once that immigrants have a say in the integration policies concerning them (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 52).

Thus, the French integration model corresponds to the assimilationist integration model by not denying immigrants most financial or material rights but by limiting their cultural and civic rights.

Responsibility for integration:

This document seems to recognize the responsibility of the French state in integrating immigrants. First, it mentions explicitly that integration involves state responsibility (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 54). Second, it wants to achieve the goal of social harmony (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 14). In this aspect, the High Council for Integration meets the position of the *minderhedennota*.

Similarities with the *minderhedennota*:

Some of the differences or similarities with the *minderhedennota* have already been discussed throughout the analysis. This section will present some additional points one which the two documents are similar.

First, both documents agree on the need to coordinate different ministries and other actors from the civil society (p.54).

Second, both documents emphasize the importance of information provision (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 58). The High Council recognizes the importance of information provision for the aim of developing an adequate integration policy, comparing the French integration policy with the integration policies of other European countries and comparing different categories of immigrants (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1991: 59). The *minderhedennota* also referred to information provision as an important aspect, although it was more with the aim to avoid discrimination and stereotypes and promote tolerance between natives and immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 1983: 185).

Conclusion

The first report of the High Council for Integration reflects the rather assimilationist integration model of France. Indeed, it is less accepting of cultural differences than the Dutch model and it does not give too many civic rights to immigrants. Moreover, it does not mention

extensively the possibility for immigrants to be represented in politics. However, this document is less explicit in qualifying the French integration model as assimilationist than the Dutch *minderhedennota* in qualifying the Dutch model as multicultural. This could be due to the fact that the term assimilation may have a pejorative connotation for many individuals. In contrast, the word multiculturalism is usually viewed positively and is thus easier to defend openly.

Conclusion of the document analysis

The *minderhedennota* and the first report of the High Council for Integration were useful in answering H4 and H5:

H4: the French integration model in the 1980s and the 1990s was assimilationist

H5: the Dutch integration model in the 1980s and the 1990s was multicultural.

It can be said without a doubt that H5 is confirmed. Little in the *minderhedennota* disconfirms the hypothesis that the Dutch integration model of the 1980s and the 1990s was multicultural. The evidence confirming H4 is less strong, but it can still be stated that the French integration model of the 190s-1990s was assimilationist. With the proof that the integration model of both countries differed, the thesis will now turn to the statistical analysis.

Statistical comparison

Structural integration

H1: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of structural integration.

H1a: the French participation rate of immigrants is relatively higher than the Dutch one.

Table I. 14: Participation rate and unemployment rate of nationals and foreigners by sex in selected OECD countries 1999-2000 average

	Participation rate			
	Men		Women	
	National	Foreigner	National	Foreigner
FR	75.6	76.4	63.5	48.5
NL	84.8	67.2	66.4	44.6

Source: OECD Trends in International Migration 2001 (p.55)

In France, the participation rate of foreign men is slightly higher (+0.8 percentage points) than the participation rate of national men. In the Netherlands, the participation rate of foreign men is nearly 1.26 times lower than the participation rate of national men.

In France, the participation rate of foreign women is nearly 1.31 times lower than nationals. In the Netherlands, the participation rate of foreign women is nearly 1.49 times lower than nationals.

For both men and women, the participation rate of foreigners is absolutely and relatively lower in the Netherlands than in France. The difference is more significant for men than for women. Hence, H1a is confirmed.

H1b: the unemployment rate among immigrants is relatively higher in the Netherlands than in France.

Table I. 14: Participation rate and unemployment rate of nationals and foreigners by sex in selected OECD countries 1999-2000 average

	Unemployment rate			
	Men		Women	
	National	Foreigner	National	Foreigner
FR	8.7	19.7	12.5	25.7
NL	2.2	7.7	3.9	10.5

Source: OECD: Trends in International Migration 2001 (p.55)

In France, the unemployment rate of foreign men is nearly 2.26 times higher than the unemployment rate of nationals.


In the Netherlands, the unemployment rate of foreign men is 3.5 times higher than the unemployment rate of nationals.

In France, the unemployment rate of foreign women is nearly 2.06 times higher than the unemployment rate of nationals.

In the Netherlands, the unemployment rate of foreign women s is nearly 2.69 times higher than the unemployment rate of nationals.

For both men and women, the unemployment rate of foreigners is relatively higher in the Netherlands than in France. Hence, H1b is confirmed.

Chart I.12 proportion of foreigners in total unemployment relative to their share in the labor force 1999-2000 average



Note: Foreign-born population for Australia, Canada, Hungary and the United States. August 1999 for Australia; 1996 for Canada; March 1998 for the United States; 1999 for Hungary and 1998 for the Slovak Republic.
Sources: Labour force surveys (Eurostat and Australian Bureau of Statistics); 1996 Census (Statistics Canada); Current population survey (US Bureau of the Census).

Source: OECD: Trends in International Migration 2001 (p.61)

On average in France between 1999 and 2000, foreigners represented almost (or less than) 2% of total unemployment.

On average in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2000, foreigners represented around 2.75% of total unemployment. In the Netherlands, the share of immigrants in total unemployment was the highest of the selected countries. Hence, H1b is confirmed.

H1c: the educational level of foreigners in France is higher than the education level of foreigners in the Netherlands.

Table I.11. Foreign and national adult population classified by level of education in selected OECD countries, 1999-2000 average, percentages

	Lower secondary		Upper secondary		Third level	
	Foreigners	Nationals	Foreigners	Nationals	Foreigners	Nationals
France	66.4	36.2	19.7	42.0	13.9	21.8
Netherlands	50.2	33.8	28.2	42.3	21.6	23.9

Source: OECD: Trends in international migration 2001 (p.42)

The education level of foreigners in the Netherlands is higher than the education level of foreigners in France. Indeed, in the Netherlands, 49.8% of foreigners have a degree from the upper secondary or from third level education while in France, this percentage is only 33.6%

Moreover, the difference of education level between nationals and foreigners is smaller in the Netherlands than in France. Indeed, in the Netherlands, nationals have nearly 1.15 times more chance to have a degree from third level education while in France, nationals are nearly 1.7 times more likely to have a degree from a third level education. Hence, H1c is disconfirmed.

However, these findings could also be caused by the fact that the Dutch government only allows for high skilled migration. Or, it could show that immigrants in the Netherlands are even less well integrated because despite their higher level of education, they are still overrepresented in unemployment.

Cultural integration

H2: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of cultural integration.

Cultural integration is usually measured through language proficiency. Databases on language proficiency of immigrants will determine whether this hypothesis is true. Another indicator for cultural integration is whether immigrants have been naturalized or not. Naturalization is sometimes viewed as the ultimate goal of assimilation.

Thus, H2 can be divided in 2 sub hypotheses:

H2a: immigrants in France speak better French than immigrants in the Netherlands speak Dutch

Tabel 3.3 Beheersing en gebruik van het Nederlands, naar etnische groep, 2002 (in procenten)

	Turkije	Marokko	Suriname	Antillen
Pb Spreken				
Vaak/altijd	32.7	15.6	4.5	4.2
Soms	39.8	38.0	10.2	24.1
Nooit	27.5	46.5	85.3	71.6
Pb Lezen				
Vaak/altijd	46.8	47.1	17.3	7.1
Soms	45.4	41.1	34.0	42.9
Nooit	7.8	11.8	48.7	50.0
Sprekt NL met partner				
Vaak/Altijd	23.9	17.6	82.4	60.2
Soms	33.8	35.4	14.7	22.0
Nooit	42.3	47.0	2.9	17.8
Sprekt NL met kinderen				
Vaak/altijd	19.6	28.6	91.4	65.0
Soms	50.2	46.6	7.4	28.3
nooit	30.2	24.8	1.2	6.7

Bron: ISEO/SCP (SPVA'98) SCP-bewerking

Source: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau : rapportage minderheden 2003 (p. 54)

3-maitrise de la langue française (p. 91)

	Maitrise	Mauvaise maitrise, mais pas de gêne pour la parler	Mauvaise maitrise et gêne pour la parler	Ensemble
Age à l'arrivée en France				
0-10 ans	98	1	1	100
11-19 ans	81	13	6	100
20-25 ans	75	17	8	100
26 ans ou plus	57	24	19	100
Moyenne	77	13.75	8.5	
Pays d'origine				
Espagne, Italie	80	12	8	100
Portugal	73	17	10	100
Autres Pays d'Europe	76	13	11	100
Maghreb	68	19	13	100
Autres pays	77	14	3	100
Ensemble	74	16	10	100

Source : INSEE : *Fiches thématiques*

« Champ : immigrés âgés de 18 ans ou plus résidant en ménage ordinaire dont les parents ne leur parlaient pas exclusivement en français lorsqu'ils étaient enfants. Source : Insee, enquête Histoire de vie - Construction des identités, 2003. »

In order to make these two tables comparable, this data will be changed into a dichotomous variable: proficiency and non-proficiency in the language of the host country. For the Dutch table, the average of the first two components will be taken: problems with speaking and problems with writing. The answer: “never experiences problems” will be equated with “proficient in Dutch”. The answers: “always/often experience problems” and sometimes experience problems will be equated with “non-proficient in Dutch”. For the French table, the answer: “maîtrise” will be equated with “proficient in French”. The answers « Mauvaise maitrise, mais pas de gêne pour la parler » and « Mauvaise maitrise et gêne pour la parler » will be equated with «non-proficient in French ». Only the percentages in the row « ensemble » [total] are relevant in this case.

This leads to the following tables:

	Proficient in Dutch	Non-proficient in Dutch
Turkey	$(27.5+7.8)/2= 17, 65\%$	$(32.7+39.8+46.8+45.4)/2= 82.37$
Morocco	$(46.5+11.8)/2= 29,15\%$	$(15.6+38.0+47.1+41.1)/2= 70.9\%$
Surinam	$(85.3+48.7)/2= 67\%$	$(4.5+10.2+17.3+34.0)/2= 33\%$
Antilles	$(71.6+50.0)/2= 60\%$	$(4.2+24.1+7.1+42.9)/2= 39.15\%$

It is not possible to make an average of the different groups for the Dutch table as the numbers of respondents in each group is unknown. However, none of the groups has better language proficiency than the average of foreigners in France. Indeed, immigrants from Surinam score the highest with a language proficiency of 67%, which is still lower than the average language proficiency of foreigners in France, which is of 74%. The proficiency of other groups such as the Turks or the Moroccans is even lower, with 17,65% and 29,15% respectively.

For the French document, no additional calculations are required. The last line in the table, listing the average proficiency in French is relevant. The data show that in 2003, 74% of foreigners were proficient in French. Hence, H2a is confirmed.

However, there are a number of limitations to this result. First, the dichotomization of the tables might lead to a loss of information and objectivity. Second, these two tables do not measure the language proficiency of the same group of people. The Dutch table only takes into account four ethnic groups while the French table takes into account immigrants older than 18 who did not exclusively speak French with their parents.

H2b: naturalization rate of immigrants in France is higher than in the Netherlands

The data of 1999 will be used because the percentage of foreign population of France is not known for 2001.

Table a.1.6. Acquisition of nationality in selected OECD countries (p.283)

Year 1999

	France	Netherlands
Thousands	145.4	62.1
Percentage of foreign population	4.5	9.4

OECD Trends in international migration 2001 (p.283)

In France in 1999, 4.5% of the foreign population got naturalized.

In the Netherlands, 9.4% of the foreign population got naturalized.

The percentage of foreigners getting naturalized in the Netherlands in 1999 is more than double the percentage of foreigners in France getting naturalized. Hence, the data clearly reject H2b

However, the data from Eurostat (2016) suggest important fluctuation from one year to the other. Unfortunately, the table does not allow to calculate the percentage of foreign population that acquired the French or Dutch nationality because it does not mention the number of foreigners in the country. It is however useful to confirm the calculation made above for the year 1999 and to show possible limitations to the findings.

Acquisition of citizenship by sex, age group and former citizenship

GEO/TIME	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2010
European Union (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	815.700
France	83.676	123.761	147.522	150.025	127.548	128.092	144.640	168.826	154.827	143.261
Netherlands	59.831	59.173	62.090	49.968	46.667	45.321	28.799	26.171	28.488	26.275

(source: Eurostat 2016)

Social integration

H3: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of social integration

H3a: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of exogamy among immigrants

In France in 1998, the total number of marriages was 280 000. 9.6% of the marriages were mixed marriages. However, 2% of these marriages include a union between a foreign man and a foreign woman (OECD, 2001: 166). In order to measure the levels of social integration, these marriages have to be excluded. In order to find the percentage of marriages between a foreigner and a national, the following calculation has to be made:

$$(9.6*100)/2 \approx 9.408\%$$

In France in 1998, 9.408% of marriages were mixed marriages.

In the Netherlands in 1998, the total number of marriages was 86 956 (CBS, 2016). The same year, there have been 12 300 (proper) mixed marriages (OECD, 2001: 213). In order to find the percentage of marriages between a foreigner and a national, the following calculation has to be made:

$$(12\,300*100)/86\,956 \approx 14.145\%$$

In the Netherlands in 1998, 14.145% of marriages were mixed marriages.

Hence, the data clearly reject H3a.

However, a high proportion of these marriages might be between two people from the same ethnic group. These will not appear in the figures about mixed marriages because of the high naturalization rate of foreigners (OECD, 2001: 213). This could be a limitation to this result.

Conclusion of the statistical analysis

The previous section has attempted to answer the research question by testing three hypotheses, divided in six sub hypotheses. The data proved that the results are mixed. Indeed, the first hypothesis (*H1: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of structural integration*) seems confirmed. Indeed, the relative participation rate of immigrants in France is higher than in the Netherlands while the relative unemployment rate of foreigners in France is lower. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate of immigrants in both countries is still higher than the unemployment rate of nationals. Moreover, the position of foreign women in both countries is worrisome as their unemployment rate is very high and their participation rate is very low. This means that foreign women were poorly integrated in the economy of the host country at the beginning of the 21st century, even though their position was better in France than in the Netherlands. H1c is the only hypothesis about structural integration that is disconfirmed, meaning that the education level of foreigners in the Netherlands is higher than the education level of foreigners in France. This could point to a lack of integration or higher discrimination from the part of Dutch employers as a high education level is usually enhancing job opportunities. Indeed, despite being better educated, foreigners still suffer a relatively higher unemployment rate in the Netherlands compared to France.

The result of the second hypothesis (*H2: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of cultural integration*) are mixed. Indeed, foreigners in France speak better the language of the host country compared to foreigners living in the Netherlands. However, at the same time, the naturalization rate of foreigners living in the Netherlands is higher than the naturalization rate of foreigners in France, even though this rate fluctuates importantly over the years. It is thus difficult to answer H2, also because other indicators not taken into account in this thesis are important in order to assess the degree of cultural integration. Also, naturalization rate is an indicator related to different forms of integration. It has been placed under the category of cultural integration because criteria for naturalization often require mastery of the language of the host country and knowledge of history, culture and customs of the host country. However, it could also have been placed under the category of structural integration as the acquisition of the nationality of the host country often leads to better chances on the job market.

The result of the third hypothesis (*H3: the assimilationist model leads to higher levels of social integration*) is easier to discuss as only one indicator has been taken into account. To

the extent that exogamy among immigrants is clearly higher in the Netherlands than in France at the beginning of the 21st century, it can be stated that the multicultural integration model leads to better social integration and that hence, H3 is rejected.

In sum, there is no clear answer to the research question, but it can be concluded that the assimilationist model apparently leads to higher levels of structural integration while the multicultural model leads to higher levels of social integration.

CRITIQUE

This section will discuss the limitations of this thesis. Some points of critique have already been mentioned in the relevant sections, when it seemed more appropriate to mention them right away.

This section will review a number of critique points that apply more generally to this thesis. Most of them concern limitations regarding the validity and generalizability of this research

Definitions

One possible limitation is the difference in definition of immigrants between France and the Netherlands. In France, immigrants are usually defined as people holding another nationality than the French, or people that were born outside France. The High Council for Integration defines an immigrant as someone who was born abroad with a non-French nationality (Safi, 2008: 268) In the Netherlands, the terms *allochtoon* is more commonly used. This term refers more to the belonging of an individual to an ethnic group, as it is defined as any person who has at least one parent who was born abroad. Sometimes, the terms “ethnic minorities” was used, for instance in the *minderhedennota*, without the authors being able to clearly define this concept (Molleman (2003: 64). Thus, while the French focus on nationality, the Dutch focus more on ethnicity. However, even though immigrants are not defined the same way in both countries, it is still relevant to compare the different policies concerning them. Indeed, it can be argued that what matters more is not the objective and universal definition of an immigrant, but rather who is perceived as an immigrant in both countries.

Evolution of integration

Another limitation is that this thesis does not assess the evolution of the integration of immigrants in both countries. Indeed, Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak (2009: 246) state that the Dutch integration policy was quite successful in reducing the arrears of immigrants especially in the area of education. Maybe the situation of immigrants in the Netherlands was worse at the start of the period under investigation than in France, for instance due to the lack of knowledge in Dutch. Indeed, an important part of the immigrants in France might have

already spoken French at the beginning of the 80s. So even if immigrants are better integrated in France than in the Netherlands, it can still be true that the Dutch integration policy was more effective.

Besides, Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak (2009: 248) mention the economic situation, the ambition of immigrants and support from volunteers as other factors that might have influenced the success or failure of integration in the Netherlands. These variables are not controlled for in this thesis.

Other indicators for integration

As mentioned earlier, integration can be measured through different indicators. The thesis chose to focus on structural, cultural and social integration, as these are the most often mentioned in the dominant literature about integration. Resentment was not taken into account. One reason for this is that the concept of resentment is difficult to measure. Another element that could have been taken into account is the opinion of natives on the integration policies and outcomes. Indeed, the opinion of natives is also important when assessing the success of integration (Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2009: 247).

The same is true for indicators within the three dimensions mentioned. Most of the time, the indicators that have been chosen were the most relevant and the easiest to measure.

Resentment

This section will discuss why resentment is an important aspect to take into account when discussing the success of integration policies

Resentment is a less tangible aspect of integration than structural, cultural and social integration. It flows from the feeling of the immigrant that he is not accepted by the host society as such and that he is not allowed to retain his own cultural identity. This feeling can have a negative impact on how the immigrant feels towards the host society.

This point is mentioned by Giugni & Passy (2004: 51) when they state that the closed political opportunity structures of France, which are linked to what they call France's "civic-assimilationist conception of citizenship", can lead to migrants being more "radical". In this case, integration models are linked with political opportunity structures. Indeed, France, who

has an assimilationist integration model, also has closed political opportunity structures (Giugni & Passy, 2004: 55-56). Giugni & Passy (2004: 74) explain which role the French Revolution has played in this process and how it could lead to resentment:

“The principles of equality and of universal rights fostered by the French Revolution imply the denial of particularism and claims for the recognition of ethnic difference and cultural diversity. However, as Young (1990) has pointed out, cultural rights are inherent in individual personality, and it is often psychologically difficult and socially quite destructive to have to downplay ethnic differences. Migrants in France face a situation in which they are asked to avoid expressing cultural diversity in the name of respect for French republicanism, and it appears that they try to redress this situation by asking the authorities (and more generally French society) to remove such constraints from their everyday life.”

A manifestation of resentment can be seen through figures showing that there are three times more claims regarding cultural rights and participation in France compared to Switzerland (Giugni & Passy, 2004: 74).

Oberti (2008) argues that the French republican model can lead to resentment. Indeed, the republican model rests on equality but in practice, equality is not always applied and immigrant populations are sometimes victims of racism and discrimination. Spatial segregation could also be a cause of resentment (Prost, 2009).

However, there is also another explication for resentment. According to Entzinger (1994: 85), lack of employment and paternalism, which characterized and were the result of the Dutch multicultural integration model, could lead to religious radicalization or criminality as a substitute for employment. Because (children of) immigrants had a low employment rate and thus lacked structure in their lives and a daily rhythm, they could have been more tempted to look to these two alternatives to structure their lives.

Malik (2015) argues that resentment is indeed linked to integration policies, but that it is not due to a lack of integration. On the opposite, “youth, wealth and being in education” (referring both to structural- economic and educational- integration) are risk factors for terrorism. This argument meets the observation that both assimilationist countries (France) and more multicultural countries (Belgium, UK) are exposed to terrorism (Malik, 2015).

Measurement

Another important critique is that of measurement. Indeed, some of the indicators are too imprecise. This is true especially for the hypothesis about employment. Indeed, employment rate does not tell anything about the quality of the job. For instance, it might be the case that the employment rate of immigrants is higher in France than in the Netherlands, but that most immigrants are employed part time in low skilled and precarious jobs. Another aspect is that some factors, such as social mobility, are not taken into account.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to assess the effectiveness of different integration models in successfully integrating immigrants. The research question was: which integration model is most effective in integrating immigrants? In order to answer this question, this thesis has made a comparison between the French assimilationist integration model and the Dutch multicultural integration model during the 1980s and the 1990s. In fact, policy documents from both countries show that France had an assimilationist integration model in the 1980s and the 1990s while the Dutch integration model was strongly multicultural during the same period.

The main hypothesis was that the assimilationist model leads to better integration than the multicultural model. Three dimensions of integration have been taken into account: structural integration, cultural integration and social integration. These dimensions have then been split into six indicators: participation rate, unemployment rate, education level, language proficiency, naturalization rate and rate of exogamy.

The results of this thesis are mixed. Indeed, none of the two models scores highest on all the indicators. While immigrants living in France have a higher participation rate, a lower unemployment rate and a higher level in French, immigrants in the Netherlands are better educated, have a higher naturalization rate and tend to intermarry more often with nationals. These findings seem to point to the conclusion that while the assimilationist model is more effective in structurally integrating immigrants, the multicultural model is more effective in socially integrating them. The findings for cultural integration are too mixed to qualify one of the two models as most effective.

Despite these findings, this thesis presents a number of limitations. First, some of the data are not easily comparable because of differences in definitions and in observed groups. Second, an important number of relevant indicators, such as resentments or amount of contacts with natives could not be taken into account. These are aspects further research could focus on. Other suggestions for further research are to extend this analysis to other countries or to compare it with countries holding the exclusionist integration model. This would enhance the possibilities for generalization of the findings presented in this thesis.

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ANNEX

Data analysis *minderhedennota* (Netherlands)

Netherlands		
Model	Multicultural	Challenges to the model
Recognition of cultural differences	Yes <u>II. Beleid inzake de vermindering van achterstand</u> <u>Zelfstandig ondernemingsschap</u> “Voorts zal door middel van een algemene voorlichtingsbrochure in de meest in aanmerking komende talen getracht worden om de bekendheid en de bereikbaarheid van de bestaande voorlichtings- en adviesinstituten voor (startende) ondernemers uit minderheidsgroepen zoveel mogelijk te bevorderen.” (p. 180) <u>De overheid als werkgever</u> “Bezien zal worden of het bestaande selectie-instrumentarium bij sollicitaties mogelijke belemmeringen inhoudt voor minderheden (bijvoorbeeld tests die onvoldoende aansluiten bij de culturele achtergrond van sollicitanten).” (p. 181) <u>Gezondheidszorg:</u> “De hulp aan leden van etnische minderheden wordt soms bemoeilijkt door verschil in taal en cultuur.” (p. 182) “In de eerste plaats maakt de Wet voorzieningen gezondheidszorg het mogelijk bij de	No

planning en de vestiging van gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen (inclusief hulpverleners) rekening te houden met aanwezigheid van minderheden.

Voorts is de tolkvoorziening gecontinueerd die de inschakeling van gratis tolken bij de hulpverlening mogelijk maakt. In de derde plaats wordt een Bureau voorlichting gezondheidszorg buitenlandse werknemers gesubsidieerd, dat voorlichting met het oog op de hulpverlening aan minderheden verzorgt. In de vierde plaats wordt de nadruk gelegd op de bevordering van doelmatigheid door voorlichting, onderzoek, door scholing en door bij- en nascholing.” (p. 182)

“In de hulpverlening aan drugsverslaafden uit minderheidsgroepen zal, vanwege het gebrek aan maatschappelijk perspectief, gezocht moeten worden naar aansluitingspunten binnen de eigen gemeenschap voor het maatschappelijk herstel. De toegankelijkheid van de algemene drughulpverlening voor etnische minderheden zal verder vergroot worden.” (p. 182)

Politie:

“De politie houdt in haar optreden rekening met het multiculturele karakter van de samenleving” (p. 182)

“Om de politie zo goed mogelijk voor deze taak toe te rusten, wordt binnen de politieopleiding en binnen de voortgezette vorming van politiefunctionarissen die in de praktijk werkzaam zijn voorlichting gegeven over de achtergronden van minderheden, over discriminatie en over discriminatiebestrijding.” (p. 182)

“Binnen het gevangeniswezen zijn maatregelen genomen om tegemoet te komen aan de godsdienstbeleving door leden van minderheidsgroepen en om de taal- en cultuurverschillen te overbruggen.” (p. 183)

III. Beleid inzake bestrijding van achterstelling

“In de Nederlandse samenleving worden leden van minderheidsgroepen op diverse manieren ten onrechte anders behandeld, dat wil zeggen benadeeld, omdat zij anders zijn”

<p>(p. 183)</p> <p>“4. maatschappelijke instellingen, die een belangrijke rol spelen bij de verhoudingen in onze samenleving, in staat worden gesteld tot het uitvoeren van programma's die gericht zijn op het bevorderen van verdraagzaamheid tussen bevolkingsgroepen.” (p.184)</p> <p>“Voorlichting is één van de weinige middelen om iets te doen aan verdraagzaamheid tussen bevolkingsgroepen” (p. 185)</p> <p><u>IV. Participatie, emancipatie en cultuurbeleving</u></p> <p>“Minderheden dienen evenveel kans te hebben aan hun identiteit vorm en inhoud te geven in de Nederlandse samenleving als andere groepen” (p.185)</p> <p>“Op de terreinen van kunst, radio en televisie en onderwijs worden maatregelen getroffen die rekening houden met culturen van minderheden in onze samenleving.” (p. 186)</p> <p>“Op het terrein van onderwijs wordt in het kader van het intercultureel onderwijs bijgedragen aan de emancipatie van minderheden.” (p. 186)</p> <p><u>VI. Vrouwen uit minderheidsgroepen</u></p> <p>“a. in het vrouwenemancipatiebeleid zoveel mogelijk rekening te houden met de positie en problemen van vrouwen uit minderheidsgroepen” (p. 188)</p> <p>“Voor de versterking van de positie van vrouwen is het van belang dat ontwikkelingen in de landen van herkomst over normen en waardenpatronen ook in Nederland worden gevolgd.” (p. 188)</p> <p><u>VII. Jeugd uit minderheidsgroepen</u></p> <p>“het bibliotheekwerk (subsidie voor het samenstellen van aankooplijsten van jeugdliteratuur</p>	
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	<p>uit het herkomstland). Ook zal het kabinet landelijke organisaties zoals de Stichting voor de leerplanontwikkeling, de Stichting educatieve activiteiten minderheden, het Nederlands bibliotheek en literatuurcentrum en het Landelijk ondersteuningsinstituut voor de kunstzinnige vorming in staat stellen ondersteunende activiteiten te ontwikkelen ten behoeve van cultuuruitingen van jongeren uit minderheidsgroepen” (p. 189)</p> <p><u>X. Organisatie, onderzoek en internationale aspecten van het gecoördineerde minderhedenbeleid</u></p> <p>“Aangezien het land van herkomst nog een belangrijke rol speelt en, naar het voorkomt, zal blijven spelen in het bestaan van de verschillende minderheidsgroeperingen, is aan de relatie tussen Nederland en het betrokken land een extra dimensie toegevoegd. De aanwezigheid van ingezetenen uit minderheidsgroepen maakt samenwerking met de landen van herkomst over verschillende onderwerpen nodig:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - culturele akkoorden ... - onderwijsvraagstukken, met name de aanstelling van buitenlandse leerkrachten; ... - aanstelling van godsdienstleraren.” (p. 193- 194) <p>“Verdrag inzake uitbanning rassendiscriminatie. Verdrag inzake burgerlijke en politieke rechten, ILO-verdragen, verdragen over migrerende werknemers in VN en de Raad van Europa, EG-regelingen...sociale zekerheidsverdragen, problematiek inzake de overbrenging en integratie van vluchtelingen, Benelux-overleg betreffende het personenverkeer.” (p. 194)</p>	
Obligations or rights (for the immigrants)	Rights <u>I. Inleiding</u>	Obligations <u>VIII. Toelatings- en vreemdelingenbeleid</u>

	<p>“Het minderhedenbeleid is gericht op de totstandkoming van een samenleving, waarin de in Nederland verblijvende leden van minderheidsgroepen ieder afzonderlijk en als groep een gelijkwaardige plaats en volwaardige ontplooiingskansen hebben.”(p. 175)</p> <p>“ het minderhedenbeleid is erop gericht voor minderheidsgroepen die voorwaarden te scheppen, die noodzakelijk zijn om te kunnen emanciperen in en te kunnen deelnemen aan de samenleving. Bevorderd moet worden dat wederzijdse aanpassing en aanvaarding van alle bevolkingsgroepen plaats kan hebben. Emancipatie wordt in ruime zin opgevat: niet alleen als proces van versterking van eigenwaarde en zelfbewustzijn van de minderheidsgroepen en de afzonderlijke leden daarvan. Emancipatie heeft ook ten doel de omringende samenleving zo te beïnvloeden, dat deze blijvend ruimte voor ontplooiing van minderheden biedt;”(p. 175)</p> <p>“minderhedenbeleid richt zich op het voorkomen van discriminatie, en waar discriminatie zich voordoet, op het bestrijden daarvan, alsmede op het - waar nodig - verbeteren van de rechtspositie.” (p. 175)</p> <p>“In de nota wordt beschreven welke maatregelen getroffen zullen worden om minderheden evenveel ontplooiingskansen te bieden als de andere ingezetenen van Nederland. Het accent wordt er vooral op gelegd om minderheden op gelijke wijze als andere ingezetenen in het algemeen beleid aan bod te doen komen. Daarbij staan niet alleen de bijzondere maatregelen voor minderheden centraal maar evenzeer maatregelen die in het algemene beleid genomen moeten worden zodat algemene voorzieningen ook voor deze bevolkingsgroepen daadwerkelijk toegankelijk worden.”(p. 175)</p> <p><u>III. Beleid inzake de vermindering van achterstand</u></p> <p><u>Onderwijs</u></p> <p>“de huidige circulaire voor de toekenning van faciliteiten ten behoeve van minderheden</p>	<p>“Het toelatings- en vreemdelingenbeleid kenmerkt zich enerzijds door een restrictief toelatingsbeleid” (p.190)</p> <p>“Het verblijf van éénmaal toegelaten vrouwen in het kader van gezinshereniging wordt bij feitelijke of juridische verbreking van het huwelijk in beginsel slechts beëindigd indien niet is voldaan aan het vereiste dat het huwelijk drie jaar heeft bestaan, waarvan tenminste het laatste jaar tijdens legaal verblijf in Nederland” (p. 190)</p> <p>“Ook vreemdelingen die zelf in het kader van gezinshereniging naar Nederland zijn gekomen, vragen om toelating van hun huwelijkspartners uit het buitenland (gezinsvorming). De regering is van mening dat bij deze gezinsvorming het zwaartepunt ligt bij het restrictief toelatingsbeleid. Vooral de sombere</p>
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	<p>worden omgezet in wettelijke maatregelen, zodat wordt verzekerd dat de inrichting van het onderwijs blijvend rekening kan houden met de aanwezigheid van minderheden” (p. 176)</p> <p>“In de eerste lijn past het bevorderen van intercultureel onderwijs op alle Nederlandse scholen, het mogelijk maken van onderwijs in de eigen taal en cultuur en het onderbrengen van de thans geldende circulaire in de onderwijswetgeving voor het reguliere Nederlandse onderwijs. De tweede lijn krijgt vorm door het voeren van een onderwijsvoorrangsbeleid, waarin aan bepaalde gebieden die gekenmerkt worden door een cumulatie van problemen die onderwijsachterstanden veroorzaken extra faciliteiten kunnen worden toegewezen. Daarbij zal met name aandacht worden gegeven aan leerlingen uit minderheidsgroepen.” (p. 176)</p> <p>“Gemeenten krijgen daarin de mogelijkheid plannen voor basiseducatie te ontwikkelen. Leden van minderheidsgroepen krijgen daarbij prioriteit.” (p. 176)</p> <p><u>Huisvesting:</u></p> <p>“Het volkshuisvestingsbeleid is erop gericht achterstanden in de huisvesting van groepen van de bevolking te voorkomen en zo nodig op te heffen.” (p. 177)</p> <p>“Toch zal de oplossing van de huisvestingsproblematiek van minderheden vanwege de grote overeenkomst met problemen van andere bevolkingsgroepen primair binnen het algemene huisvestingsbeleid gevonden moeten worden. Indien daarbij blijkt dat de toegankelijkheid van huisvestingsvoorzieningen voor minderheden onvoldoende is, dienen aanvullende maatregelen genomen te worden, bij voorkeur binnen het algemene beleid.” (p. 177)</p> <p>“De regering wijst een beleid dat gericht is op gedwongen concentratie of gedwongen spreiding van leden van minderheidsgroepen af. Bij het toewijzen van huizen moet iedere woningzoekende gelijk worden behandeld, ongeacht etnische herkomst.” (p. 177)</p>	<p>toekomstverwachtingen voor betrokkenen geven voor deze keuze de doorslag. Toelating voor gezinsvorming is derhalve mogelijk indien de vreemdeling die om toelating van een huwelijkspartner verzoekt, beschikt over passende huisvesting en voldoende middelen van bestaan. Om humanitaire redenen kan, ondanks dat niet aan deze criteria wordt voldaan, niettemin verblijf worden toegestaan.” (p. 190)</p> <p><u>IX. Remigratie</u></p> <p>“Voorts is de regering van oordeel dat aan remigranten niet de mogelijkheid geboden moet worden om zich binnen een bepaalde periode na hun vertrek uit Nederland, opnieuw in Nederland te vestigen. Aangezien de regering heeft besloten tot een basisregeling voor alle groepen met de mogelijkheid tot aanpassing op grond van specifieke omstandigheden, wordt het Terugkeerprojectenprogramma</p>
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	<p>“Gelet op de lokale verantwoordelijkheid voor de woonruimteverdeling heeft de regering besloten de zogenaamde Regeling rijksvoorkeurswoningen, althans voorzover betrekking hebbend op minderheden, in beginsel slechts toe te gaan passen op die minderheden, waarvan bij binnenkomst in Nederland van een duidelijke rijks verantwoordelijkheid kan worden gesproken. In de praktijk betreft dit bijna uitsluitend - individuele knelsituaties uitgezonderd - vluchtelingen en asielgerechtigden.” (p. 177-178)</p> <p>“Een (tijdelijk) project grote woningen is ontwikkeld om te bevorderen, dat voor zeer grote gezinnen (8 personen of meer) uit etnische minderheden grote huizen beschikbaar komen.” (p. 178)</p> <p>“Maatregelen ten behoeve van minderheden bij de stadsvernieuwing liggen vooral in de preventieve sfeer. Zo zijn er onder andere ruimere subsidiemogelijkheden geschapen binnen het kader van de bestaande regeling voor voorbereidingskosten van uitvoeringsplannen bij stadsvernieuwing, waarbij veel anderstaligen zijn betrokken. (1983, MG 83-03).” (p.178)</p> <p>“Waar signalen zijn dat een rechtvaardige behandeling van minderheden achterwege lijkt te blijven zal de rijksoverheid in eerste instantie contact opnemen met de betreffende instanties. Zo nodig wordt dan om nadere rapportage verzocht en aangedrongen op het nemen van doeltreffende maatregelen om achterstandssituaties op te (doen) heffen. Mocht op deze wijze geen oplossing bereikt worden, dan zullen andere sancties dan wel nadere maatregelen worden overwogen, die het doel naderbij brengen. Naast bestuurlijke actie door de overheid bestaat voor degenen die zich bij het verkrijgen van huisvesting gediscrimineerd acht, de weg open zich tot de civiele rechter te wenden dan wel een beroep te doen op artikel 429 quater van het wetboek van strafrecht.” (p.179)</p> <p><u>Werkgelegenheid:</u></p> <p>“Het beleid is er dan ook op gericht om alle beschikbare maatregelen (scholings-, plaatsing bevorderende en plaatsing verruimende maatregelen) zodanig toegankelijk te maken voor</p>	<p>(TPP) voor buitenlandse werknemers uit de wervingslanden niet voortgezet” (p. 191-192)</p>
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leden van minderheidsgroepen dat zij daaraan evenredig kunnen deelnemen. Daarboven zullen aan de gewestelijke arbeidsbureaus in een aantal achterstandsgebieden (zie hoofdstuk V) extra gelden ter beschikking worden gesteld om in overleg met de gemeenten ter plaatse tijdelijke arbeidsplaatsen in de kwartaire sector voor werklozen uit deze gebieden ter beschikking te stellen.

Ook zullen mogelijkheden worden geschapen om leden van minderheidsgroepen werkervaring op te laten doen in de marktsector en zal ook op andere manieren een grotere deelneming van minderheidsgroepen aan de marktsector worden nagestreefd.” (p. 180)

“De bestaande instanties op het terrein van de voorlichting en bedrijfsadvisering is verzocht binnen de beschikbare mogelijkheden maatregelen te treffen om ook de ondernemer afkomstig uit de kring van de minderheden van dienst te kunnen zijn.” (p. 180)

“Het uitgangspunt van de nieuwe wettelijke regeling zal zijn dat de rijksoverheid zo toegankelijk mogelijk is voor vreemdelingen” (p. 181)

“Daarnaast zal de overheid bij het verstrekken van opdrachten aan derden verzoeken om een evenredige inschakeling van minderheden. Teneinde de diplomavergelijking te vergemakkelijken, zullen de mogelijkheden worden bekeken om voorlichting te geven aan personeelsfunctionarissen over de waarde van de meest voorkomende buitenlandse diploma's.” (p. 181)

Welzijn:

“a. zowel het toespitsen van het algemene beleid op de problematiek van minderheden, om de toegankelijkheid ervan te vergroten (facetbeleid);

b. als het continueren van specifiek op minderheden gericht beleid (het categoriale welzijnsbeleid).” (p.181)

“Ter vergroting van de toegankelijkheid van de sport zal in het rijksbeleid onder andere de nadruk worden gelegd op verbetering van de bestaande voorlichting ten behoeve van

minderheden, specifieke opleidingen, ontwikkelingsprojecten in gemeenten, provincies en bij landelijke sportorganisaties.

Voor het bevorderen van de toegankelijkheid van het bibliotheekwerk en het stimuleren van kunstuitingen door en voor minderheden worden verscheidene projecten mogelijk gemaakt.” (p. 181)

“Deze instellingen zullen in hun taken meer nadruk leggen op het ondersteunen van plaatselijke activiteiten voor minderheden.

Om die activiteiten op lokaal niveau mogelijk te maken krijgen de gemeenten een aanvullende subsidie, op basis van een daartoe ingediend plan.” (p. 181)

Politie:

“Zij streeft ernaar alle ingezetenen onbevooroordeeld en op gelijke wijze te behandelen. Daarbij bestaat, naast de handhaving van de rechtsorde, aandacht voor hulpverlening, en bestrijding van discriminatie.” (p. 182)

“Er wordt naar gestreefd ook de hulpverlening en de zorg binnen de justitiële sfeer, beter op minderheden af te stemmen.” (p. 183)

“In dit verband wordt bij voorbeeld extra aandacht geschonken aan onderwijs en geestelijke verzorging voor etnische minderheden.” (p. 183)

“Minderheden en personeel van penitentiaire inrichtingen worden gestimuleerd Nederlands respectievelijk een vreemde taal te leren.” (p. 183)

III. Beleid inzake bestrijding van achterstelling

“1. overheden hier legaal verblijvende leden van minderheidsgroepen in wet- en regelgeving en in hun beleid zo veel mogelijk behandelen als waren zij Nederlanders. Dat houdt in dat, daar waar in regelgeving onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen Nederlanders en niet-Nederlanders zonder dat daarvoor (tegen de achtergrond van een blijvend

	<p>ingezetenschap) voldoende rechtvaardigingsgronden bestaan, dit onderscheid opgeheven zal worden</p> <p>2. overheden bij de verdeling van goederen en diensten, voor zover zij daarop invloed hebben, een feitelijke achterstelling van de categorie minderheden zullen voorkomen. Als zich dit voordoet, zullen maatregelen genomen worden die dat corrigeren;</p> <p>3. slachtoffers van achterstelling zoveel mogelijk in staat worden gesteld tot het verkrijgen van deskundige hulp- en dienstverlening om die achterstelling aan te tonen, en in rechte daartegen op te komen” (p.183-184)</p> <p>“Daarom is het in de eerste plaats van belang dat een ruimhartig naturalisatiebeleid wordt gevoerd. In de memorie van antwoord die onlangs op het Wetsontwerp rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap aan de Tweede Kamer is aangeboden is dit beginsel nader uitgewerkt. Wie in Nederland is ingeburgerd heeft in beginsel recht op de Nederlandse nationaliteit.” (p. 184)</p> <p>“Onevenredigheid kan een vermoeden van discriminatie aantonen en aanleiding zijn tot beleidsverandering of tot juridische stappen. Daar waar de regering bevoegdheden heeft in de sfeer van toetsing of toezicht zal bij gebleken onevenredigheid niet gearzeld worden van die bevoegdheden gebruik te maken.” (p. 184)</p> <p>“Enerzijds legt het recht de norm van gelijkwaardigheid juridisch vast en anderzijds biedt het recht bescherming aan diegenen die slachtoffer zijn van discriminerende gedragingen of uitingen.” (p. 184)</p> <p>“Ten derde zal een onafhankelijk landelijk bureau in het leven worden geroepen dat de volgende taken zal verrichten” (p. 185).</p> <p>“Waar belemmeringen bestaan in het voldoen aan religieuze verplichtingen wordt, waar mogelijk, getracht deze weg te nemen. Zo zijn regelingen getroffen voor het ritueel slachten</p>	
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volgens islamitische voorschriften. Voorts is in het ontwerp van wet «Nieuwe bepalingen inzake de lijkbezorging» rekening gehouden met de wijze waarop moslims en hindoes begraven. Ten slotte zullen moslims en hindoes evenals andere religieuze groeperingen gelegenheid krijgen tot religieuze verzorging in openbare scholen, in het leger en in gevangenissen.” (p 186)

VI. Vrouwen uit minderheidsgroepen

“In het onderwijs zullen activiteiten voor basiseducatie voor vrouwen en meisjes mogelijk worden gemaakt” (p. 188)

“Aan lagere overheden, (vormings)scholen, GAB's en organisaties van allochtone(n) (vrouwen) zal voorlichting worden gegeven over de mogelijkheden voor het opzetten van alternatieve werkgelegenheidsprojecten voor en door vrouwen uit minderheden.” (p. 188)

“Het gebruik van de begrotingspost voor ondersteuning van landelijke projecten en activiteiten (Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid) door vrouwen uit minderheden zal gestimuleerd worden.” (p. 188)

VII. Jeugd uit minderheidsgroepen

“Wat betreft de onderwijscomponent van deze maatregelen zal het deelnemen van jeugdige leden uit minderheidsgroepen aan het leerlingwezen gestimuleerd worden.” (p. 189)

VIII. Toelatings- en vreemdelingenbeleid

“Het toelatings- en vreemdelingenbeleid kenmerkt zich anderzijds door het streven om de verblijfsrechtelijke positie van in Nederland toegelaten vreemdelingen te versterken.”(p. 190)

“Slechts hij hoge uitzondering (bijvoorbeeld inbreuk op de openbare orde) kunnen jeugdige vreemdelingen die ten minste 1 jaar in het kader van gezinshereniging in Nederland hebben verbleven, worden verwijderd. Dit vloeit voort uit het streven om de rechtspositie van in Nederland verblijvende leden van minderheidsgroepen te versterken.” (p. 190)

“Deze wet beoogt beperking van de toestroom van nieuwe buitenlandse werknemers, bestrijding van illegale tewerkstelling en stimulering van structurele voorzieningen in bedrijfstakken en bedrijven gericht op een beperking van de behoefte aan nieuwe buitenlandse werknemers. De WABW heeft inmiddels aan kritiek blootgestaan. Daarom is een evaluatie van de WABW in gang gezet door het ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.

De evaluatie betreft onder meer de vraag of de WABW thans nog onnodig nadelige gevolgen zou kunnen hebben voor rechtmatig in Nederland verblijvende vreemdelingen” (p. 191)

IX. Remigratie

“De regering is van mening dat de beslissing om in Nederland te blijven of naar het land van herkomst terug te keren, een vrijwillige en persoonlijke beslissing moet zijn.” (p. 191)

“De regering stelt een onderzoek in naar de mogelijkheden van terugkeer met behoud van uitkering dan wel met terugbetaling van betaalde premies in de sociale zekerheid.” (p. 191)

“Er komt op korte termijn voor de betreffende groepen een regeling die betrekking heeft op zowel de kosten van voorbereiding, van overtocht en bagage, alsmede van de opvang voor de eerste periode in het land van herkomst.” (p. 191)

“De regering zal bezien in hoeverre het scholingsinstrumentarium, dat onder de minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ressorteert, kan worden aangewend voor aspirant-remigranten.

In dit verband wordt - onder bepaalde voorwaarden - ook gedacht aan financiële hulp aan

	<p>het bedrijfsleven bij scholing van buitenlandse werknemers die willen terugkeren naar hun land van herkomst.” (p. 191)</p> <p><u>X. Organisatie, onderzoek en internationale aspecten van het gecoördineerde minderhedenbeleid</u></p> <p>“Bij het beleid met de nadruk op het beter toegankelijk maken van algemene voorzieningen ten behoeve van personen uit minderheidsgroepen is het onder meer noodzakelijk: ...” (p. 193)</p> <p>“Aangezien het land van herkomst nog een belangrijke rol speelt en, naar het voorkomt, zal blijven spelen in het bestaan van de verschillende minderheidsgroeperingen, is aan de relatie tussen Nederland en het betrokken land een extra dimensie toegevoegd. De aanwezigheid van ingezetenen uit minderheidsgroepen maakt samenwerking met de landen van herkomst over verschillende onderwerpen nodig:</p> <p>-sociale zekerheidsaspecten ... -internationaal privaatrecht” (p. 193- 194)</p>	
Representation	<p style="text-align: center;">Yes</p> <p><u>II. Beleid inzake de vermindering van achterstand</u></p> <p><u>Welzijn:</u></p> <p>“In het rijksbeleid voor het sociaal-cultureel werk zal de gerichte aandacht voor minderheden worden voortgezet, onder andere in de vorm van projecten die steun beogen aan plaatselijke activiteiten” (p. 181)</p> <p><u>Politie:</u></p>	No

“Het wervings- en selectiebeleid zal erop afgestemd worden om meer leden van minderheidsgroepen bij de politie aan te trekken.” (p. 182)

“De reclassering tracht de hulpverlening aan minderheden te verbeteren door het instellen van vreemdelingencommissies om de aandacht voor minderheden te vergroten, het aantrekken van personeel dat minderheidsgroepen kent en het bevorderen van de deskundigheid van reclasseringsmedewerkers. Een vroegtijdige hulpverlening op het politiebureau wordt gestimuleerd” (p. 183)

“Ter verbetering van de rechtshulpverlening aan minderheden hebben de bureaus voor rechtshulp folders vertaald in de meest gangbare talen en is er ten behoeve van de advocaten in 13 arrondissementen een tolkenvoorziening getroffen. Voorts wordt de deskundigheid van advocaten en bureaumedewerkers door middel van piketcursussen vreemdelingenrecht bevorderd en zijn in enkele plaatsen initiatieven ontwikkeld om vreemdelingen die in bewaring zijn gesteld in verbinding te stellen met een advocaat.” (p. 183)

IV. Participatie, emancipatie en cultuurbeleving

Eigen organisaties

Het ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur maakt onder andere in de nieuwe Rijksregeling welzijn minderheden steun mogelijk voor activiteiten van plaatselijke minderhedenorganisaties. Daarnaast zal de rechtstreekse financiering van instellingen van minderheden die bedoeld zijn voor steunverlening aan plaatselijke initiatieven en die zich bezinghouden met pleitbezorging en voorlichting worden gecontinueerd” (p. 185-186)

“In het kunstbeleid zullen voor kunstuitingen van minderheden meer faciliteiten beschikbaar komen.” (p. 186)

“Op het terrein van de media zal de NOS door herschikking van zendtijd meer ruimte bieden voor programma's waarin aandacht wordt gegeven aan minderheden en waarvoor zij

zelf medeverantwoordelijkheid dragen. Ten behoeve van educatieve programma's voor minderheden is aan de NOS additionele zendtijd beschikbaar gesteld voor de Federatie Educatieve Omroep. Plannen bestaan voor uitbreiding van radiozendtijd voor minderheden. Tenslotte wordt een begin gemaakt met lokale kabelexperimenten voor en door minderheden. Doel van deze experimenten, die maximaal 3 jaar kunnen duren, is de bevordering van de betrokkenheid van minderheden bij deze mediavorm, de ontwikkeling van een bestuurlijke organisatie terzake en de overdraagbaarheid van de aldus opgedane kennis.” (p. 186)

“Het is gewenst dat minderheden invloed kunnen uitoefenen op maatschappelijke gebeurtenissen waarbij zij zijn betrokken. Daartoe hecht de regering aan inspraakmogelijkheden op zowel het lokale als het landelijke niveau.” (p. 186)

“De regering streeft ernaar dat niet-Nederlanders die daarvoor in aanmerking komen vanaf 1986 aan de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen kunnen deelnemen. Daarnaast wordt inspraak op lokaal niveau gestimuleerd door de tijdelijke bijdrageregeling bestuurskosten. Voorts wordt verwacht dat de betreffende bepaling over inspraak in de nieuwe Gemeentewet ook de inspraak van ingezetenen uit minderheidsgroepen een plaats zal doen toekennen in plaatselijke inspraakverordeningen. Op landelijk niveau wil de regering de inspraak van minderheden een meer bestuurlijk accent geven.

Er wordt voorkeur gegeven aan de snelle totstandkoming van één adviesraad van minderheden die de regering gevraagd en ongevraagd adviseert over aangelegenheden betreffende het landelijke minderhedenbeleid. De regering heeft daarbij een raad voor ogen die onderraden kent voor de te onderscheiden minderheidsgroepen.

De weg waarlangs tot op heden is getracht tot afzonderlijke inspraakorganen te komen duurt te lang en geeft de inspraak gedurende die tijd een te onduidelijk karakter. De regering zal daarom op korte termijn een ontwerp van wet voor één landelijke adviesraad van minderheden aan de volksvertegenwoordiging voorleggen. Dat zal gebeuren nadat over deze nota met het parlement overleg heeft plaatsgevonden. Tenslotte zal de regering in de toekomst het deelnemen van minderheden aan adviesraden die gericht zijn op terreinen die ook voor minderheden van belang zijn waar mogelijk bevorderen.” (p. 187)

VI. Vrouwen uit minderheidsgroepen

	<p>“Er is momenteel te weinig kader van vrouwen aanwezig om eigen organisaties op korte termijn van de grond te krijgen. Daarom zal het Rijk in zijn beleid voor sociaal-cultureel werk en voor welzijn minderheden bij de planning en programmering speciale aandacht geven aan activiteiten en ondersteuning gericht op kadervorming en training.” (p.188)</p> <p><u>X Organisatie, onderzoek en internationale aspecten van het gecoördineerde minderhedenbeleid.</u></p> <p>“In principe zal politieke besluitvorming over voorstellen niet plaatsvinden dan nadat, via de inspraakprocedures, kennis is genomen van het gevoel van minderheden daarover.”(p. 192)</p>	
Moral responsibility	<p style="text-align: center;">Yes</p> <p><u>V. Beleid inzake achterstandsgebieden</u></p> <p>“Gemeentebesturen staan voor de taak diverse vormen van achterstandsbeleid voor alle bevolkingsgroepen uit die gebieden vorm en inhoud te geven... Er wordt gestreefd in 1985 de eerste overeenkomsten te kunnen afsluiten.” (p. 187)</p> <p><u>VII. Jeugd uit minderheidsgroepen</u></p> <p>“Het kabinet zal in aanvulling op hetgeen in het voorgaande staat vermeld projecten mogelijk maken voor:</p> <p>a. ondersteuning van activiteiten van eigen organisaties van jeugdigen uit minderheidsgroepen en</p> <p>b. randgroepjongeren.” (p. 189)</p>	No

Data analysis first report of the High Council for Integration (France)

	France	
Model	Assimilationist	Challenges to the model
Recognition and acceptance of cultural difference	<p>No</p> <p>« Cette immigration, même si elle a donné lieu à toutes les époques à des phénomènes de rejet et des campagnes xénophobes, a été sur le long terme assimilée » (p. 11)</p> <p>« la force du « modèle français » qui, à l'inverse du modèle américain, a conduit tout au long des décennies passées à une fusion individuelle et non en termes de « groupes minoritaires » des étrangers dans la société française » (p. 12)</p> <p>« A condition de disposer d'un emploi régulier, d'un statut juridique stable et clair pour eux-mêmes et pour leur environnement, ces étrangers en voie d'acquérir la nationalité française, eux ou leurs enfants, par l'effet de notre « jus soli » et selon la problématique développée par Mme Tribalat, chercheur à l'INED, dont le schéma est expliqué en annexe au rapport, participeraient heureusement au brassage séculaire de la population française » (p. 14)</p> <p>« français et de longue date dans leur grande majorité, ils se heurtent eux aussi à des difficultés d'intégration, dont toutes ne résultent pas de leur propre volonté de conserver un mode de vie original » (p.17).</p> <p>« Bien entendu une politique d'intégration implique l'adhésion de tous à un minimum de valeurs communes, l'acceptation individuelle et collective d'un cadre global de référence. L'une</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>« la plus grande partie d'entre eux constituent, comme par le passé, un apport précieux pour la société française, tant du point de vue économique et démographique que du point de vue culturel » (p. 13)</p> <p>« Comme nous l'avons souligné plus haut, les trois catégories ci-dessus sont loin de recouvrir la totalité des personnes rencontrant des difficultés d'intégration dans la société française » (p.16).</p> <p>« il s'agit de susciter la participation active à la société nationale d'éléments variés et différents, tout en acceptant la subsistance des spécificités culturelles, sociales et morales et en tenant pour vrai que l'ensemble s'enrichit de cette variété, de cette complexité. Sans nier les différences, en sachant les prendre en compte sans les exalter, c'est sur les ressemblances et les convergences qu'une politique d'intégration met l'accent afin, dans l'égalité des droits et des obligations, de rendre solidaires les différentes composantes ethniques et culturelles de notre société et de donner à chacun, quelle que soit son origine, la possibilité de vivre dans cette société dont il a accepté les règles et dont il devient un élément constituant » (p.18)</p> <p>« spécificités culturelles » (p.70)</p>

des difficultés actuelle de l'intégration vient du fait que, l'immigration provenant de régions plus éloignées, le système de valeurs sociales, culturelles, juridiques, religieuses des immigrés récents est plus éloigné que par le passé du système de valeur traditionnellement dominant dans notre pays et d'ailleurs contesté à son tour par une bonne partie des nouveaux prolétaires. Le pari de l'intégration est que cette contestation peut être surmontée et des valeurs de tolérance et de respect des droits de l'homme affirmées avec assez de force pour que la fusion des immigrants dans la collectivité nationale continue à l'enrichir et à contribuer à son rayonnement » (p. 18-19).

«Conformément à ce pari, le Haut Conseil affirme sa conviction que la conception française de l'intégration doit obéir à une *logique d'égalité* et non à une *logique de minorités*. Les principes identitaires et égalitaires qui remontent à la Révolution et à la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen imprègnent notre conception, fondée ainsi sur l'égalité des individus devant la loi, quelles que soient leurs origines, leur race, leur religion... à l'exclusion d'une reconnaissance institutionnelle des minorités. En Europe de l'Ouest, cette conception est partagée par des pays comme l'Allemagne et la Belgique, alors que les Pays-Bas ou le Royaume-Uni font largement sa place à la politique des minorités » (p. 18-19)

«Depuis les changements survenus en Europe de l'Est, beaucoup de pays de cette zone souhaitent à leur tour une consécration des minorités ; de fortes pressions s'exercent notamment sur le Conseil de l'Europe pour que la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales soit amendée en ce sens. Une telle évolution, contraire à nos traditions, apparaît également dangereuse pour

notre pays : la lutte contre le racisme, la xénophobie, les discriminations qui peut en France s'appuyer sur un arsenal juridique bien armé, se heurte dans les faits à un « racisme ordinaire » diffus et difficile à combattre ; un changement de logique serait loin de garantir une meilleure efficacité et comporterait des risques de déclin de l'unité nationale » (p. 19).

« Tout naturellement ceux que frappent de plein fouet la précarisation et la xénophobie rechercheront dans la chaleur communautaire ou dans l'identification religieuse un refuge contre l'exclusion. Mais il semble bien que la majorité d'entre eux, adultes et plus encore jeunes, n'y voient qu'un point d'appui temporaire pour faire valoir leurs revendications alors que celles-ci tendent à faire d'eux, aussi rapidement que possible des Français « comme les autres » » (p.19)

« Notre système d'observation statistique courant dont l'enregistrement, fondé sur la nationalité, interdit toute interrogation sur l'origine des ascendants, ne permet pas de faire ressortir le rôle antérieur de l'immigration dans la population française » (p. 27)

« ces phénomènes de concentration étrangère ne peuvent que préoccuper. Ils constituent un frein à l'intégration dans la mesure où ils réduisent les rencontres – quelles qu'elles soient – avec la population française, y compris pour les enfants. Ils sont d'autant plus alarmants qu'ils regroupent des populations en situation sociale difficile qui risquent de se refermer sur elles-mêmes dans une opposition croissante à une société qui ne parvient pas à leur faire une place » (p.47)

« on compte une part plus importante qu'auparavant d'immigrés en provenance de pays éloignés de l'Europe, dont les caractéristiques linguistiques, culturelles, religieuses, ethniques, nécessitent un effort plus soutenu d'intégration » (p.51)

« la France est une République une et indivisible, ce qui signifie que l'intégration, loin de se fonder sur la reconnaissance de communautés ethniques comme aux Pays-Bas ou en Grande-Bretagne, postule la participation active à la communauté nationale d'éléments variés et différents » (p. 52)

«la France est une République laïque : si les mots ont un sens, cela veut dire qu'elle accepte le fait religieux, mais qu'elle interdit qu' il porte atteinte à la stricte neutralité de l'Etat. Or les intégrismes, d'ou qu' ils viennent, cherchent à faire pression sur l'Etat pour faire reconnaître leurs préférences, pour imposer leur façon de penser et leur mode de vie. L'importance de ces problèmes est telle que le Haut Conseil, qui n'a pas eu le temps en 1990 de les étudier à fond, envisage, pour 1990, de constituer en son sein un groupe de travail sur la laïcité et l'intégration » (p. 52).

«La nationalité française a toujours constitué un facteur de l'identité nationale, sans pour autant faire obstacle à l'intégration des étrangers, soit qu' ils conservent leur nationalité, soit qu' il deviennent français. Sans suffire à assurer l'intégration. L'acquisition de la nationalité française est un moyen d'y contribuer : le caractère ouvert de notre code, dès la loi du 7 février 1851, a favorisé le processus séculaire de l'intégration, ainsi que les brassages de population a partir desquels la population de la France est aujourd'hui ce qu' elle

	<p>est » (p. 52)</p> <p>« « l'identité française » » (p. 53)</p> <p>« En outre, les personnes logées en foyer doivent être principalement étrangères ou d'origine étrangère, mais une diversification en direction des français d'origine doit être opérée. Cette diversification est, d'abord, au cœur même du processus d'intégration. Elle contribuera fortement à ce processus en évitant la constitution du foyer en une communauté étrangère, voire ethnique, qui renforce isolement et désocialisation » (p.64)</p>	
<p>Obligations or rights (for the immigrants)</p>	<p>Obligations or denial of rights:</p> <p>« Une autre constatation que l'on peut faire à propos de la conception française de l'intégration, c'est l'importance de la nationalité. La nationalité française est perçue comme un signe de réussite de l'intégration et de ce fait c'est et bien ainsi que s'effectuent les acquisitions de nationalité. Quant à la participation à la vie politique, elle apparaît comme le couronnement de l'intégration plus que comme un préalable à celle-ci. Là encore, les pratiques varient beaucoup d'un pays à l'autre : nos voisins britanniques par exemples sont loin de partager les mêmes conceptions » (p.19)</p> <p>« le logement : sa situation est déplorable. Pour le logement social, la demande est de loin supérieure à l'offre ; les quartiers difficiles sont légion ; les maires maîtrisent mal l'attribution des logements sociaux et connaissent mal les affectations de ces logements décidées par d'autres que par eux » (p.22)</p>	<p>Rights</p> <p>« Les immigrés installés chez nous depuis longtemps ont contribué à la croissance française, à l'embourgeoisement d'une partie de notre prolétariat, à l'augmentation du niveau de vie général. Si nous devons tous le payer aujourd'hui, d'une façon ou d'une autre, même au prix d'une légère diminution de pouvoir d'achat, ce ne serait que simple justice » (p.12)</p> <p>« la grande majorité des communes consacrent des efforts à ces populations et à la prise en compte de leurs problèmes, mais ce sont surtout les associations, plus souvent nationales qu'intercommunales, qui jouent un rôle actif et permettent un dialogue » (p.21)</p> <p>« l'école : en général les élèves étrangers sont accueillis dans les mêmes conditions que les français en maternelle comme dans le primaire ; les titres de séjour sont rarement demandés pour les inscriptions » (p.22)</p>

<p>«l'enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine pose des problèmes sérieux » (p22)</p> <p>« l'augmentation des demandes sur cette période s'est accompagnée d'un accroissement des taux de refus: 72% des dossiers examinés en 1989 par l'OFPRA ont été rejetés. La difficulté de l'accès au travail dans des conditions régulières, pour les étrangers, peut fournir une explication de ces tendances. Toutefois, l'augmentation des demandes d'asile est observée dans la plupart des pays européens quelles que soient les législations existantes » (p. 35)</p> <p>« Il faut noter que 80% de ces enfants d'immigrés devenus « cols blancs » avaient un père ouvrier ou travailleur indépendant » (p. 43)</p> <p>« La citoyenneté se confond constitutionnellement avec la nationalité française, même pour les élections locales. Les membres du Haut Conseil ne sont pas unanimes sur le point de savoir si les étrangers doivent avoir le droit de vote aux élections locales, car ils sont partagés sur le fond de cette mesure comme sur le caractère positif ou négatif de son influence sur l'intégration. En revanche, et notamment parce qu'elle impliquerait un débat constitutionnel, ils ont été unanimes à reconnaître que, dans les circonstances présentes, l'examen de cette question ne serait pas de nature à faire avancer réellement le dossier de l'intégration des populations immigrées » (p. 53)</p> <p>« maîtrise des flux » (p. 53 en 55)</p> <p>« Une régulation des entrées sur le territoire est indispensable</p>	<p>« L'immigration étrangère est un phénomène ancien, constitutive du peuplement de la France et à l'origine de brassage de populations importants, grâce à la grande capacité d'intégration du droit de la nationalité française » (p. 27)</p> <p>« b) <i>Mais le droit ne suffit pas.</i> En France, l'intégration juridique se fait plutôt plus facilement qu'ailleurs. Mais l'importance du chômage, certaines formes de marginalisation, les affrontements identitaires, les violences urbaines et péri-urbaines semblent indiquer un relatif échec du système d'identité formelle. Il faut donc, au-delà du droit, une politique d'intégration patiente, vigoureuse, inventive, permettant de faire face à des problèmes aujourd'hui aggravés. » (p.53)</p> <p>« De ce point de vue, la politique d'intégration ne se distingue pas fondamentalement de la politique sociale destinée à l'ensemble des populations défavorisées » (p.54)</p> <p>« le droit au regroupement familial, le droit à obtenir le statut de réfugié politique lorsqu'on remplit les conditions légales, la libre circulation des hommes au sein de la Communauté Européenne... Tout cela représente des flux d'entrées incompressibles » (p.55)</p> <p>« Le terme ainsi mis à l'effet d'appel et à l'installation dans la clandestinité autoriserait un traitement humanitaire des demandeurs d'asile déboutes et séjournant de longue date dans notre pays (par exemple plus de 3 ans) : un examen pourrait de faire au cas par cas sans exclure alors une possibilité d'admission exceptionnelle au séjour ou même de régularisation » (p. 56)</p>
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<p>pour qu' une telle politique puisse réussir. A la fois pour que l'opinion l'accepte – quels que soient par ailleurs les efforts de pédagogie qu'il faudra déployer pour lui faire comprendre les aspects nécessaires et positifs de l'intégration - , et aussi pour que le coût de la politique sociale à mettre en œuvre soit supportable par les finances de notre pays» (p.55)</p> <p>« la lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière » (p.55)</p> <p>«Cependant cette accélération n'a de sens que si elle s'accompagne, en cas de refus de la demande, du départ spontané ou contraint de candidats malheureux. Or tel n'est pas le cas, en dépit de récents progrès constatés à la fin de l'année 1990 ; si bien le raccourcissement du traitement des dossiers risque d'accroître très sensiblement le nombre de clandestins » (p. 56)</p> <p>« Même si les moyens de lutte contre la clandestinité sont très difficiles, le Haut Conseil estime que le Gouvernement doit exercer sans relâche son action sur ce terrain. Beaucoup plus que l'accès au travail ou à certains droits sociaux, c'est la facilité qu'il y a en France à vivre clandestinement qui exerce un « effet d'appel ». Il faut pour cela utiliser toute la palette de moyens conformes aux principes de notre Etat de droit : aides de divers ordres aux retours rendus nécessaires..., reconduites à la frontière, appel à la responsabilité des étrangers en situation régulière afin qu' ils ne fassent pas venir leur famille, ou leurs compatriotes, sans les autorisations requises, lutte impitoyable contre les employeurs de main d'œuvre clandestine, s'appuyant notamment sur une réflexion sérieuse et approfondie aux mécanismes de l'économie souterraine, examen de la possibilité de faire déposer au moins une partie des demande d'asile à nos</p>	<p>« «droits des femmes et violences sexuelles » (p. 57)</p> <p>« l'accès aux conditions de logement et d'aide de droit commun » (p.64)</p> <p>«Après un effort initial de réhabilitation et de construction le financement des foyers ne doit pas dépasser un montant de dépenses par individu équivalent a celui constaté pour les autres formes d'aide au logement » (p.64)</p> <p>« Le droit social français repose sur le principe de territorialité : en l'état actuel, l'attribution des prestations sociales est étroitement liée à la résidence sur le territoire national, quelle que soit la nationalité des résidents. Ce principe est largement commun à l'ensemble des prestations sociales, qu'elles soient de sécurité sociale, ou d'aide sociale d'urgence. Le principe d'égalité des droits régit d'abord l'ensemble des prestations en espèces ou en nature de la sécurité sociale : assurance-vieillesse, assurance invalidité, accidents du travail, prestations familiales (y compris les aides au logement), assurance maladie-maternité.</p> <p>Ces deux dernières catégories de prestations comportent une extension de la protection correspondante a l'ensemble de la famille du travailleur étranger (hors Communauté économique européenne) résidant à l'étranger, le versement des prestations familiales et les remboursements en nature en en espèces de la sécurité sociale sont effectués sous forme forfaitaire et pour des montants inférieurs à ceux versés en France. Ces remboursements sont déterminés pas des conventions bilatérales de sécurité sociale qui prévoient parallèlement les remboursements effectués par le pays étranger signataire de la convention pour les français résidant à l'étranger.</p>
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	<p>frontières... » (p.56)</p> <p>«la condition de nationalité posée par les textes a été déclarée contraire au principe de l'égalité de traitement par le Conseil Constitutionnel dans sa décision du 22 janvier 1990, à l'occasion d'une nouvelle rédaction du texte sur le Fonds national de solidarité. D'autre part, la mosaïque actuelle des textes prévoit des règles différentes pour l'attribution de chacune des prestations, notamment quant à l'appréciation de la régularité de séjour » (p. 66- 67)</p> <p>« Quelques discriminations subsistent cependant en matière de prestations sociales entre français et étrangers résidant sur le territoire national. D'une part, des règles particulières de résidence ont été fixées par le code de la Famille et de l'Aide sociale pour deux prestations d'aide sociale : sous réserve en effet de conventions internationales prévoyant, par réciprocité, des règles plus favorables, accès de l'aide médicale à domicile est subordonné à 3 ans de résidence ininterrompue en France métropolitaine et les allocations ou aides en nature aux personnes âgées et aux infirmes sont réservées aux personnes justifiant d'une résidence ininterrompue en France d'au moins 15 ans avant l'âge de 70 ans.</p> <p>D'autre part et surtout, les étrangers sont exclus expressément de certaines prestations sociales sous réserve de la signature de conventions internationales de réciprocité, Ces prestations sont essentiellement au nombre de deux ; ce sont des minima sociaux : l'allocation supplémentaire du fonds national de solidarité, et l'allocation aux adultes handicapés» (p.66)</p>	<p>Les mêmes règles président aux versements de l'aide sociale qui est aussi un droit de principe égalitaire » (p. 65-66)</p> <p>«Il faut rappeler que le législateur a prévu pour ce qui concerne l'attribution du RMI un dispositif original, puisque les étrangers demandeurs du RMI doivent justifier d'une résidence régulière et ininterrompue d'au moins 3 ans en France (...). Cette règle a été fixée afin de n'accorder cette prestation nouvelle d'insertion qu'à des étrangers ayant la volonté de s'installer durablement dans notre pays. » (p.66)</p> <p>«Pourquoi modifier un dispositif, certes complexe, mais qui s'est progressivement élargi vers le principe de l'égalité des droits ? » (p.66)</p> <p>« Le souci constant du législateur a été dans le sens de l'intégration d'une population étrangère en situation régulière qui, faute d'aides au logement, à la santé, à la couverture des charges familiales, ne pourrait subsister sur le territoire français sans des inégalités sociales considérables. Par ailleurs même pour les étrangers en situation irrégulière les dispositions de l'aide sociale d'urgence permettent d'éviter le refus de soins médicaux ou d'aides humanitaires, en vertu des principes fondamentaux de notre code de l'Aide sociale » (p.66)</p> <p>« Enfin et surtout, les principes généraux de notre droit rendent impossible la remise en cause de l'égalité de traitement » (p.67)</p> <p>« Le principe de l'égalité des droits a été confirmé par la décision récente du Conseil Constitutionnel. Les actes pris par</p>
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		<p>des autorités administratives introduisant une « préférence nationale » font l’objet de la censure du juge administratif » (p. 67)</p> <p>« La remise en cause du droit au regroupement familial est également exclue, étant bien entendu que ce regroupement ne devrait concerner que la famille restreinte (conjoint et enfants). » (p.67)</p> <p>« Si la condition d’une durée minimum de séjour en France n’est pas interdite pour les prestations non contributives, elle serait très vraisemblablement très difficile – sinon impossible – à introduire pour les prestations d’assurance » (p. 67).</p> <p>« En ce qui concerne l’aide sociale (et elle seulement), l’introduction d’une condition de régularité de séjour remettrait en cause la tradition humanitaire de notre droit, rappelé dans l’article 124 du code de la Famille de de l’Aide sociale » (p.67)</p>
Representati on	No	<p>Yes</p> <p>“Elle doit également être prise en charge par les intéressés eux-mêmes, ce qui suppose consultation, dialogue et participation” (p.54) (about integration policies)</p>
Moral responsibility	No	<p>Yes</p> <p>« C’est pour eux, en commençant par les plus précarisés et les plus exposés aux effets de révoltes, que les pouvoirs publics devront définir des politiques sociales novatrices, coûteuses incontestablement mais combien rentables en termes d’harmonie sociale » (p. 14)</p> <p>«cette politique requiert des moyens ; elle engage la</p>

		responsabilité de l'Etat, sur une durée longue, et non par à-coups lies aux fluctuations des flux migratoires » (p. 54)
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