

APRIL 26, 2017

Explaining Germany's refugee policy change in 2015 using Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework; in comparison with the Netherlands



---

Kathinka Luisa Gaess  
Student number s1723820

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. J. Voorhoeve  
Second reader: Dr. A. Afonso

Master Thesis in Public Administration  
Specialization: International and European Governance  
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs  
University of Leiden



Universiteit  
Leiden

## Executive summary

This research explores the extent to which Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) explains the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands during 2015. Both countries had been conducting restrictive asylum policies during the past 20 years. However, in 2015, at the peak of the European refugee crisis, Germany abruptly transformed its approach to refugees into an open-door policy while the Netherlands continued with its restrictive approach. This led to a remarkable difference in the number of asylum seekers both countries received in 2015; a divergence which served as a point of departure for this research. This paper mainly focuses on the case study of Germany's asylum policy. However, my findings are being compared to a synchronic analysis of the Dutch refugee policy by my colleague Lucia Overpelt.

In order to explain the different developments with regard to policy change, Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework was applied to both cases. However, throughout the study it became apparent that the MSF shows flaws in explaining policy change under certain circumstances. Hence, rather than simply applying the model, this paper also tests the model. The MSF was applied to three decisive policy decisions of the German government in 2015 which reflect a policy change. The data was collected with the application of the process-tracing method.

In my German case study, the findings revealed that the MSF can explain the change in Germany's asylum policy only to a limited extent. Although it correctly describes agenda setting, the model fails to consider important contextual circumstances and interrelationships. The MSF does not include decision making in a crisis situation, nor does it consider policy-making in a multi-level structure like the EU. Additionally, it fails to recognize that different actors, e.g. the German Chancellor, influence the policy-making process through their interaction and verbal power. After comparing those findings to the Netherlands, it became clear that the model fails to explain similar elements for the Dutch case, even though the Netherlands experienced a lower level of crisis and no policy change. This led to the conclusion that the MSF does not adequately explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015, because it lacks crucial factors of context and interaction which are necessary to be included when researching policy-making and policy change in both case studies. Therefore, it is recommended to adjust the current MSF accordingly or to develop a new model for policy change which takes the missing elements into account.

## Declaration of Authorship

I hereby declare that this Master thesis titled *'Explaining Germany's refugee policy change in 2015 using Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework; in comparison with the Netherlands'* has been developed as a final paper for obtaining a Master degree in Public Administration at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. The research process has been supervised by Prof. Dr. Joris Voorhoeve. I hereby confirm that I have authored this Master thesis independently; without external help. I declare that the research material has been duly accredited in the report and that all passages which are generally or literally retrieved from publications and other resources are marked as such.

Den Haag April 26, 2017

*Kathinka Gaess*

## Dedication and words of acknowledgement

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Stephanie and Hanno. For supporting me all my life and for having sparked and nurtured my political interest.

I would like to thank Ken van Mastrigt for supporting me, bearing with me and being there at any moment; Lucia Overpelt for being a great partner in crime and for going through this process together from the beginning until the very end; Prof. Dr. Joris Voorhoeve for inspiring, guiding and supervising me in this thesis process; Vasileios Karakasis for all those hours of technical, scientific and mental support; Stephanie Gaess and Janet Anderson for borrowing their time and brains; Martina Beleva for all those shared library and coffee hours. Last but not least I would like to thank my friends and my sister who have always been patient and supportive. Thank you.

# Table of Contents

.....	1
.....	1
.....	1
Executive summary .....	2
Declaration of Authorship .....	3
Dedication and words of acknowledgement.....	3
List of Figures.....	6
Abbreviations.....	6
<b>1.   Chapter 1: Introduction.....</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1. Thematic overview .....	7
1.2. Methodological aspects .....	9
1.3. Academic and societal relevance .....	9
1.4. A reader's guide .....	10
<b>2.   Chapter 2: Situation Analysis .....</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1 How the crisis unfolded.....	12
2.1.1 <i>Causes and conflicts</i> .....	12
2.1.2 <i>Reasons and motives to flee to Europe</i> .....	13
2.2 How the situation was managed at EU level.....	14
2.3 Germany's change of course in its refugee policy .....	15
2.3.1 <i>History of migration flows and refugee policy in Germany</i> .....	16
2.3.2 <i>Political actions and crisis management in summer 2015</i> .....	17
2.3.3 <i>Portrayal of the issue and the course of asylum policy</i> .....	19
2.3.4 <i>Different responses of civil society and politics to the government's refugee policy</i> .....	20
2.4 Conclusions of the situation analysis.....	21
<b>3.   Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1 Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework .....	23
3.1.1 <i>The framework in perspective</i> .....	23
3.1.2 <i>The three streams</i> .....	25
3.1.3 <i>Policy windows and the role of coupling</i> .....	28
3.2 Literature Review .....	29
3.2.1 <i>The nature of policy change</i> .....	30
3.2.2 <i>Contextual factors: Decision making during times of crisis and in multi-level structures</i> .	30
3.2.3 <i>Participant interaction and verbal power in the political stream</i> .....	34
3.3 Conclusion of the theory section .....	37
<b>4.   Chapter 4: Data Collection and Methods .....</b>	<b>39</b>
4.1. Key concepts, measurement and data sources.....	39
4.2. Research approach and design.....	40
<b>5.   Chapter 5: Findings.....</b>	<b>43</b>
5.1. Decision No. 1: The suspension of the Dublin System in Germany, August 21 – 25, 2015 .....	45
5.1.1 <i>Problem Stream</i> .....	45
5.1.2 <i>Policy stream</i> .....	47
5.1.3 <i>Political stream</i> .....	49
5.1.4 <i>Conclusion political decision No. 1</i> .....	50
5.2. Decision No. 2: The reallocation of refugees from Hungary to Austria and Germany – September 4, 2015 .....	52

5.2.1.	<i>The time between decision No. 1 and No. 2</i> .....	52
5.2.2.	<i>Problem Stream</i> .....	53
5.2.3.	<i>Policy stream</i> .....	56
5.2.4.	<i>Political Stream</i> .....	58
5.2.5.	<i>Conclusion of political decision No. 2</i> .....	60
5.3.	Decision No. 3: The implementation of border controls; no sealing of the border – September 13 .....	62
5.3.1.	<i>The Problem stream</i> .....	62
5.3.2.	<i>The Policy Stream</i> .....	65
5.3.3.	<i>The Political Stream</i> .....	67
5.3.4.	<i>Concluding political decision No. 3</i> .....	68
5.4.	Conclusion of the Findings Chapter .....	70
<b>6.</b>	<b>  Chapter 6: Comparison of the German to the Dutch case</b> .....	<b>74</b>
<b>7.</b>	<b>  Chapter 7: Overall Conclusions</b> .....	<b>79</b>
7.1.	Conclusions .....	79
7.2.	Research limitations and recommendation for further research .....	81
	<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>83</b>
I.	Scientific Sources .....	83
II.	Empirical Sources for Data of Analysis .....	85
	<b>Appendices</b> .....	<b>97</b>
A.	Additional literature .....	97
a.	<i>Policy windows</i> .....	97
b.	<i>Framing</i> .....	97

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015 .....	8
Figure 2: Structural design of the thesis .....	9
Figure 3: First-time applications in 2015 (Eurostat in BBC, 2016).....	12
Figure 4: Funds for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Sly, 2015) .....	13
Figure 5: Important political decisions on Germany’s refugee policy in summer 2015 .....	19
Figure 6: A Multiple Streams Model of Policymaking (Gagnon & Labonte, 2013) .....	29
Figure 7: Triangular relationship between the media, political actors and the public .....	34
Figure 8: Important political decisions on German’s refugee policy in summer 2015 .....	43
Figure 9: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016).....	44
Figure 10: What occupied the public agenda? .....	45
Figure 11: Political decision No. 1 .....	51
Figure 12: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016) .....	57
Figure 13: Political decision No. 2 .....	61
Figure 14: Window of opportunity in decision No. 3.....	65
Figure 15: Political decision No. 3 .....	69
Figure 16: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015 .....	75

## Abbreviations

AfD: Allgemeine für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)

BAMF: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge (German Ministry of Migration and Refugees)

CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)

CSU: Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union = Bavarian Christian Democrats)

EU: European Union

MSF: Multiple Streams Framework

PVV: Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party of the Netherlands)

SPD: Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party of Germany)

UN: United Nations

# 1. | Chapter 1: Introduction

*“Do not underestimate the urgency. Do not underestimate our imperative to act. Winter is approaching – think of the families sleeping in parks and railway stations in Budapest, in tents in Traiskirchen, or on shores in Kos. What will become of them on cold winter nights?”*

– Jean-Claude Juncker

(Juncker, J.-C. in State of the Union speech, 2015)

## 1.1. Thematic overview

The refugee crisis was the most debated topic in Germany in 2015 (Statistica, 2016). While living in the Netherlands, I became aware that refugees are almost invisible on the streets of Dutch cities. One of the reasons is that, in 2015, the Netherlands only received 59.100 refugees which accounts for 0,35% of their population, while Germany took on 890.000 refugees that account for 1,113% of its population (Seiffert & Wormann, 2016). Despite their differences in size, both countries are economically well off, geographically close and culturally similar (DNHK - A, 2017; DNHK - B, 2017). This led to the logical assumption that both countries would handle an identical number of refugees per capita. The fact that this is not the case sparked my interest in the reasons for that remarkable difference in number. Additionally, my fellow student, Lucia Overpelt, developed an interest in the way the Netherlands managed the refugee crisis. This motivated us to compare the two countries.

After conducting situation analyses for both countries we found relevant points of comparison: In 2015, the German government executed a welcoming refugee policy<sup>1</sup> while the Netherlands pursued a policy of discouragement. An interesting side-note is that the Dutch populist party was present in parliament during the year 2015 as the third-strongest party. The German populist party, in contrast, had not yet passed its 5% hurdle to enter parliament. Both countries had pursued a similar asylum policy for the past 20 years that reduced the number of refugees to a minimum. However, in summer 2015, the German government went through a radical shift and transformed its refugee policy from a policy of discouragement into a policy of welcome. The Netherlands, on the other hand, stayed on course with their refugee policy. This remarkable difference in asylum policy of the two countries sparked our interest to write a thesis on the question why one country

---

<sup>1</sup> Please note: Throughout the paper, I will focus on Germany’s refugee/ asylum policy. It concerns those people who applied for asylum, even if they are denied such. Hence, I will not focus on the general migration policy. Therefore, I do not include people who entered Germany due to reasons other than asylum.

changed and the other one pursued its policy approach leading to a substantial difference in the number of received refugees.




Figure 1: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015

The goal of this research is to explain the driving forces of policy change. In this regard, J. W. Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (Abbrev. MSF), which we had elaborately discussed through our Masters, appeared to be the most suitable model. It describes how and what kind of ideas reach the political agenda and cause policy change. It also explores institutions and agency that play a role in the policy process. Hence, it tries to include a variety of dimensions. For this reason, I aimed at applying the MSF in regard to this case study by using the model as a guideline for my data collection. Throughout the research, it became clear that I had to shift my focus from 'simply applying' the model to testing and potentially complementing the model. This is because inconsistencies were detected in the literature review and when applying the model to the case. Both theory and the findings suggested adding supplementary elements to the Kingdon model in order to accurately describe policy change. In sum, the Kingdon model is adequate for data collection, but needs further testing and complementary elements to be fully effective.

The fundamental challenge was the design of a research which includes the following three elements: Two single case studies, a comparison between the two case studies and a framework that needs to be tested and potentially complemented. I decided to work with the following research questions: *To what extent does Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015?* However, in order to answer this question, the following sub-question had to be addressed first: *To what extent does the MSF explain the policy change in Germany?* Using these research questions as a point of departure, I first made a case study for Germany which was based on the situation analysis and the literature. I tested the model on three decisive policy decisions the German government took in

2015. They reflected a change in Germany's asylum policy. Meanwhile, I also had to add in literature based on the findings. From the findings, I was able to answer the sub-question referring to Germany. Subsequently, I compared my findings to Lucia Overpelt who did a synchronic case study for the Netherlands<sup>2</sup>. Based on the comparison I was able to answer the general research question and draw conclusions.

## 1.2. Methodological aspects




Figure 2: Structural design of the thesis

From a scientific point of view, the study is of descriptive nature including exploratory elements. This is because the research documents a causal process while generating new questions to be further researched. It reflects an unusual research process which is partly deductive and partly inductive. This is due to the fact that I apply theory testing as well as theory generation while at the same time going back and forth between theory and findings. Moreover, the research illustrates a qualitative case study which includes the collection of data in form of process tracing. The findings of the single case study are contrasted with Lucia Overpelt's findings. Therefore, this paper also includes a comparative element which enhances the low external validity of the process-tracing method. Finally, it is important to highlight that the research is applied to a realistic time frame. The data collection includes the time from August 1 until September 17, 2015. In this period, the refugee crisis emerged in Germany and the three events of analysis occurred.

## 1.3. Academic and societal relevance

This research will academically contribute to and build upon public administration and public policy research in multiple ways. First, it attempts to explore and explain the driving forces of policy change by applying the Kingdon model to the German refugee policy in the time frame mentioned

<sup>2</sup> L. Overpelt's research can be found in the archive of the University of Leiden under Overpelt, L. (2017). Explaining change and stability with Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) in the Netherlands and Germany during the 2015 refugee crisis. University of Leiden.

above. This is the first time the Kingdon model has been applied to this case which makes it a unique contribution to the academic field of public administration and public policy. Secondly, with this research the MSF is applied to a case which is embedded into a context of crisis and multi-level structures. This connects the model to a wider academic spectrum than just local policy-making as done by Kingdon. In regards to multi-level structures, N. Zahariadis has done relevant pre-work by applying the MSF to policy-making within the European Union (Zahariadis N. , 2008). My work tries to build on his insights by reflecting a case study from the view point of a member state. By applying a model of public policy to a case that is affected by crisis and multi-level diplomacy, I also connect several academic fields with each other. Hence, the results of this research might not only be relevant for public administration/policy scholars, but also to researchers focusing on crisis management and multi-level diplomacy. Thirdly, the MSF, although discussed widely among scholars, has not been fully applied to many cases yet (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). Therefore, this research offers an opportunity to reveal the total value of the model. In addition, this study includes a comparative element by being contrasted to a similar case study. This provides the reader with an insight into a different case- study that made use of the same research approach.

One has to acknowledge the actuality of the matter and the fact that research on the European refugee crisis is still relatively young provides the topic with a high societal relevance. Firstly, when I started with this paper, not much research has been published on the European refugee crisis. In fact, it was a relatively unexplored field. Hence, this study contributes to this exploration process and adds to existing research on the European refugee crisis. Secondly, although the refugee issue is not considered to be a crisis anymore, it will have long-term consequences for member states that received a high number of refugees. Also, until today, the EU is struggling with setting up an effective refugee policy. It has not yet managed to agree on a permanent distribution scheme. For European policy makers, this research might be interesting to understand why some countries pursue open-border and other countries restrictive approaches in regards to their refugee policies. For German policy makers, this research might be valuable to understand why the German government responded to the refugee crisis the way it did. Hence, I believe the topic has societal impact on various political levels.

#### 1.4. A reader's guide

This paper is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 serves as situation analysis which provides background to the way the crisis emerged and the way it was managed on different levels. It also distils the three key policy decisions of the German government that reflect the change in

Germany's refugee policy. Chapter 3 refers to the theoretical framework which is divided into two parts. The first part describes the Multiple Streams Framework. The second part reflects on the discussion of the MSF. Thereby, aspects that were apparent in the situation analysis as well as elements which different scholars deemed as important in regard to the MSF are included. Chapter 4 describes the data collection and the methodology. It explains how the key concepts, the three streams, are measured and which data sources will be used. Additionally, I elaborate on the research approach and design. Chapter 5 reflects on the data collection in which I apply the MSF to the three key decisions of the German government with the help of process tracing. In this way, the sub-research question referring to Germany can be answered. In Chapter 6, I compare my findings to Lucia Overpelt's case-study findings. Here, I eventually answer the main research question. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the paper and provides research limitations and potential for further research.

## 2. | Chapter 2: Situation Analysis

This chapter provides a brief overview of the 2015 refugee crisis, its causes and its management. This includes an insight on how the crisis has been handled at European Union level and at the German government level. In this respect, I will analyse the German change of course in asylum policy on the basis of the country's migration history and three decisive government decisions in 2015. I will put the focus on the government's portrayal of the crisis and the course of its asylum policy. Subsequently, I will analyse different responses of civil society and the political sphere to the government's refugee policy. Thus, this chapter serves as an overview but also as a basis for the literature review in the subsequent chapter.


### 2.1 How the crisis unfolded

2015 can be described as a year in a very violent era counting nine wars and civil wars in the Middle East and the North of Africa (Cockburn, 2015). As a consequence of its geographic proximity, Europe faced its worst displacement crisis since WWII with 1,000,573 refugees reaching its shores by sea in 2015 (Clayton & Holland, 2015). Those people fled their countries due to ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq, as well as conflicts and instabilities in countries like Afghanistan, Eritrea or elsewhere (UNHCR - B, 2016).

#### 2.1.1 Causes and conflicts

The three dominant population groups who were fleeing are Syrians of whom half a million people crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 and account for 50 per cent of all refugees coming to Europe; Afghans who accounted for 20 per cent and Iraqis for seven per cent (Clayton & Holland, 2015).

**Top 10 origins of people applying for asylum in the EU**  
First-time applications in 2015, in thousands



Source: Eurostat

By 2015, Syria found itself in a state of war for more than four years without

*Figure 3: First-time applications in 2015 (Eurostat in BBC, 2016)*

showing any sign of termination (Kingsley, 2015). People's loss of hope in their war-torn countries and the failure of diplomacy to end the wars contributed to 250.000 cases of death and 12 million displaced people serving as the key reasons for the wave of refugees to Europe (Sly, 2015; United

Nations, 2015). The destruction of all means to make a living, the continuation of the conflict and the Islamic State forced half of Syria's 23 million citizens to leave their homes, with four million refugees residing in other countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and the member states of the European Union (Cockburn, 2015; UNHCR - C, 2016).

Afghans and Iraqis also fled their countries due to conflict and war. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights characterized Afghanistan as caught in a "venomous cycle" of violence, because of the intensification of the war after the withdrawal of most international forces (Al Hussein, Z. R. in Grossmann, 2015, para. 5). In 2015, the Afghan government claimed that 80% of the country would be unsafe due to extremist groups such as the Taliban and IS (Kingsley, 2015). The same can be observed in Iraq where the Islamic State has provoked the displacement of 3,3 million people as of December 31, 2015 due to its control of substantial territory and the spread of its sectarian position (Cockburn, 2015; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2016).

### 2.1.2 Reasons and motives to flee to Europe

The reasons and motives why refugees from the Middle East started coming all the way to Europe are multiple. First, refugees in Syria's bordering countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon have been experiencing a situation without any prospects. They are usually not recognized as refugees. Hence, they are denied the right to work and their children often are refused education (Kingsley, 2015). In 2015, 400.000 refugee children in Turkey were not attending school (Human Rights Watch, 2015). In addition, the UN experienced a huge shortfall in funding which significantly reduced the handouts to refugee families (*see Figure 4*). The UN has received less than 50% of what it needed to care for the refugees which presents itself, for instance, in the lack of food and healthcare in Lebanon and Jordan (Grant, 2015; Sly, 2015). This makes the Middle East an unpleasant place to stay. Therefore, many refugees decided to move to Europe, and particularly Germany, to secure their entitled rights under the 1951 refugee convention in the hope for a better life and future (Kingsley, 2015).




Figure 4: Funds for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Sly, 2015)

This hope had been further triggered by two factors: Firstly, an open-border policy coming from the German government signalled the suspension of the Dublin Regulations in August 2015. It

implied the acceptance of any asylum application coming from Syrians, even if they had applied for asylum in other European countries before. This sparked a bigger wave of refugee arrivals, since people no longer feared being arrested in neighbouring Hungary (Kingsley, 2015). Additionally, the more people arrived in Germany, the more people wanted to follow in order to reunite with family members or fellow countrymen (Salloum, 2015). Secondly, more convenient travel routes had been discovered (Kingsley, 2015). Initially, refugees started travelling to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route sailing from Libya to Italy. However, towards summer 2015, visa restrictions in North Africa and the Libyan civil war complicated reaching the Libyan coast. Hence, people realised that crossing the Eastern Mediterranean into Greece and walking the Balkan route seemed a cheaper and safer option. This increased the number of people landing in Greece significantly from 43,000 in 2014 to more than 750,000 in 2015 (Kingsley, 2015; UNHCR, 2016). Meanwhile, the Balkan states facilitated easier travel through their territory (Kingsley, 2015).

The last reason why refugees made their way to Europe needs to be ascribed to the European Union itself. The EU underestimated people's desperation and assumed that refugees would never dare risk their lives and to take the dangerous journey to Europe (Kingsley, 2015; European Union, 2016). Once refugees realised that gaining asylum in Europe is easier than expected they simply forced Europe's hand by actually making the journey themselves. This caused a disorderly process in which anyone was able to reach Europe by joining the Syrian travellers. In the meantime, by failing to relocate a significant number of refugees from Turkey, Europe provided Turkey with little incentive to better protect its own borders (Kingsley, 2015). In sum, the result demonstrated "a perfect storm in which refugees have no reason to stay put; Middle Eastern countries have no incentive to prevent them from leaving; and Europe has no means of blocking their path" (Kingsley, 2015, para. 14).

## 2.2 How the situation was managed at EU level

In spring 2015, the EU member state governments started to feel a sense of urgency after being surprised by the unprecedented number of migrants that started to shift from the Central to the Eastern Mediterranean route (European Union, 2016). In May 2015, the EU decided on a European agenda on migration underlying the need for better migration management and shared responsibilities. It identified actions and measures in the areas of (I) incentive reduction for irregular migration, (II) the securing of external borders and saving of lives, (III) a strong asylum policy and (IV) a new policy that defines legal migration (European Council, 2016). Hence, the EU governments experienced a clear shift in their focus from saving lives towards how to treat people that actually set foot on European territory (European Union, 2016).

However, rapidly, flaws of the pre-existing Dublin Regulations became obvious. It put a tremendous burden on first-entry countries such as Italy and Greece who were in charge of processing the majority of asylum applications. Soon the EU started to discuss burden sharing via reallocation schemes (European Union, 2016). However, this divided the union into two camps. On one side, one could find a majority of the Eastern member states who do not have a tradition of large-scale immigration and feared a loss of identity. On the other side were those who favoured a mandatory reallocation scheme. This was largely preferred by the north-western countries such as Germany who were arguing in favour of the fulfilment of an international human duty including the defence of human rights (Merkel and Lofven in Martinez, 2015; Zafrini, 2016).

Soon, the EU realized that it needed to take some urgent short-term measures to cope with the situation. In summer 2015, the union faced a massive refugee influx via the Greek islands. At that time, Germany experienced the strongest influx due to its suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrians. It became clear that the voluntary reallocation scheme was not showing any effect. Consequently, the Council decided upon the mandatory reallocation of 40.000 (September 14, 2015) and later of an additional 120.000 migrants (September 22, 2015) from Italy and Greece (European Union, 2016). However, the decision to reallocate 120.000 migrants was only made after extensive discussions spread over months, persuasion attempts by the European Commission and the eventual use of the majority voting mechanism<sup>3</sup> (Junker, J.-C. in State of the Union speech, 2015; Council of the European Union, 2015). The use of majority votes is considered to be highly unusual for such a sensitive issue (Council of the European Union, 2015). Thus, in the time frame of this paper<sup>4</sup> the EU coerced its member states into agreeing on the reallocation of 160.000 refugees; however, it failed to make member states agree on a permanent distribution mechanism.

### 2.3 Germany's change of course in its refugee policy

This section analyses the change of course in the German asylum policy based on the country's history in migration and refugee policy<sup>5</sup> and three decisive government decisions in 2015. Additionally, I will focus on the government's motives and framing of the crisis and its refugee

---

<sup>3</sup>Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary voted against mandatory quotas and Finland abstained.

<sup>4</sup>Exceeding the time frame of this paper: In September, the urgency to regain control of external borders and the registration process of refugees became apparent. Therefore, the instalment of registration hotspots and the development of a joint action programme with Turkey were agreed upon (European Union, 2016). The deal with Turkey entered into force in March 2016 and included 3 billion of support funding to Turkey, a one-to-one exchange mechanism which comprised that refugees that reach the Greek islands illegally should be brought back to Turkey in exchange for registered refugees being sent by Turkey to the EU, and the drop of visa requirements for Turkish citizens within the EU (Reimann A. et al., 2016).

<sup>5</sup>Please note: Throughout the paper, I will be focusing on Germany's refugee/ asylum policy. It concerns those people who applied for asylum, even if they are denied such. Hence, I will not focus on the general migration policy. Therefore, I do not include people who entered Germany due to reasons other than asylum.

policy. Eventually, I will analyse the most important responses to the government's refugee policy by the civil society and the political sphere.

### 2.3.1 History of migration flows and refugee policy in Germany

In order to understand how the German government made a U-turn in its refugee policy, some brief facts about Germany's migration history and the development of its asylum policy need to be highlighted. Although I do not focus on Germany's general migration policy, I consider it to be important to reflect on Germany's overall migration history as it is often linked to a country's refugee policy. The country experienced four crucial migration influxes since the WWII. First, between 1944 and 1948, 12 million German citizens and ethnic Germans had to leave their homes in the former Eastern parts of Germany that were annexed by the Soviet Union or Poland. They were forced to find a home in Germany or Austria. Germany struggled with receiving and caring for such a high number of refugees due to a chaotic post-war situation marked by destruction and poverty (Herm & Kubitzka, 2015). The second wave, occurring between 1955 and 1973, featured economic motives. Approximately 2.6 million 'guest workers' from Greece, Turkey, Italy and Spain were invited to participate in the economic rise of Germany (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016). Third, the most recent immigration wave Germany experienced occurred in the 90s due to the end of the cold war and the German reunification (Oezcan, 2004). Between 1988 and 2003 three million 'resettlers'<sup>6</sup> returned to Germany. Its number peaked in the early 90s with 390.000 resettlers arriving in 1992 alone (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016). In the same year, 438,190 asylum applications were filed mainly from citizens of the former Yugoslavia and Romania (Bade & Oltmer, 2005). This number comes close to the 2015 number. However, it is important to consider that only 4,2 % of the refugees in 1992 were granted asylum while around 60% of the refugees in 2015 received the asylum status<sup>7</sup> (Pro Asyl, 2017; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.a.).

From this time on, the German government frequently reformed its asylum law which usually concluded in its intensification and an ever-decreasing number of refugees entering the country. In 1992, the government decided upon 'the asylum compromise in order to deal with the immigration pressure and the social and economic challenges of the reunification,'. It was ground-breaking, since it implied denying asylum applications from "safe third countries" (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016, p. 6). Additionally, a policy of discouragement was pursued which included the

---

<sup>6</sup> Resettlers are ethnic Germans who had left the country in order to migrate to the former Soviet states since the 18th century (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016)

<sup>7</sup> Please note: Refugees from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea had an almost 100% chance to be granted asylum in 2015 (Pro Asyl, 2017)

'Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz' in 1993. It resulted in asylum applicants receiving only a small amount of money to make a living. At times, the amount was less than the standard unemployment benefit (Heißler, 2015). Therefore, asylum numbers decreased substantially (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016). Another reason for the decrease is the Dublin Regulation which entered into force in 1997. Since most of the countries bordering with Germany were participants of the Dublin Regulation, refugees attempting to apply for asylum in Germany could only do so by entering the country by airplane. Consequently, since 2004, only 50.000 people applied for asylum in Germany (Heißler, 2015).

In the past ten years, the German government swayed back and forth in its refugee policy. Once the number of asylum seekers was perceived too low due to demographic deficits and labour shortage the parliament agreed on the 'Zuwanderungsgesetz' in 2004. Together with better conditions for EU workers, the law also relaxed the restrictions of asylum recognition and improved the status of refugee families (Oezcan, 2004; Heißler, 2015). For this reason, the number of asylum seekers started to increase since 2010. Especially refugees from states in crisis such as Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan made their way to Germany. Once the number was perceived as too high, the government declared the Balkan states - Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina - as safe countries in order to terminate the stay of asylum seekers from these countries more quickly (Heißler, 2015). Hence, in the past 20 years, Germany represented a rather restrictive refugee policy. Every slight increase of asylum seekers was followed by containment measures.

During the 2015 refugee crisis, the fourth event, the German government responded unusually late. Although local communities had already been warning in winter 2015 while transit countries started preparing in spring 2015, the officials in Berlin refused to undertake action. For instance, a request from the Ministry of Migration to hire additional staff in order to quickly process old cases was declined (Amann M. et al., 2015). The low-migration profile Germany pursued for the last 20 years as well as the Dublin Regulation made Germany an almost unreachable country for asylum seekers. These factors contributed to the non-preparedness of the German government in regard to this refugee crisis.

### 2.3.2 Political actions and crisis management in summer 2015

In summer 2015, Germany was drifting into a state of crisis. It had the highest number of asylum applicants it had had in many years as well as the highest number in Europe. Several conditions aggravated the situation. The Dublin Regulation was starting to show flaws, because reception countries let refugees pass without registration. Germany counted more than 1,000 refugees

entering the country without permission on a single day in July. However, German authorities were no longer allowed to send asylum seekers back to Greece as the country was in such bad financial condition. Moreover, via the Balkan route, affluent Germany and global suffering was linked eventually (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Those conditions caused a high amount of pressure on German authorities. It led to the need to pursue actions that would change Germany's refugee policy eventually.

The German government reacted to the refugee influx with three decisive measures that represent a welcoming refugee policy approach (see Figure 5). These measures are of great importance and will be further analysed throughout the paper. First, on August 25, 2015 Germany suspended the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees. It implied that once they reached German ground, refugees would not be sent back immediately. This decision was made public by an accidental document leak of an overstretched Ministry of Migration<sup>8</sup> (Abé et al., 2015). The announcement of this decision triggered a wave of enthusiasm amongst Syrians to travel to Germany and among non-Syrians to find ways of hiding their identities (Welt N24, 2016; Alkousaa et. al, 2016). As the influx increased administrations started to struggle and needed to be assisted by civil society (Bochow, 2015). This is when the German Chancellor released her famous "Wir schaffen das."<sup>9</sup> statement on August 31. It was debated in the media as either an attempt to transform Germany into a moral superpower, or as a compassionate statement free from any tactic and calculation (Abé et al., 2015).

As a second decision, on September 4, Germany and Austria jointly agreed on absorbing thousands of refugees that were stranded in Hungary (Welt N24, 2016). Budapest had turned into a favoured travel stop for refugees from which they were unable to depart due to the Dublin Regulation. However, on August 31, the Hungarian government allowed the first trains to leave Budapest with the destination of Munich. The Austrian and German government condemned this action and urged Hungary to adhere to the Dublin rules (Kasperek & Speer, 2015). Thus, communication between EU member states seemed to be disturbed intentionally or unintentionally (ARD, 31.08.2015). On September 4, a group of thousand refugees who were tired of waiting in Budapest started walking towards Austria along the highway. It became known as the #marchofhope. The media were closely following their walk and reported on the circumstances under which those people had to sleep on the highway in the rain (Domokos, 2015). This put sufficient pressure on Merkel and the Austrian Chancellor Faymann to open the borders. Hence, during the weekend of September 4-6, trains

---

<sup>8</sup>Please note, throughout the paper, I will make use of the German abbreviation BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) when referring to the Ministry of Migration and Refugees

<sup>9</sup> Translated the statement signifies: „We can do it!“

began officially departing from Budapest to Germany. That weekend, refugees entering Germany amounted to 20,000 (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). This decision was framed as a joint exception to EU law (Streiter and Steinmeier in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2015). However, it turned out to be irreversible leading to Germany's permanent open-border policy.

The third political decision was a direct consequence of the second decision. Due to the open borders, the number of refugees entering Germany increased significantly (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). The city of Munich had to carry the main burden and was dependent on the help of thousands of volunteers. At one point, the city's mayor announced the Munich's near collapse, because the city was unable to accommodate any more refugees (Reiter, D. in ARD, 12.09.2015). German government officials were forced to find a solution which should limit the influx. One of the




Figure 5: Important political decisions on Germany's refugee policy in summer 2015

discussed options was the sealing of the borders. However, Merkel decided not to limit but to decelerate the influx by 'only' implementing border controls. This measure would not turn refugees away but send a clear signal of Germany remaining open to them, instead (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Concluding, these three political measures in response to the 2015 crisis clearly reflect a political change in Germany's asylum policy. This open-door policy significantly contributed to the high number of 890.000 refugees that entered the country in 2015 (de Maizère in der Spiegel, 2016).

### 2.3.3 Portrayal of the issue and the course of asylum policy

The crucial policy actions towards a welcoming refugee policy strongly centred around Merkel's opinion, assertiveness and crisis perception. Merkel portrayed her actions with arguments based on values and practicalities. She regarded it as the Germans' moral duty to represent a refugee welcoming country (Merkel in Anne Will, 2015). When she was asked how it feels to be the face of

a friendly Germany, she responded that she was happy that Germany, too, is now a country that is able to provide hope to people abroad. She added that when looking at the country's history, that this is something of great value (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Here, the feeling of guilt in relation to the German past might have played a crucial role (Freedland, 2015). Other argumentations for a refugee friendly attitude were of practical nature and derived from the skills shortage and the ageing of German society. Refugees were often framed as a boost for the economy (Bundesregierung, 2016). In this regard, humanitarian and moral values as well as practical reasons served as justification for the open-border policy.

The Chancellor, the media and the public opinion created what became known as the 'Willkommenskultur'<sup>10</sup>. Merkel chose to lead the situation by saying that Germany is able to cope with the challenge. She embodied a positive framing of the crisis and her crisis management. In this regard, the famous 'Wir schaffen das.' statement, encouraging words to the German citizens in Sunday evening prime time interviews, as well as visits to refugee centres and selfies taken with refugees reflected her personal and political attitude (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015; Merkel in Anne Will, 2015). The positive portrayal of the challenge was backed up by the 'Willkommenskultur' Germans were providing at train stations in the first weeks of the massive arrivals (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Also, the media only reported positively on the atmosphere in the country (see findings). The German government experienced a strong boost of confidence, as it seemed, through the fact that a great part of the country was ready and willing to jointly manage the situation (Amann et al., 2015). With the legitimation of the public and the media, the culture of welcome turned into a policy of welcome.

#### 2.3.4 Different responses of civil society and politics to the government's refugee policy

As the crisis intensified the German government received a variety of responses to their asylum policy course from European and national political leaders, German parties and citizens.

At the European level, opinions were divided about Germany's policy course. On the one hand, particularly Eastern European member states opposed Germany's attempt at an open-door policy. For instance, the Hungarian government condemned Germany's suspension of the Dublin system and declared that the refugee crisis needs to be regarded a 'German problem' (Orbán, V., Schulz,

---

<sup>10</sup> Translation: Culture of Welcome; The term describes the intercultural competence and openness of a society that appreciates immigration and inclusiveness (Heckmann, 2012). Throughout this paper, I use the German term 'Willkommenskultur', because even the international media made use of the German term when referring to the German civil society which engaged into the refugee matter.

M. in press conference, 2015). Also, Great Britain which refused to contribute to a European asylum solution and Denmark which temporarily suspended its train connections to Germany became part of the opposition (Amann et al., 2015; Abé et al., 2015). On the other hand, neighbouring countries such as France and Austria supported Germany's open-door policy and continued promoting a fair European distribution system. In addition, the EU institutions supported Germany's course. However, they were unable to do more than persuading as their hands were tied due to the divided member states (Merkel, A., Fayman, W., Vučić, A., Mogherini, F. in press conference, 2015).

Also on the national level, a clear division of opinions became apparent. Merkel received criticism for her course from certain political actors. One that went as far as opposing her in public was Horst Seehofer, the Bavarian governor and leader of the CSU, the Bavarian CDU sister party. He publicly stated that it was a mistake to circumvent the EU asylum rules and demanded a cap on refugees and the sealing of the borders (Welt N24, 2016). Furthermore, he affronted Merkel by inviting the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, to Bavaria to discuss the crisis (Amann et al., 2015). On the other hand, Merkel received support from the rest of the governing coalition including the Christian and the Social Democrats (Zeit online, 2015). Even, the Left Party saw the necessity of the political decisions leading to an open-door policy (Gysi, G. in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015, 2015).

Another actor that made its voice heard was the media. In the period during which the most defining decisions were taken, the media solely reported positively on refugees and the government's decisions (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). Even the conservative and sensationalist BILD newspaper did not find fault with the decision to suspend the Dublin Regulation for Syrians (Bild, 2015). This attitude also seemed to reflect in the overall public opinion which was characterized by a compassionate and refugee welcoming civil society. The German 'Willkommenskultur' was celebrated internationally as TV pictures of Germans greeting refugees on train stations circulated (AlJazeera, 2016). In the following weeks, ten per cent of the Germans engaged in volunteering activities for refugee matters (Kamann, 2015). However, pictures of burning asylum accommodations and right-wing protestors also circulated. These pictures reminded politicians of the fact that a small part of Germany does not agree with the asylum course of the government (ARD, 18.08.2015). The media and politicians sharply condemned these people and their motives (Hollande, F. and Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015); (Gauck in Zeit Online, 2015, para. 1; Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015).

## 2.4 Conclusions of the situation analysis

In 2015, the refugee crisis surprised the European Union which had underestimated people's

desperation and the courage to risk their lives by taking the dangerous journey to Europe. Reasons why people fled from crisis countries in the Middle East and Africa to Europe were various. They included an inhumane situation without prospects in the neighbouring countries, the German suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrians, the discovery of the Balkan route and the recognition that applying for asylum in the EU is relatively easy. This put pressure on the union to implement necessary measures. The EU responded with the creation of a European agenda on migration and shifted its focus from saving lives to the treatment of people that set foot on EU territory. Due to the flaws in the Dublin Regulations, member states engaged in discussions on burden sharing and permanent reallocation schemes. Eastern member states opposed permanent distribution schemes while Western member states favoured them. Due to those diverging member state interests, only a reallocation of 160.000 refugees from Italy and Greece was agreed upon. Hence, no agreement on a permanent distribution mechanism was reached.

Germany, too, found itself surprised and unprepared due to the previous adoption of a low migration profile. The high refugee influx transformed the country into a state of crisis. As a reaction, the German government engaged in measures that reflected an open-door policy which were justified with arguments based on values and practicalities. In this context, three decisive policy decisions reflect the government's change of course: the suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees, the absorption of the refugees in Hungary, and the decision to implement border controls without sealing the border for refugees. Hence, Germany responded to the crisis with a policy change.

Chancellor Merkel significantly contributed to the positive portrayal of the crisis and her policy approach and enjoyed support from a big part of German society and the media. This helped legitimizing a significant policy change away from the discouraging asylum policy it pursued for the past 20 years. However, the open-door policy also received public criticism from within her party. Additionally, right wing protests and violence posed a strong contrast to the German 'Willkommenskultur' that was celebrated internationally as Germans welcomed and took care of arriving refugees on train stations. Nevertheless, in the end, Mrs. Merkel's policy approach allowed for 890,000 registered refugees to arrive in Germany in 2015.

## 3. | Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

The theory section is composed of two parts. First, I will explain in detail the Multiple Streams Framework which serves as guideline for the data collection that will be elaborated on in Chapter 5. Secondly, I will review the literature that adds, criticizes or emphasizes on the MSF. The literature is based on the findings of the situation analysis and on general debates circulating around the MSF.

### 3.1. Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework

The Multiple Stream Framework (abbrev. MSF) which is part of John W. Kingdon's agenda-setting theory was originally published in 1984. It is regarded one of the most relevant and debated theories of public policy (Baumgartner in Zahariadis N., 2016). For this paper, it serves as a theoretical guideline for the data collection which is summarized in the findings chapter. Generally, the model has received much appraisal as well as critique and was tested in a variety of policy fields. However, it is important to note that the number of times the full model has been applied to reality is sparse. Although a significant number of researchers have referred to Kingdon's MSF they have usually done so by identifying individual elements of the model (such as policy entrepreneur or window of opportunity) in order to provide background to their papers. However, researchers rarely have applied those concepts directly. A significantly smaller number of researchers have made actual use of the elements in their analysis while an even smaller number has applied the full MSF to policy analysis (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). Hence, I also hope to contribute to the body of research by applying the full model to reality as coherently as possible.

For the case of the German refugee policy approach in 2015, the MSF has been chosen as a framework for data collection but also as a model to be challenged and tested. Kingdon argues that the MFS explains how and what kind of ideas reach the political agenda and eventually cause policy change (Kingdon, 2011). Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis (2013) add that the model explores which actors participate during a window of opportunity, how issues are framed and how skilled policy entrepreneurs politically manipulate the process. Thus, I expect the model to help explain the driving forces behind the changes in German asylum policy. Additionally, Lucia Overpelt and I would like to explore how and why the German policy approach differed to the one of the Netherlands.

#### 3.1.1. The framework in perspective

With the Multiple Streams Framework, Kingdon aimed at expressing the chaotic and unpredictable nature of the American public policy-making process while still carving out clear patterns. By providing a tool to understand the agenda-setting process, the MSF explains how ideas move up on

the agenda. Its point of departure is Cohen, March and Olsen's Garbage Can Model (Kingdon, 2011). It describes how four streams that have a life of their own run through an organization: Problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. The moment a choice opportunity runs by available participants, problems and solutions evoke change. A choice opportunity can be viewed as a garbage can into which a variety of problems and solutions are cast off by participants as they are generated (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). The MSF shows Kingdon's attempt to apply the Garbage Can Model to the political setting.

According to Kingdon, there are two important factors that need to be considered when investigating which issues arrive on the agenda in the public policy-making process: Processes and participants. First, the MFS includes three processes: Problems, policy proposals and politics (see *Figure 6*). These are independent streams which develop in accordance with their own rules and dynamics. Despite their independence, there is a critical juncture at which the three streams intersect. This means that "a problem is recognized, a solution is available, the political climate makes the time right for change, and the constraints do not prohibit action." (Kingdon, 2011, p.88). At this point, policy entrepreneurs, who have developed policy proposals and waited for problems or changes in the political stream to come along, attach their solutions. Consequently, this might evoke policy change. The opportunity for an entrepreneur to push a proposal is called 'policy window'. It is usually only open for a short time before it closes again, since policy makers soon focus their attention on something else (Kingdon, 2011). As a second factor, the role of participants inside<sup>11</sup> and outside<sup>12</sup> the government needs to be highlighted. Participants can be involved in any or in several streams of the MSF. Kingdon emphasizes that is important to make a differentiation between participants and processes (Kingdon, 2011). In general, it needs to be acknowledged that in other countries, different participants might be involved in the policy process than the ones Kingdon defined for the American context.

The MSF is based on three approaches which include the tracing of origins of initiatives, rational and comprehensive decision making, and incrementalism. With the tracing of origins Kingdon wants to illustrate that the proximate origin of policy change varies from case to case. Due to an infinite regress, an ultimate origin of an idea or proposal cannot be specified. Additionally, topics do not move from participant to participant with a regular pattern. Hence, if a person would trace back the path of a proposal's history, there would be no logical place to stop the process (Kingdon, 2011).

---

<sup>11</sup> Participants inside the government comprise the administration including the President and staff, civil servants and the Congress (Kingdon, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Participants outside the government include interest groups; researchers, academics, consultants, foundations and think tanks; the media; election-related participants and the public opinion (Kingdon, 2011).

Secondly, the approach of comprehensive and rational decision making should emphasize the fact that policy makers actually do not make decisions rationally. Kingdon justifies this by pointing out their failure to define goals clearly and to compare alternatives systematically. This goes hand in hand with his denial of the fact that policy proceeds in orderly stages. He rather claims that streams develop independently and are logically coequal (Kingdon, 2011). Thirdly, Kingdon expresses his disagreement with Charles Lindblom who argues that policy change occurs incrementally (Kingdon, 2011; Lindblom, 1959). His study proves that agendas change in a discontinuous and non-incremental manner (Kingdon, 2011). These three elements serve as baseline for his model.

### 3.1.2. The three streams

The three streams form the fundamentals of the MSF. They are marked by different characteristics and composed of different factors (*see Figure 6*).

#### 3.1.2.1. The problem stream

The problem stream describes how conditions receive attention and subsequently transform into political problems. Problems attract attention of people in and around government by focusing events, such as crises or disasters; by feedback of current programs and by systematic indicators and indicator changes. Firstly, indicators refer to activities and events such as disease rates, consumer prices, or highway deaths. Indicators are mostly assessed to understand a problem's magnitude or to raise awareness of changes in a problem. Additionally, people around and in government look for changes in indicators, because they might represent a change in a system's state. Secondly, focusing events might turn people's attention to indicators or problems if they are not self-evident. For instance, disasters or crises represent focusing events. Thirdly, feedback serves as a more programmatic factor than indicators. Feedback about the operation of existing programs that reach government officials often bring problems to their attention. Contents of feedback messages can include the realisation that a programme's implementation does not square with higher or legislative administrative intent; the failure to meet stated goals; the cost of a programme or unanticipated consequences of a public policy that comes to the attention of decision makers (Kingdon, 2011).

Some attention needs to be devoted to the way problems are defined. A condition does not necessarily have to be a problem. It might transform into a problem when people start believing that they need to do something about it. Hence, conditions translate into problems with the help of values, comparisons and categories. People define problems by comparing their current situation

with the values they have regarding more ideal situations. A mismatch between one's conception of an ideal state and the observed conditions becomes a problem. Additionally, problems are defined by the comparison people make about their own situation with other countries. For instance, relative disadvantages and inequality might pose a problem. Lastly, the way people categorize subjects defines problems. In that sense, struggle over a problem definition might depend on the defining categories and the way they will be used. This implies that people might be unable to judge a problem by its category, but a category can structure the perception people have about a problem (Kingdon, 2011).

#### 3.1.2.2. The policy stream

The policy stream describes policy communities which concentrate on generating policy proposals. Kingdon refers to the 'primeval soup' when he describes ideas floating around and fading in these policy communities (Kingdon, 2011, p. 116). Existing and new ideas confront each other and combine in various ways. Ideas that meet certain criteria survive and turn into important policies as in a natural selection process (Kingdon, 2011).

Some attention needs to be paid to the role of policy communities and policy entrepreneurs. Firstly, policy communities consist of intimate cycles of specialists in a certain policy area who are scattered both within and outside government. They share a common concern with one policy area and interact with each other. In policy communities, intellectual puzzles and dilemmas are being solved and alternatives developed by muddling through proposals and problems. Secondly, the role of policy entrepreneurs is to advocate for proposals and ideas (Kingdon, 2011). They do so by crafting meaning which they disseminate to policy makers to gain attention and to mobilize support (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). While they do not necessarily need to be part of a policy community, they are willing to invest their resources in the hope for a future return. Their generation of solutions can occur in two ways: They either sense a problem and advocate a solution to solve it; or they become advocates for solutions and look for current problems to which they attach their pet solutions. Hence, policy communities and entrepreneurs are essential for the success of a policy proposal (Kingdon, 2011).

Policy entrepreneurs make use of a variety of tactics to ensure the successful adoption of their proposals. The most important one is the 'softening up technique'. It involves advocating for their ideas in many different forums which softens up change resistant policy communities and publics that get used to new ideas and build acceptance. When an opportunity emerges that allows for pushing a proposal, the way has been paved. Without this procedure, a proposal might fail to

succeed, even when being pushed at the right time (Kingdon, 2011). Secondly, their proposals will have an increased chance to survive when matching three criteria - technical feasibility, value acceptability and anticipation of future constraints. Hence, a successful proposal is usually softened-up and fulfils the three criteria (Kingdon, 2011).

### 3.1.2.3. The political stream

The political stream constitutes the broader environment in which policy is made (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). It is assembled from partisan, electoral or pressure group factors. It sets itself apart from happenings in the policy communities and from the problem stream. Developments in the political stream affect agendas, because they possess the power to push new items on the agenda while ensuring that other items get postponed (Kingdon, 2011).

The first element of the political stream is the national mood<sup>13</sup>. It is predicated on the assumption that a large number of citizens think along the same lines. The mood can change from time to time and these changes can significantly impact on policy agendas and outcomes. Government participants sense the national mood in order to promote items on their policy agenda and to prevent others from becoming prominent by pushing them into obscurity. Therefore, changes in the national mood affect the administration's success in creating new proposals. The mood does not necessarily evolve from the masses, but can come from anywhere. For instance, social movements can change the mood when being effectively organized and led. Successful movements can spill into the general public and eventually have electoral impact. As a result, politicians often jump on the bandwagon which can add up to the kind of shift in the national mood. Consequently, a mood shift can make certain proposals viable that were not viable before, and outweigh alternative proposals (Kingdon, 2011).

The second element of the political stream refers to organized political forces. Kingdon mainly focuses on interest groups. However, in the German system, parties and their spokespersons who are often represented as political elites need to be included as well. They might be more outspoken and influential in Germany than in the US because the multi-party system allows for their wider involvement in the policy-making process. In this connection, Hill criticizes Kingdon for underplaying the dimension of politics in the agenda-setting process (Hill, 2013). Furthermore, it is important to understand that those forces create the environment in which political decision makers have to balance between the pro- and contra arguments on a given proposal or the rise of an agenda item.

---

<sup>13</sup> Please note: National mood and public opinion can be used interchangeably throughout this paper.

People around and in the government, sense the interplay of support and opposition through communication flows (Kingdon, 2011). While in the policy stream consensus is mainly built through persuasion, the political stream is dominated by bargaining (Kingdon, 2011).

The third element is composed of events within the government such as turnovers of key personnel and questions of jurisdictions. The turnover of personnel might lead to the generation of new priorities onto the agenda. The question of jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns itself with constitutions, statutes, charters and regulations. In this respect, agenda setting is affected by the turf battles of administrative agencies and committees (Kingdon, 2011). Concluding, the national mood, political forces and events within government compose the political stream.

### 3.1.3. Policy windows and the role of coupling

Next, the role and functioning of policy windows and coupling needs to be explained. A policy window is “the result of an iterative process between problems, solutions, actors and events.” (Natali, 2004, p. 1080). When policy windows open, the coupling of the three streams is most likely to happen. Hence, a problem is defined, a solution is created and pushed by an entrepreneur and a political change provides the right time for policy change. It describes the moment when proposals are linked to political exigencies, and alternatives are introduced once the agenda changes. In this respect, it is important to recognize that the window is only open for a short time period during which the different streams join and are coupled. Then entrepreneurs push their problem conceptions, political forces and proposals into the choice opportunity. The outcomes depend on how the elements are mixed and coupled. The agenda is more likely to be affected by the political and the problems stream while the alternatives are influenced by the policy stream. Therefore, a window opens because of a new problem which captures attention or because of a shift in the political stream such as a change of administration, a political turnover or a change in the national mood (Kingdon, 2011). It is important to be aware that windows can be of predictable or unpredictable nature. In the unpredictable case the joining is accidental and forces the government to move one direction or the other (Kingdon, 2011). Hence, the appearance of a policy window can cause significant consequences.




Figure 6: A Multiple Streams Model of Policymaking (Gagnon & Labonte, 2013)

### 3.2. Literature Review

The intellectual impact of Kingdon's agenda-setting theory has been discussed widely. Many researchers (partly) applied his model and deemed it as a useful tool compatible with a variety of policy arenas (Baumgartner, 2015; Sabatier, 2007). Nevertheless, it is argued that the model lacks clarity and internal consistency (Sabatier, 2007). One possible reason is that Kingdon only focuses on the agenda-setting process in the US. However, scholars argue that one should not hold this against him, because he provides a general, useful toolkit to explain contextual change (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013; Hill, *The Public Policy Process*, 2013). Cairney and Zahariadis perceive the MSF as a lens that explains US policy under the conditions of ambiguity. In their opinion its major strength lies in providing an insight in interactions between institutions and agency (Cairney & Zhariadis, 2016). In this regard, the model explains the way the policy process works in "organized anarchies", where there is a shifting roster of participants, opaque technologies, and individuals with unclear preferences" (Cairney & Zhariadis, 2016, para. 1).

The literature review provides a discussion of elements of the MSF that seem to be relevant according to the situation analysis and according to important scholars in the field.

### 3.2.1. The nature of policy change

At first, it is crucial to address a general debate surrounding the MSF that is of importance to this case study – the questions whether policy changes occur in an incremental or an abrupt manner. On the one hand, Lindblom claims that policy change occurs in small incremental steps. They proceed from small, marginal adjustments made by policy makers whose behaviour he describes as ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959). Kingdon agrees with the non-rational decision making, but disagrees with Lindblom on the fact that policy proceeds in orderly stages. He argues that the generation of alternatives can be regarded as an incremental process, but that this does not apply to agenda changes which happen in a non-incremental and discontinuous way (Kingdon, 2011). This view is supported by Baumgartner and Jones who claim that public attention to social issues cannot be described as being incremental. Here, they refer to the public agenda which often experiences dramatic sudden agenda changes evoked by negative feedback in agenda-setting processes and politics. With their theory of ‘punctuated equilibria’, they claim that large shifts occur in which the agenda is reset more radically after it experienced a period of stability and minor adaptations (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). This theory is developed further by Capocchia & Kelemen who refer to critical junctures. In the context of path-dependent processes, critical junctures are short moments during which agent choices encounter an increased probability to affect the outcome of interest. Hence, agents have more freedom in decision-making. It is important to recognize that the decisions made within a critical juncture may evoke a path-dependent process (Capocchia & Kelemen, 2007). The situation analysis suggests the likelihood of a critical juncture in combination with a path-dependent sequence; however, the details need to be investigated in the data collection process.

### 3.2.2. Contextual factors: Decision making during times of crisis and in multi-level structures

When the refugee influx increased in Germany, the government needed to make decisions that were affected by a crisis and by multi-level diplomacy. Those contextual factors which influence the problem and the policy stream are disregarded by the MSF.

#### 3.2.2.1. Decision making in a crisis mode

A crisis might change the nature and operational procedures of the policy stream. As the situation analysis suggests Germany found itself in a crisis mode. In his book, Kingdon refers to the opening of policy windows through crises, but he does not refer to the circumstances of policy-making in crisis situations. Rather, he assumes that policy entrepreneurs and policy-makers have sufficient

time to flesh out one of many solutions to a problem. However, according to literature more complex policy windows such as those caused by a crisis might change the decision-making procedures and therefore the nature of the policy stream as a primeval soup as well as the nature of policy entrepreneurs.

First of all, it is important to define crisis and the circumstances that accompany the people dealing with it. A crisis is “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.” (Rosenthal, Charles, & t'Hart, 1989, p. 10). It is composed of three elements – threat, uncertainty and urgency. Threat alone does not necessarily lead to action (e.g. climate change); however, it is time compression that urges leaders to act. Time constraints also signify that the usual policy-making methods of debating and selecting the most suitable proposal cannot be applied. Moreover, the fact that decisions are often highly consequential while involving dilemmas and uncertainties about future developments requires leaders to be discrete. Furthermore, during crises, citizens look at their leaders, because they expect them to minimize the damage of the crisis and eliminate the threat (Boin et al., 2005). Thus, leaders face the responsibility “to help safeguard society from the adverse consequences of the crisis” and guide the nation out of the crisis (Boin et al., 2005, p. 10). These circumstances force leaders to act quickly and often only under consultation of a very close group of decision makers (Boin et al., 2005).

This unusual manner of decision making contradicts the MSF model in three ways. Firstly, it provides political leaders with more power than indicated by Kingdon. In his book, Kingdon only devotes a small section to ‘the president’. In this connection, he indicates that the president can set the agenda singlehandedly and that his bills take the first spot in the queue. However, he also states that the president is unable to dominate the serious alternatives and therefore to determine the policy outcome (Kingdon, 2011). Though, literature suggests that leaders take on key decision making roles during crises. Also, the situation analysis makes us believe that Chancellor Merkel, as a leader, had a crucial role in the policy debate. However, because Kingdon does not refer to policy-making in crisis situations, he underestimates the potential power of political leaders.

Secondly, there is reason to believe that policy communities have a less important role in decision making during crises. The fact that leaders need to make quick and discrete decisions implies that alternatives are not being chosen after being discussed in official forums or policy communities attended by policy entrepreneurs. If this was true, then the policy stream as described by Kingdon might not apply to a crisis situation like the one we are analysing.

Thirdly, connected to both previous points is the assumption that political leaders might act as key decision makers and as policy entrepreneurs at the same time. Originally, policy entrepreneurs are the crucial means of producing action while crafting contestable meaning which they disseminate to policy makers (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). They influence policy change by choosing the alternatives decision makers can pick from (Kingdon, 2011). When decision makers become policy entrepreneurs they potentially develop and choose their own policy solutions. In contrast to Kingdon's understanding, this means that they possess the power to steer the direction of policy outcomes (Zahariadis N. , 2008). This option is widely discussed even in relation to non-crisis scenarios. According to scholars, there are different reasons why those roles can blur. Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis (2013) who claim that EU decision-making takes place in an environment dominated by ambiguity suggest that policy entrepreneurs must be seen in their context in order to apprehend their influence in policy change. Political actors are rational and self-determining while operating in particular contexts. For this reason, they might engage in "creative policy-making strategies" (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013, p. 14). Another reason why the line between decision makers and policy entrepreneurs might blur is connected to the crisis scenario. Certain policy issues which are salient in policy windows might be so complex that they demand a unique solution and do not leave much room to manoeuvre for entrepreneurial agency. The same applies to windows that create short-term, time-pressured political agendas (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). In this respect, the general assumption is that 'something needs to be done' (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). Here, it is the nature of the policy window that forces decision makers to create and choose a policy solution which makes them become policy entrepreneurs (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). Hence, Ackrill & Kay claim that the separation between policy entrepreneurs and decision makers as suggested by Kingdon is too stark. They recommend to draw an analytical distinction between the policy entrepreneurs as individuals and the process describing policy entrepreneurship (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). When considering policy entrepreneurship as a set of behaviours, rather than a permanent characteristic, it allows for better apprehension of actions made in certain policy-making situations (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). Concluding, the question whether the policy stream changes its nature under the influence of a crisis needs to be addressed in the research.

#### 3.2.2.2. Multi-level diplomacy

The situation analysis shows that the political struggle related to the refugee crisis did not only include the national decision-making level, but also the European level. However, Kingdon's framework lacks the inclusion of multi-level structures and two-level games, since policy solutions are largely produced domestically in his framework (Cairney & Zhariadis, 2016). Hence, the

question whether outside factors and decision making in the context of a multi-level structure affects the three streams in the national setting needs to be addressed.

At this point, one must acknowledge that issues as well as responses in form of decision-making processes have become more global since the first time the MSF was published. In respect to the refugee crisis, Rosenau would argue that it is a typical example for an issue that interlinks domestic and international affairs and therefore requires global response. When dynamics such as the occurrence of wars shift, then the consequences of those developments will affect every level of community – from the provincial to the international level (Rosenau, 1995). In this respect, modern crises have become increasingly complex by disregarding common boundaries but including deep additional problems and prolonged impacts (Rosenthal 1998; 't Hart and Boin 2001 in Boin & 'tHart, 2003). For this reason, they require responses in form of control mechanisms that reach beyond national boundaries. This translates into international systems, such as the European Union, which diminish national entities and the extension of local mechanisms. In sum, when governments create national policies, they will increasingly clash with international frameworks who create policies that lie outside the legal state frameworks (Rosenau, 1995). Therefore, a global issue might affect the three streams of national policy-making.


Another theory that supports Rosenau is Stephenson's Multi-Level Governance theory. It regards the EU as a multilevel structure and refers to the notion that member states engage in dispersed policymaking activity which involves multiple actors (institutions and individuals) at different political levels. Although there are geographical separation and spatial distinctions, there is an intimate entanglement between the international and the domestic levels of authority. At its heart lies the community and self-governance which are represented in political parties and the public opinion (Stephenson, 2013). These frameworks illustrate the influences on decision making in the European Union on a national and an international level. However, the MSF remains limited in specifying this context and the described links (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013).

Therefore, it also disregards policy practices, such as two-level games. They involve the engagement of state representatives in negotiations at the international level in order to reach a tentative agreement. Meanwhile, they engage in separate discussions at the national level in order to decide whether to ratify the agreements. In addition, states can degrade or improve their bargaining positions by offering small or large win-sets (Putnam, 1988). Thus, international positions are influenced by domestic politics and the other way around. This might be an important factor of consideration when applying the MSF.

In conclusion, if decision making is embedded in a special context such as a crisis situation or a multi-level structure, it is to be expected that the policy stream changes its original nature. To what extent and in what way this is the case needs to be investigated within this case study. Also, the questions if and how those contexts affect the problem and the political stream should be addressed by this research.

### 3.2.3. Participant interaction and verbal power in the political stream

Literature challenges Kingdon's description of the political stream in several ways. To clarify, Kingdon says that the political stream consists of shifts in the national mood, the influence of political forces and political turnovers. In general, he refers to the institutional power of those forces. However, scholars believe that participants in the political stream might be rather powerful through their verbal power and interaction processes with each other. Boin et al. suggest that in crisis situations political actors<sup>14</sup>, mass media and the citizenry form a triangular relationship (see *Figure 7*). Here, communication between citizens and governments is mediated and transmitted by mass media in a context where all other political actors try to persuade media to convey their opinions and information to the public. All constituents of this relationship send, receive and absorb information on the crisis. This enhances their influence on the way the crisis is perceived and managed. The way they do so depends on their role and position in the institutional context (Boin et al., 2005). Also, the situation analysis suggests that Merkel, the media and the public created the 'Willkommenskultur' by interacting with and influencing each other. Their mutual agreement on the situation most likely legitimized Merkel's refugee policy approach.



*Figure 7: Triangular relationship between the media, political actors and the public*

There are various theories that build on this triangular relationship by describing how the different participants interact with each other. They include discursive institutionalism, the mobilization model and policy evaluation. According to discursive institutionalism, Kingdon fails to describe how

<sup>14</sup> including government, political parties as well as non-governmental actors and what Kingdon refers to as interest groups

politicians seek to influence the public opinion while at the same time looking for its approval. It is what Schmidt calls 'the communicative discourse' (Schmidt V. A., 2008, p. 310). Here, politicians engage with the general public with the purpose of presentation, legitimation and deliberation of political ideas. It is considered a mass process of public persuasion of political actors who communicate and frame the programs and ideas generated among policy-makers. It also involves other actors, such as opposition parties, activists, experts and the media who communicate their reactions to government policies. Meanwhile, the general public responds to the suggested policies via grass-roots organizations and mobilizations, as well as opinion polls and surveys etc. (Schmidt V. A., 2008). The mobilization model of Cobb et al. makes similar assumptions adding that policy implementation is often contingent on behaviour changes and public acceptance (Cobb, Ross, & Ross, 1967). In respect to crisis situations, Boin et al. say that it is important that political leaders provide 'meaning' to the crisis in a way that the crisis management efforts are enhanced (Boin et al., 2005, p. 13). In order to do so, they must be perceived as a trustworthy and credible source of information. Only when they are trusted, their words and actions are perceived as competent and sincere (Boin et al., 2005). Again, the situation analysis suggests that especially Merkel provided meaning to the crisis in a way that legitimized the change in the German refugee policy.

Another form of interaction next to communicative discourse is policy evaluation. It is different to what Kingdon calls policy feedback, because it can be highly subjective. Political actors embed policy evaluation in the regular political debate and include the media and the wider public. In Germany policy evaluation can be observed in almost every 8 o'clock news show in form of interviews or statements of politicians (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15). It usually focuses on intended results of policies and their unintended consequence and often includes public blame-games (Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2007). This goes hand in hand with Stone's conception that politicians use different causal explanations to assign responsibility to problems (Stone, 2012). It has been observed in the situation analysis on the national level between political parties and the government; and on the European level between member states and the European institutions. In general, policy evaluation refers to the attempt of political actors to publicly influence the policy-making process.

Those models require deviation from the Kingdon model in several ways. First, within the political stream, Kingdon refers to the institutional power the public opinion and political forces exert on the agenda and the policy-making process. However, he does not refer to the verbal power and the interaction processes of these actors. The aforementioned theories suggest that the verbal power

and the interaction processes between media, political actors and the public might play a crucial role and should be taken into consideration.

This requires the media to be regarded part of the political stream. According to theory, the media might serve as a crucial actor and mediator in the political stream while attempting to influence occurrences in the policy stream. Also, the situation analysis suggests that the media were actively participating in the political process. According to Kingdon, the media have the power to affect the public agenda and shape issues; however, he also states that the media are unable to affect the policy agenda. This is due to the fact that that the media serve as messenger and not as shaper or creator of messages by simply reporting on the processes in government. He denies their independent effect on governmental agendas (Kingdon, 2011). In contrast, other researchers attribute more importance to the media and refer to their verbal power (Walgrave & van Aelst, 2006). For instance, Downs (1972) claims that the media influence the extent to which an issue would track the issue-attention cycle. Moreover, Hill states that the methods and timing of problem reporting affect the political attention these problems receive. Additionally, he claims that the media shape ideas on the policy agenda by promoting some perspectives and excluding others and by highlighting simpler ideas rather than the more complex ones (Hill, 2013). Baumgartner builds on this theory by arguing that each time media interest in a topic is high, one can experience some degree of policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Thus, other researchers assign more than just a messenger role to the media by assuming their tactical reporting and framing of events. Hence, during the research, it has to be investigated whether the media is an active participant in the political stream while exerting influence on the policy agenda.

Thirdly, the public opinion might be more powerful than indicated by Kingdon. He clarifies that the public opinion can indirectly thrust issues on the agenda by encouraging vote-seeking politicians to engage into a topic. In addition, he says that public opinion can direct government or constrain the government from certain actions. Yet, he does not describe how it is able to do so. Kingdon also explains that there are limitations to the influence of the public opinion, because important political spheres are invisible to the public; and the public opinion is rarely informed enough to influence a debate among policy specialists (Kingdon, 2011). However, the situation analysis raises the assumption that Merkel was able to make certain decisions, because her attitude towards the refugee question received support from a big part of the public (often reflected in the media). Thus, the public approval might have legitimized her actions as suggested by the mobilization model and communicative discourse.

This is connected to the fourth point – the fact that political actors seek to influence public opinion for various reasons. Kingdon says that political actors try to sense public opinion (Kingdon, 2011). Also, he states that public opinion “may, in some important respects, be an echo of events at the governmental level” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 149); however, he does not indicate that political actors actively seek to influence public opinion for their purposes. Yet, contemporary literature believes that this is the case. As stated above, crisis management literature believes that if governmental actors successfully frame the nature of a crisis, they hold the key to define the appropriate resolution strategies. For this reason, they need to influence or direct the opinions and behavior of the citizenry (Boin et al., 2005). Interestingly, the situation analysis suggests that this was elaborately done by Chancellor Merkel. Communicative discourse and the mobilization model describe the same phenomenon for non-crisis situations. Even regarding generic policy decisions political actors seek for agreement and approval of the public. This shows that Kingdon might underestimate the fact that the public opinion is potentially shaped by political actors in a way that they can achieve their goals. Concluding, the influence of verbal interaction of different participants in the political stream on each other and on the policy decisions needs to be investigated during the process-tracing procedure.

### 3.3. Conclusion of the theory section

The thorough explanation of the MSF shows that the model is elaborate, detailed and highly abstract in many ways reflecting on the chaotic and unpredictable nature of the public policy-making process. The discussion of the theory illustrated the possibility that the MSF might have to be adjusted when being applied to the case of this paper. Several elements that were discussed need to be taken into consideration during the data collection process.

1. The debate whether policy change occurs in incremental ways or in an abrupt fashion through punctuated equilibria or critical junctures in combination with a path-dependent development needs to be addressed.
2. I will need to pay attention to whether policy-making in the context of a crisis changes the nature of the policy stream. In this regard, it is important to consider the special circumstances of urgency and discretion under which leaders need to make their decisions. Therefore, it also needs to be researched whether policy communities really have the chance to influence the policy-making process. This is connected to the question whether decision makers can act as policy entrepreneurs and whether policy entrepreneurship should rather be regarded as a set of behaviours than as a permanent characteristic.

3. Decision making that is affected by global issues and multi-level structures also needs examination. Next to crisis circumstances, this is an area which has not been addressed by Kingdon's MSF. The effect of those contextual factors on the three streams in a national setting needs to be explored.
4. Finally, the research needs to address the verbal power and the influence of interaction between different participants in the political stream. The theory that the media, political actors and the public form a triangular relationship which includes flows of communication, interaction and influence as described by communicative discourse, the mobilization model and policy evaluation needs to be explored and specified. This is also connected to the debate which role the media play in the policy-making process. Additionally, I will have to pay attention to the questions whether the public opinion legitimizes governmental action and whether political actors actively influence public opinion.

In the following chapter I will explain how I will collect data with the process-tracing method and the Kingdon model as a backbone. For the data collection itself, I will need to pay attention to what other researchers have added to or criticized in regard to the MSF model. The results will be recorded in the Findings Chapter which will conclude with a diagnosis on how well the MSF describes the policy change in the German refugee policy. Subsequently, I will compare my results to the Dutch case and see whether they apply to another case study.

## 4. | Chapter 4: Data Collection and Methods

The model I am going to use in order to test whether and in what way change occurred in the German refugee policy in 2015 is the Multiple Streams Framework. This chapter defines how the three streams and the including concepts that constitute the MSF will be measured and in which dimension. I will base these indications on the definitions in the theory and in the literature sections. Moreover, I will indicate the data sources that I am going to use. Eventually, I will elaborate on the research approach and design.

The three streams are composed of different elements which illustrate concepts that need to be researched. Their definition can be found in the theory section.

### 4.1. Key concepts, measurement and data sources

The problem stream consists of indicators, focusing events and policy feedback. Also, the way problems are defined and framed by political, governmental and non-governmental actors plays an important role. At this juncture, I will pay attention to whether values, comparisons or categories influence the problem definition as Kingdon suggests. I will focus on definite<sup>15</sup> and designative<sup>16</sup> statements of those actors according to Toulmin's "classification of the sorts of claims that can be made in arguments" (Toulmin, 1958, in Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993, p. 51). One source for those statements will be the ARD evening news, Tagesschau, due to the fact that television is the most popular news medium for Germans. The Tagesschau has the highest viewing rate with 10 million viewers daily (Tagesschau, 2016; Schmidt H., 2015). Additionally, interviews and public statements, press releases and conferences and political debates will serve as data sources.

Furthermore, I will pay attention to focusing events which generate attention and possibly cause a window to be opened. Also, indicators which often complement those events will be regarded, because they provide an understanding of a problem's magnitude (Kingdon, 2011). I will look for those events and indicators in the Tagesschau news<sup>17</sup>. The Tagesschau is usually very accurate, timely and position itself as being independent from political and economic interest (ARD, 2016). I will analyse every news show in the time frame stated below. Lastly, I will pay attention to policy feedback which includes the technical proof that a policy programme does not work the way it was intended to.

---

<sup>15</sup> definitive = concerning the meaning of terms

<sup>16</sup> designative = concerning questions of fact

<sup>17</sup> The Tagesschau is the news show of Germany's first public TV channel, ARD.

Concerning the policy stream, I will consider policy communities and policy entrepreneurs who develop ideas and push them at a window opening. They will be defined as political and governmental actors, such as the Chancellor' staff and ministries, bureaucrats, political parties and their spokes people, as well as NGO's and think tanks if available. I will focus on their ideas and suggestions that can illustrate policy solutions and alternatives. According to Toulmin, those statements should be advocative<sup>18</sup> and evaluative<sup>19</sup> (Toulmin, 1958, in Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993). Furthermore, as literature suggests I will also pay attention to the multi-level structure. For this reason, I will include the European agenda and statements of European actors including member state leaders in regards to Germany and the refugee crisis. Furthermore, I need to consider the circumstances of decision making in a crisis mode if applicable. To retrieve this data, I will make use of the Tagesschau news, interviews and public statements, press releases and conferences and political debates.

With respect to the political stream, I will consider the public opinion, statements of political actors and interest groups, media involvement, turnover of key personnel and questions of jurisdiction. In order to sense the public opinion, I will pay attention to official polls and media references to, for instance, protests. In order to see whether literature is right about the presence, interaction and influence of the triangular relationship, I need to pay attention to a couple of factors. First, I will analyse evaluative statements of political actors and interest groups in reference to the suggested policy solution or former policies which should reflect policy evaluation (Toulmin, 1958, in Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993). Here, I also watch out for blame games among politicians. I will look for them in the media, debates and press statements. Secondly, I will analyse the presence and the role of the media in the political stream. Here, I will pay attention to whether and how communicative discourse<sup>20</sup> occurs between the media, the public and political actors. Again, the media, public debates and press-statements will serve as sources. In this connection, I will need to focus on the question whether political actors actively influence the public opinion and whether public opinion legitimizes governmental action in return.

## 4.2. Research approach and design

This study will be conducted as a qualitative case study with the German refugee policy illustrating the case of research. Within the case, the MSF will be applied to three main political decisions that should reflect the overall change that Germany experienced in its refugee policy in 2015. Thus, the

---

<sup>18</sup> advocative = something that should or should not exist

<sup>19</sup> evaluative = concerns the worth of something which does or could exist

<sup>20</sup> as defined in literature

three decisions occurring in a path-dependent fashion are the main reasons why Germany absorbed 890.000 refugees in 2015. Generally, the MSF serves as skeleton structure for gathering research data.

The study is descriptive including exploratory elements and aims at testing and generating theory. Firstly, the descriptive nature predominates, because it documents a causal process (clarifying a sequence of stages or steps) and reports on the context and background of a situation (Neuman, 2014). However, while exploring patterns of empirical facts, there is a great overlap between description and exploration (Toshkov, 2016). Since the MSF has never been applied to the German refugee crisis, this research formulates questions for future research and explores new territory (Neuman, 2014). It has therefore exploratory elements. Secondly, it reflects an unusual research process which aims at theory testing and theory generation. At the beginning of the research I had planned to simply apply the MSF to this particular case; however, throughout the research process the goal of applying the model soon shifted to testing the model. This is due to the fact that inconsistencies were detected in the literature review and when applying the model to the case. The theory testing part required a deductive research approach. However, since I also aimed at generating theory by potentially complementing MSF, the research is partially inductive. This mixed approach will show in constantly going back and forth between empirical findings and theory.

To limit the research, I have applied a realistic time frame. The three political decisions of analysis occurred between August 25 and September 13, 2015. Sources will be analysed in depth in that time-frame. However, in order to retrieve a coherent picture, the three decisions cannot be detached from the bigger timeline. The refugee issue started to occupy the German public agenda at the beginning of August, 2015. In August, there was no single day without news reporting on the refugee topic (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15). For this reason, I will collect findings from August 1 until September 17, 2015. The time frame of analysis exceeds the last decision, because political decisions are often analysed retrospectively. In this way, I make sure not to miss out on valuable information.

The applicable research method that is used for this purpose is process tracing. It builds on mechanistic explanations that identify causes and effects as well as the causal paths that link them. It tries to explain how the cause influences the effect (policy change) “by tracing the links of the causal chain or the interactions of the elements of a mechanistic model” (Toshkov, 2016, p. 150). Causal paths usually specify a sequence of events because mechanisms often unfold in time (Toshkov, 2016). By disentangling the different mechanisms that might produce a change in the

dependent variable process tracing helps formulating expectations about intermediate steps that take place in the causal chain of events (Bennett & George, 2006). Additionally, process tracing facilitates the definition of observable and fine-grained implications of causal processes and outcome. This enables researchers to test multiple hypotheses and establish causality (Panke in Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). Therefore, the process-tracing method often avoids using explanatory hypotheses that only investigate one cause-effect relationship.

The process-tracing method fits the application of the MSF on the refugee crisis due to various features it possesses. Firstly, process tracing attempts to investigate an actor's information and motivation and keeps a close proximity to the subjects. It aims at investigating what actors want, what kind of ideas they have and what their capabilities are to achieve their goals. The MSF, on the other hand, is a model which receives its input from various actors and their actions (Toshkov, 2016). In this respect, the model and the method suit each other. Secondly, process tracing is also used to recover the institutional context while it reconstructs the chronology of events that lead to an outcome of interest. This is relevant for the MSF because it moves in streams who are bound to or influence certain institutional contexts (Toshkov, 2016). Additionally, time plays a crucial factor in regard to when policy windows open and streams are coupled to provoke policy change. Thirdly, like the structure of the MSF, process tracing asks for flexibility while including events and general facts. Furthermore, it mediates between structure and agency and shifts back and forth between the abstract and the concrete while building explanatory accounts (Toshkov, 2016). In this way, process tracing not only answers 'why', but also 'how-come' questions (Panke in Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). Concluding, the application of process tracing on the Multiple Streams Model is reasonable as it provides the model with enough space for research and interpretation while accepting that a policy change roots in a combination of factors that need to come together in order to produce an effect.

However, when applying process tracing to a single case study the internal validity is high while the external validity in regards to generalizations is limited. Thus, Panke recommends to conduct additional case studies in order to make generalizations possible and enhance the positive effect produced by the high internal validity (Panke in Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). This increases the value of comparing my research findings to the research findings in the Dutch case study conducted by Lucia Overpelt.

## 5. | Chapter 5: Findings

The findings section reflects the main outcomes of the process-tracing procedure of the three key political decisions that illustrate a policy change in the German refugee policy (*see Figure 8*). The goal is to analyse the decisions through the lens of a chronological reconstruction in combination with the Multiple Streams Framework. In this way, I hope to answer the sub-research question by explaining how and why the German refugee policy changed in 2015.




Figure 8: Important political decisions on German's refugee policy in summer 2015

Before starting with the analysis of the first event it is crucial to provide some context. Although the first event happened towards the end of August, it is important to acknowledge that the refugee debate slowly conquered the German political agenda at the end of July. After analysing multiple Tagesschau editions it became clear that the Greek debt crisis extensively occupied the agenda before that point of time. Due to its complexity, it did not leave space for another political topic to be debated (Faigle, Polke\_Majewski, & Angeloudis, 2015). Ultimately, the inevitable agenda shift coincided with the increasing number of refugees entering Germany in the summer of 2015 (*see Figure 9*).




Figure 9: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016)

It is also important to realize that several issues were running on Germany's public agenda at the same time as the three events of analysis (see Figure 10). They directly and indirectly influenced these events. One of the main happenings is that from July on refugees were entering the EU in higher numbers than before (UNHCR - E, 2017). From that moment, the media covered refugees and the problems they faced on their route. It provided the impression that the German media 'were walking with the refugees'. Coverage started with the problems the main crowds were facing in Turkey and Greece (especially the island Kos). They continued with reports from the Balkan route<sup>21</sup> until the first masses eventually arrived in Germany (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15). Also, the way different countries responded to the different refugee waves, such as such as the border closing in Macedonia and the construction of a wall in Hungary, were covered (ARD, 21.08.2015; Zeit, 2015). Once the media started focusing on Germany, the struggles faced by refugees, municipalities, the state and its administrations and civil society were reported (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15).

Furthermore, the debate on whether and how the European Union could install a common European asylum policy and replace the dysfunctional Dublin Regulation was a dominant topic on the German public and political agenda during that time (Hollande, F. and Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). German politicians blamed the non-acting of the EU for the increasing and uncontrolled influx of refugees to Germany (Gabriel, 2015). Hence, the German and the European

<sup>21</sup> Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary

political agenda were interlinked in regards to the refugee crisis. This reflects a multi-level structure as suggested by literature.

Eventually, a phenomenon that increased with the high number of refugees entering Germany was right-wing violence towards refugees and refugee accommodations. From January until July 2015, 202 attacks have been recorded. Those occurrences were extensively covered, debated and condemned in public (ARD, 19.08.2015; ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). In general, those issues occupying the public agenda influenced and often merged with the political agenda. Therefore, they affected the three decisions of analysis (see Figure 8).

#### What occupied the public agenda?




Figure 10: What occupied the public agenda?

## 5.1. Decision No. 1: The suspension of the Dublin System in Germany, August 21 – 25, 2015

### 5.1.1. Problem Stream

Before focusing on the elements of the problem stream, one should pay attention to the way the problem was defined by various actors. The problem leading to the suspension of the Dublin Regulation in Germany was that the German authorities were overwhelmed with the registration and administering of refugees (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). This caused long waiting periods for refugees in respect to their registration and for those who waited for granted asylum (Merkel, ZDF-Sommerinterview 2015; Amann et al., 2015; ARD, 11.08.2015, 2015). In return, this led to overcrowded asylum centres and a shortage of accommodation. Additionally, asylum seekers that were denied asylum stayed in reception centres for longer than necessary (Herrmann in ARD, 23.07.2015; ARD, 27.07.2015; Der Spiegel, 2015). The way the problem was portrayed differed among politicians. For instance, the Home Secretary indicated that Germany is challenged but not

overwhelmed while Merkel stated that everything can be managed together (de Maizère in ARD, 11.08.2015; Merkel, ZDF-Sommerinterview 2015). However, Vice Chancellor Gabriel pursued a less positive stance by making clear that Germany was in danger to underestimate its biggest challenge since the reunification (Gabriel, 2015). Hereby, he made use of an element of comparison to accentuate his problem definition. Thus, the problem was portrayed in multiple ways.

When analysing the problem stream, one needs to pay attention to three different elements – policy feedback, indicators and focusing events. In the weeks that preceded the policy decision of analysis, policy feedback in combination with policy evaluation as well as indicators and focusing events were stimulating the debate on refugees until the point that refugees replaced the Greek Financial Crisis on the political agenda (Vornbäumen, 2015).

Policy feedback and policy evaluation occurred on different levels showing how the refugee crisis was a crossing-border issue embedded into a multi-level structure. In regards to the international sphere, the media highlighted the clear failure of the Dublin regulation. It did so by extensive reporting on indicators and small focusing events referring to drowning refugees, overcrowded Greek islands and overwhelmed Greek administrations (Amnesty International, 2015). Later on, this turned into the coverage of chaotic situations in Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. In addition, the UN, NGO's and German politicians criticized the Dublin Regulation and the perceived silence of the European Union (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). For instance, Merkel did not only mention that Dublin is not being reinforced at the moment, she also mentioned that Dublin became invalid (Hollande, F. and Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015; Merkel, ZDF-Sommerinterview 2015, 2015). Other politicians such as the Vice Chancellor used harsh words to describe the EU's inactivity in the refugee crisis such the fact that the EU seems to be in "winter sleep" (Gabriel, 2015, min. 00:13:00 – 00:13:30). In general, German politicians tried to shift responsibility in the refugee question away from the German government and to the EU. Hence, this reflected stories of blame in the context of policy evaluation. This is a surprising finding as literature suggested policy evaluation to be occurring in the political stream.

On the national level, policy evaluation in regards to the overwhelmed administrations also occurred in form of public statements. Refugees from the Balkan states who amounted to 40% of all asylum applications until July often received the blame for the chaotic situation in Germany, as their chance for asylum was fairly low (ARD, 23.07.2015; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015). For instance, the Home Secretary of Bavaria stated that the return of the Balkan state refugees is taking too long and that they are occupying too much space in asylum accommodations

(Herrmann in ARD, 23.07.2015). Other people in charge of municipalities and cities complained that the situation was home-made; that municipalities did not have sufficient time to prepare; and that the state government needed to increase its support tremendously (Koch in ARD, 12.08.2015; Jäger in ARD, 26.07.2015). Thus, policy evaluation was a significant part of the problem stream.

Indicators illustrated the seriousness of the situation. One common indicator referred to the waves of refugees of various origins that entered Germany at different times (ARD, 23.07.2015). For instance, the fact that Germany had registered 218.221 refugees from January to July 2015 of which 44.417 applications were Syrian received attention (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015). Another alarming indicator was that 2.700 refugees were registered on a daily basis in July which was expected to increase in August (ARD, 19.08.2015). Additionally, NGOs, politicians and the media paid attention to the indicators by pointing out that the conditions and standards in German asylum accommodations were decreasing and that registration processes were too slow (ARD, 07.08.2015).

Furthermore, a high amount of focusing events happened in the months before the first event, such as the sinking refugee boats in front of the Greek and the Italian coast (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). However, only one focusing event opened the window of opportunity. This is because it concretized that a big number of refugees would eventually cross the border into Germany. It was August 19 when the Home Secretary announced that Germany would expect 800.000 refugees within 2015. Additionally, he announced a variety of measures that need to be taken in order to administrate and accommodate this high number of refugees (Maizière, 2015). Concluding, the Home Secretary and this announcement of urgency opened the window for the suspension of the Dublin System that only occurred two days after.

### 5.1.2. Policy stream

In regards to the suspension of Dublin, the policy stream developed in a rather untypical and 'non-Kingdon like fashion'. The policy entrepreneur who drafted and internally distributed the defining memo on August 21 was an employee of the German Ministry for Migration and Refugees (Wenzl, 2015). The memo said that the Dublin Regulation would be suspended for Syrian refugees. This indicated that the place where Syrian refugees entered the EU will no longer be investigated by German authorities. As a consequence, Syrians could not be sent back to those first-entry countries. The memo had the purpose of accelerating registration processes in order to provide bureaucratic relief (Abé et al., 2015). However, the document was determined only for internal purposes and not supposed to leak to the public as it did four days later. On August 25, the memo ended up in

the inbox of the NGO Pro Asyl who asked BAMF<sup>22</sup> for the validation of the document. As a reaction, the ministry tweeted “We are at present largely no longer enforcing the Dublin procedures for Syrian citizens (BAMF in Abé et al., 2015, para. 25). As a justification, the ministry stated that this year they had not been operating according to Dublin for quite some time (Ata in Tagesspiegel, 2015). Another truth was that the ministry was completely overstretched and no longer able to trace back refugees’ countries of origin. In this regard, the announcement of the expected 800.000 refugees triggered BAMF’s short-term reaction (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Thus, in this case there was no policy community discussing different alternatives. Rather, the solution has been pulled out of the hat in a state of administrative struggle. In this case, the policy entrepreneur acted as a decision maker as suggested by literature.

Political leaders let the decision pass. The Home Secretary tried to control damage by justifying that the action was ‘just’ a guideline for the administration (de Maizère in Abé et al., 2015). However, neither he nor Merkel who said the previous day that Dublin should be put back into force tried to reverse this administrative decision. A possible explanation why Merkel did not reverse the policy decision might be her anger towards right-wing attacks on refugees and refugee centres that had happened in Heidenau a couple of days in advance. The French President Hollande indicated that this happening was a wake-up call for both Merkel and him to clarify what asylum law means in democratic countries (Hollande, F. and Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015).

The Kingdon model states that in order to choose a solution to a problem alternatives need to be considered. Since this decision has not been discussed widely in the public and political sphere it is embedded in a rather untypical policy stream. Nevertheless, it has been accepted as a quick and temporal solution to relieve administrations. Other alternatives that were being debated should have unburdened German administrations in the long run. One of them was the suggestion to treat Balkan refugees differently which should accelerate the returns to their home countries. For instance, it was suggested to not distribute them to the municipalities at all but let them stay in the first reception centres. This should accelerate the process of return (Herrmann in ARD, 23.07.2015; de Maizère in ARD, 14.08.2015). Another solution which was applied included deterrence videos of the German government in cooperation with the Balkan state governments. The concrete goal of this campaign was to reduce the number of the unpromising asylum applications from those countries (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2015). Other alternatives included the mobilization of all employee resources for the Migration Ministry, more capacity for first reception and more

---

<sup>22</sup> BAMF = Abbreviation Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Ministry for Migration and Refugees).

accommodation possibilities (Merkel, 2015). Eventually, leading German politicians, but also the French president demanded a common European asylum policy which should include the common definition of safe countries; more and effective registration centres in Italy and Greece and a fair distribution scheme within Europe (Hollande, F. and Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). This shows how policy-making was embedded in a multi-level structure. However, one needs to acknowledge that these measures would have not been able to meet the required urgency in the way the Dublin suspension did.

### 5.1.3. Political stream

In the political stream, the public opinion and the media took a refugee-friendly stance and positively influenced the suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrians. In August, 60% of German citizens (more people than in July) believed that Germany is able to manage the large number of incoming refugees (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., 2015). This coincided with the majority agreeing with Germany being an immigration country. 44% even said that they would not mind if the number would rise further while only 11 % believed that there were already too many refugees in the country. Furthermore, 40% of the questioned citizens indicated that they would be willing to voluntarily engage for refugees (Stern, 2015). These numbers clearly indicate a high level of tolerance and solidarity of the German population towards refugees. Also, the political course of Merkel and the CDU received support with 42% of the citizens specifying that they would re-elect the CDU at this moment of time while voting for Merkel as the most popular politician (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., 2015).

This attitude was reflected and stimulated further by the media. Not only did the media report on all indicators and focusing events in relation to refugees and their suffering within and outside of the country, but also did they do so with extended coverage times and overall positive framing of the refugee issue. The Tagesschau started to report extensively on refugees in July and continued reporting on refugees on a daily basis in August (Tagesschau, 2016; ARD Archiv, 2015).

The media's positive framing of the refugee issue can be observed in media content which reflected solidarity with refugees or condemned the EU for non-action. Additionally, they clearly denounced right-wing attacks on refugees (ARD, 22.08.2015). When alarming news had to be reported, such as the Home Secretary's announcement of expected 800.000 refugees, the media would contrast them with positive news and indicators. For instance, the media highlighted how Germany makes 6,5Mrd Euro profit annually through taxes paid by migrants (ARD, 19.08.2015). In respect to the suspension of Dublin, even the conservative BILD newspaper remained positive. The introductory

lines of the article that referred to BAMF's Twitter announcement regarding the Dublin suspension stated: "140 characters towards the future" (Bild, 2015, para. 1). Hence, the media approved on this particular political decision.

Other measures the media took in order to transmit a positive image of refugees included the reporting of personal refugee stories. Also, they provided a platform for people who speak in defence of refugees (and against right-wing violence), such as UNHCR, NGO'S, politicians, volunteers and prominent people (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). They, therefore, steered the policy debate and nurtured communicative discourse. Concluding, the media and the public opinion formed a unity in their positive attitude towards refugees. They influenced and positively evaluated refugee-friendly political decisions such as the suspension of the Dublin Scheme which illustrates the powerful triangle Boin et al. refer to.

#### 5.1.4. Conclusion political decision No. 1

The way this political decision developed can only partly be explained by the MSF. There are two factors that corresponded with the model: First, Kingdon says that policy change is possible when the three streams are coupled during the opening of a window of opportunity. The German Home Secretary opened this window with the announcement of 800.000 expected refugees. Second, the agenda-setting process was influenced by occurrences in the problem stream. However, the problem stream was not only shaped by indicators, focusing events and policy feedback, but also by the extensive reporting and public discussions of those events in form of problem definition and policy evaluation. This included several actors on multiple levels proving that the issue was embedded into a multi-level structure as indicated by literature. Additionally, a large portion of the German public was open for such a policy change as they showed solidarity and tolerance towards refugees. This was again supported by refugee-friendly media reporting who also provided a platform for political actors to trigger communicative discourse. The country's general positive attitude towards refugees might have motivated Merkel to give her blessing to the decision to suspend Dublin for Syrians. Thus, the triangular relationship between politicians, the media and the public described by theory does exist and surprisingly occurs in the political, as well as in the problem stream. Another unexpected factor was the inducement of the Dublin suspension by a spontaneous administrative decision from a ministry and not through an elaborate debate in policy communities. This is paradoxical to the MSF, since it undermines the original character of the policy stream. However, it fits the chaotic situation Germany and its administrations found themselves in.




Figure 11: Political decision No. 1

## 5.2. Decision No. 2: The reallocation of refugees from Hungary to Austria and Germany – September 4, 2015

### 5.2.1. The time between decision No. 1 and No. 2

The political decisions of analysis cannot stand alone, since they are connected through a series of path-dependent events. There are two time-spans that are important to consider. First, there is the time between August 25 (the date of the suspension of Dublin) and August 31, the date when the Hungarian prime minister allowed the first trains with refugees to depart towards the Austrian border. In this time, many focusing events occurred:

- August 26: Merkel visits a refugee accommodation in Heidenau, the place where the right-wing riots happened a couple of days earlier. Her goal is to show solidarity with refugees and to set a clear sign against right-wing attacks. When she steps out of her car, right-wing protestors heavily insult her. A video of those insults circulates in the media. Later on, it became known that those insults concerned Merkel deeply and that this was the moment in which she started treating the refugee issue with first priority (Aust et al., 2015; Alkousaa et. al, 2016; Salloum, 2015).
- August 27: On this day, a truck of a smuggler is found on the Austrian highway. It carries 71 dead refugees that suffocated in the truck. This event deeply shocks politicians and the public in Germany (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung -C (27.8.2015)).
- August 29: The media start excessively reporting on the situation at the Budapest Keleti train station where more and more refugees arrive. They refuse to register as they are planning to continue their travel to the west. The Hungarian police, however, prevents them from traveling further. This leads to the train stations turning into inhumane mass dormitories. Protests and clashes with the police increase from day to day (ARD, 29.08.2015, ARD Archiv, 2015<sup>23</sup>).
- August 30: The Hungarian government announces that the termination of the provisional fence to the Serbian border. However, refugees still find ways to overcome the hindrance (ARD, 30.08.2015).

Secondly, there is the time-span between August 31 and September 4, the date of the second event. The happenings in this time will be described in the problem stream.

---

<sup>23</sup> Time-span to look up in archive: August 29 – September 4

### 5.2.2. Problem Stream

The problem stream advancing decision No. 2 is mainly defined by problem definition and policy evaluation as well as focusing events. Problem definition and policy evaluation occurred on the national and the international level reflecting multi-level diplomacy. Governments whose countries were affected by the refugee crisis defined the situation in respect to their own country as well as in relation to Europe which often included two-level games. The EU and various member states were confronted with negative policy evaluation including stories of blame. In these weeks, the dispute between the different governments and the EU was frequently made public. In the context of press conferences, communicative discourse was highly visible. At this point, it is important to clarify that the situation in Hungary was a symbol for the non-functioning and disagreement about EU asylum policy.

There were two different perspectives reflecting the situation on a EU level. The perspective which was strongly supported by Germany, Austria and France and the EU institutions included the view that Dublin III is not working and that the EU, as a “community of fate, responsibility and law” needs to install a new asylum policy that includes fair distribution quotas (Merkel, A. in speech in Austria, 2015, para. 7; Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). At this juncture, the Austrian Chancellor provided Hungary with indirect policy evaluation by claiming that the construction of walls and watchtowers cannot be common ground (Merkel, A., Fayman, W., Vučić, A., Mogherini, F. in press conference, 2015). At the beginning of the arguments, Merkel and her allies stated that the other countries need to be ‘convinced’ (Merkel, A., Fayman, W., Vučić, A., Mogherini, F. in press conference, 2015). The more time went by, the more threats in form of two-level games could be identified in their argumentation. For example, Merkel indicated that if the EU fails in the refugee question, Europe’s connection with the Universal Human Rights will be destroyed. Also, she said that Schengen will be questioned if no agreement on a fair quota can be reached (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Additionally, the Vice Chancellor warned Eastern European states that if they continue rejecting burden sharing, Europe’s financial planning needs to be altered (Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). In general, this side used stories of blame by accusing the Eastern European countries for obstructing the way to a fair solution based on solidarity.

The other side’s argumentation was led by the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, whose country faced a precarious situation with a big number of refugees being stuck in Budapest. He and his government also involved stories of blame. For instance, Hungary made Greece and Brussels

responsible for not doing enough to protect the European borders which is why Hungary had to take over the task (Szijjártó, 2016). Orbán also claimed that the EU was not dealing with a European but a German problem, since all the refugees want to go to Germany. Generally, he argued that he was just fulfilling his European duties while protecting Schengen (Orbán, V., Schulz, M. in press conference, 2015). His views received support from other Eastern European states (ARD, 04.09.2015).

On the German level, Merkel engaged into communicative discourse when addressing the refugee crisis in public. However, she never made use of the term 'crisis' when addressing the issue (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Rather, she framed the refugee crisis to be a "huge challenge" which can only be mastered when Germany acts in accordance to a common will and when breaking new ground (Merkel in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung-B (27.08.2015), para. 6). She indicated that flexibility should now dominate German thoroughness. This also served as justification of the suspension of the Dublin system Germany was heavily attacked for. In this time, Merkel also released her famous 'Wir schaffen das.' statement which became her personal slogan for her crisis management approach (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Here, Merkel clearly provided meaning to the crisis in order to even the path for her crisis management solutions as suggested by Boin et al.

The Chancellor made use of all elements of problem definition according to Kingdon. Those include values, categories and comparisons. Firstly, Merkel justified here humanitarian thinking and (future) actions with the help of the Basic Constitutional Law which she portrayed as a German value system. It includes the right for political asylum and the respect of dignity of all persons (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Also, she referred to Christian values when making that argument (Merkel, A., Sommaruga, S. in press conference, 2015). Secondly, Merkel made use of comparisons in order to define the problem. For instance, she compared the 'dark past' of the country with the current state of being "a country of hope and chance" (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015, para. 11). Further, she equated the current situation with former precarious situations such as the Greek debt crisis or the reunification which Germany had successfully managed. She did so in order to indicate that Germany is a 'strong country' which is able to deal with challenges (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Eventually, she and other members of the government made use of categories by drawing a clear line between those who believe in the humanitarian solution such as the volunteers and NGO'S; and "the darker side of Germany" referring to the right-wing protestors (Gauck in Zeit Online, 2015, para. 1). Those should not be followed, because they do not support and work against the appropriate value system (Merkel, A.

in summer press conference, 2015). Concluding, Merkel became the mouthpiece of a humanitarian treatment of refugees (Hassel, T. in Tagesschau, 2015). With her encouraging speeches, she asked the German citizens to follow her example and lead. Also, she indirectly asked for public approval of her policy decisions as suggested by communicative discourse, the mobilization model and crisis management literature. In that respect, she used untypical words for her style such as 'being proud' of her country (Merkel, Sommerpressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 2015). In addition, the media supported Merkel by commenting that she developed a political vision and finally showed some leadership (Lautenbeck, R. in Tagesschau, 2015). This, demonstrates the interaction of the triangular relationship between political actors, the media and the public.

As mentioned above, this problem stream is quite elaborate including many path-dependent focusing events closely succeeding each other. These events increased the pressure on the EU (and Germany), because they happened in such a sort time-span and within EU borders. Amongst those events were two that opened the policy window which enabled the decision for Germany and Austria to absorb the refugees from Hungary. The first focusing event was, according to Orbán, a direct consequence of Germany suspending the Dublin Regulation. On August 29, Hungary suddenly decided to allow hundreds of refugees to travel by train to Austria (Glass, S. in Tagesschau, 2015). The Hungarian government justified this action with two statements: Firstly, it claimed to have misunderstood the German decision to suspend Dublin and assumed that Germany was planning on offering asylum to all refugees (Rüger, T. in Tagesschau, 2015). This shows that communication between EU member states was intentionally or unintentionally disturbed (ARD, 31.08.2015). Secondly, it blamed Germany for the chaotic situation, since the Dublin suspension caused hope and pressure among refugees to find a way to Germany (Rinke, 2015). The fact that Hungary was overwhelmed with the number of refugees entering their country and the fact that they were harshly criticized for their border policy was left unmentioned (Verseck, 2015). Concluding, this was the first attempt to open a policy window and at the same time the reason why the following event happened.

The second focusing event which eventually led to political decision No. 2 was caused by the refugees themselves. After Germany and Austria urged Orbán to refrain from letting refugees pass and adhere to the Dublin rules, he ordered to close off the train stations for refugees again. At this moment, there were still ca. 3.000 refugees nearby the station in Budapest (Kasperek & Speer, 2015). On September 3, refugees were being told that they could take the regional trains towards the border; however, the first train was stopped in Bicske, 23 km away from Budapest. There, the police tried to force the refugees off the train and into registration centres. When this message

spread, no more refugees tried to enter trains in Budapest (Kasperek & Speer, 2015). However, in Biske and in Budapest refugees started to protest. On September 4, around 1.000 refugees who felt frustrated about the Hungarian authorities decided to take matters into their own hands. Together they started what became known as the #marchofhope. Under police escort, a crowd of refugees left Budapest and started walking on the highway towards the 180 km distant Austrian border (ARD, 04.09.2015). They were accompanied by the media who ensured that the pictures of refugees walking next to speeding cars spread rapidly (Domokos, 2015). Concluding, this was the day when thousands of refugees forced their way into the heart of Europe and opened their own policy window.

### 5.2.3. Policy stream

In the night of September 4, the media reported on refugees sleeping on the highway without any shelter. That night, Merkel and Faymann, who acted as policy entrepreneurs, agreed to open their country border to those refugees. Before Merkel made her final decision, she liaised with the Vice Chancellor, the Foreign Minister and her Home Secretary. She also called the head of the CSU party and Bavarian Prime Minister Seehofer who, she knew, might have opposed her decision. However, according to media sources, she only tried to reach him once and decided to go ahead with the decision when he did not answer his phone (Abé et al., 2015; Aust et al., 2015). This can be regarded as the ideal moment within the open policy window, since those whose agreement Merkel appreciated agreed and those who might have opposed her plan were not consulted. After the decision was communicated to Orbán, he cooperated by sending hundreds of busses who brought the refugees to the Austrian border (Aust et al., 2015). In the following days, thousands of refugees arrived at the train stations of Vienna and Munich (Kálnoky, 2015).

Two things should be highlighted in regards to this decision. First, the decision was made under immense time pressure between leaders who did not consult with any policy communities. Again, this undermines Kingdon's notion of the policy stream. Secondly, this decision was framed as a one-time decision; however, this was not the case. The next morning, the media used headlines such as "the night in which the gate to Europe was burst open" (Kálnoky, 2015, para. 1). The German government endeavoured to ensure that his was a unique event by describing the situation as a resolution of an emergency and by emphasizing that Dublin is still valid (Streiter and Steinmeier in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2015). Nevertheless, this decision was irreversible and showed that events had taken a path-dependent course. It opened the German

border to many more refugees (see Figure 12) and determined the new course of German's refugee policy for the next months (Kálnoky, 2015).




Figure 12: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016)

Furthermore, the decision to open the gates was a symbol for the failure of international parties to discuss alternatives. In the days before the incident, politicians made increasingly use of press conferences in order to represent their positions and to argue opposing parties in public. Hence, communicative discourse as well as policy evaluation embedded in a multi-level structure played a crucial role. I first reflect on the discussions in the European and subsequently in the German political sphere.

On the one hand, Germany and its allies agreed that a quick solution which would enable refugees to make use of their right to receive protection was needed (Merkel in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2015). Their preferred solution was a fair, EU-wide quota system. Besides that, they agreed that Greece and Italy can no longer be left alone and that the European registration system needs to be expanded (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). On the other hand, Hungary and its allies opposed refugee-friendly measures. Not only did they want to indicate to refugees that they should stay in Turkey, because it is a safe country; but also, did they want to make border protection a priority. In this regard, they portrayed the construction of a wall as the protection of Schengen and Dublin. Furthermore, they opposed a quota system, because it would attract more refugees (Orbán, V., Schulz, M. in press conference, 2015).

The EU, who started engaging in the discussions late sided with Germany and its allies. Schulz engaged into policy evaluation by arguing that Hungary is not pursuing a constructive approach to problem solving. He also claimed that it can hardly be a problem to distribute 400.000 – 500.000 refugees under 507 billion people who live in 28 member states (Orbán, V., Schulz, M. in press conference, 2015). Junker and Tusk suggested more careful measures by proposing the reallocation of 100.000 – 120.000 refugees (Schulz and Junker in ARD; 03.09.2015). It is interesting, that European leaders found themselves arguing against Hungary who claimed to uphold European regulations. In this regard, the fundamental question was whether humanitarian values should be prioritized over the commonly agreed rules of the EU.

#### 5.2.4. Political Stream

As with the previous event, media and the public opinion dominated the political stream. However, this time also reactions to the policy decision of parties and interest groups need to be considered. Again, policy evaluation can be observed in this stream.

The media were positive-minded in their reporting on refugees before and after the political decision. On the one hand, they followed the occurrences in the problem stream closely. On the other hand, they became advocates for refugees by focusing on the following points: Firstly, they attempted to connect to people's sense of solidarity by representing the human face of refugees and reflecting on the destinies of their families. For instance, the media extensively reflected on the story of the small, Syrian boy, Aylan, who was found drowned on a Turkish beach (ARD; 03.09.2015). Secondly, the media engaged in charity measures. For instance, the Tagesschau asked for donations for refugees in every evening news shows from August 27 on (ARD, 27.08.2015). Thirdly, the media also provided a platform to introduce volunteers and their work and reflect on the 'Willkommenskultur' in the country (ARD, 05.09.2015; Querner, 2015). Especially after the decision to absorb the refugees from Hungary, the media reported on the many volunteers who provided refugees with first aid and care on Germany's train stations (ARD, 05.09.2015). Chancellor Merkel encouraged the media to continue their style of reporting, since the portraying of role models would encourage more citizens to help (Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). Also, via the media she and her ministers repetitively addressed the great deeds of civil society (Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). This clearly proves the presence of the powerful triangle between the media, political actors and the public as indicated by literature. Fourthly, the media expressed their outrage at the EU's non-acting and at the inhumane treatment of refugees by certain countries (ARD, 30.08.2015; Hassel, T. in Tagesschau, 2015). Hence, the media did not

only report positively on refugees but also encouraged the 'Willkommenskultur' and supported Merkel's humanitarian solution approach.

The media's positivity towards refugees and political decisions reflecting humanity and solidarity also showed in the public opinion. 22% of German citizens claimed that Germany should take on more refugees and 37% indicated to be pleased with the current number. 88% expressed their willingness to engage personally for refugees. Moreover, 92% of the citizens agreed with Merkel by preferring a European quota system. Also, 85% favoured legal immigration possibilities to prevent the dangerous sea travels (ARD, 03.09.2015 ). In sum, the German public had an overall positive attitude towards refugees at the time of the defined political decision on September 4. This might have encouraged Merkel in taking this decisive decision.

When analysing interest group opinions before September 4, one becomes aware that there were two sides present in the public sphere. On the one hand, there were those who were in line with the media and the public opinion by holding a positive attitude towards refugees. For instance, the social democratic party invited hundreds of volunteers to their head office in Berlin as a symbol for the "friendly Germany" (Gabriel in ARD, 29.08.2015, min: 00:04:54). Also, representatives of the Catholic Church made their voices heard in the media. They addressed European politics which, according to them, need to change its goal orientation and ensure that no one dies at the European borders (Marx, 2015). On the other hand, there were a few right-wing protestors and extremists who achieved media coverage due to violent attacks on refugee accommodations (ARD, 18.08.2015). Even if they cannot be seen as an officially organized interest group, they still received a large amount of public attention due to their behaviour and the fact that they posed a sharp contrast to the 'Willkommenskultur'.

Eventually, since there was no time for political actors to debate the decision to absorb refugees from Hungary in advance, one needs to pay attention to the way it was discussed retrospectively. There were two positions who expressed their view in form of policy evaluation. On the one hand, there were those who supported the decision of the Chancellor, such as the coalition partner SPD (Zeit online, 2015). On the other hand, there were those who criticized the decision, such as the CSU leader, Seehofer, who was not consulted before the decision to absorb the refugees from Hungary. He declared the next day that the Chancellor had "decided in favour of a vision of a different Germany" (Abé et al., 2015, para. 52). Further, the CSU, as a joint entity, declared that the decision was wrong and would send an incorrect signal to Europe. In their view, Germany was unable to absorb more refugees (die Welt, 2015). The fact that the own sister party opposed Merkel

in public and therefore trying to divide the party acquired a new dimension for the Chancellor (Abé et al., 2015). However, the non-inclusion of the CSU in this political decision might have enabled the decision to be taken in this particular way.

In sum, the political stream reflects a multitude of opinions on Merkel's humanitarian refugee policy approach. Also, in this stream policy evaluation is consciously used by various actors to influence each other. Nevertheless, the fact that Merkel had the back of the media, a big part of the public opinion, and the coalition partner might have made taking this political decision easier.

#### 5.2.5. Conclusion of political decision No. 2

The decision to absorb the stranded and badly treated refugees in Hungary was a humanitarian decision based on what Merkel defined to be German and European values. Connected through many path-dependent focusing events, this decision can be regarded as a logical consequence of the first administrative decision to suspend the Dublin Regulation. In a domino-like fashion things took its course and received its final push through Viktor Orbán who sent trains to Germany and played a cat-and mouse game with the refugees in his country (ARD, 04.09.2015, 2015). Once, they could not bear it anymore, they decided to march towards the border and forced the opening of a policy window. Merkel who found herself in the position that her allies and closest ministers agreed while her opponents were absent only had to 'push through' at the right moment in time. By absorbing the refugees from Hungary, she opened the German border. Again, we observe a decision that was not based on the reflection of a policy community but based on time pressure and the consultation of a few individuals. Additionally, the dispute between Eastern and Western member states shows that the issue was embedded into a multi-level structure and therefore sensitive to external forces. Two-level-games, policy evaluation and communicative discourse were used to influence opposing actors or the own public. In regard to the own public, it is important to highlight that Merkel showed determined leadership. She portrayed the crisis and her crisis management approach in a way that expressed confidence that this crisis is manageable. At the same time, she motivated citizens to participate in crisis management measures. Additionally, she benefitted from and praised a supporting media coverage. In return, the overall positive attitude in the country might have made Merkel feel legitimized to pursue with the bold decision to absorb the refugees from Hungary.




Figure 13: Political decision No. 2

### 5.3. Decision No. 3: The implementation of border controls; no sealing of the border – September 13

After the second event, refugees arrived in Germany in large numbers. Professional aid structures were unable to keep up and therefore needed assistance of the civil society. The pictures in the (inter-)national media showed thousands of citizens applauding the arrivals of refugees and delivering first aid at German train stations. The time-span between the second and the third event was nine days.

#### 5.3.1. The Problem stream

The problem stream in this event was dominated by problem definitions and occasions of policy evaluation as well as indicators that often occurred in the form of focusing events.

At this phase, problem definition and policy evaluation in Germany was highly influenced by the debate on whether the decision to absorb the refugees from Hungary was the ‘right’ decision. The person who was portraying himself as a big opponent of Merkel’s decision was Horst Seehofer. He was supported by his fellow CSU party members. In public statements, he expressed that Merkel’s decision was a big mistake, that the “plug cannot be put back on the bottle” and that he would invite Viktor Orbán to find a common solution to the problem (Spiegel Online, 2015, para.1). Clearly, this was an attempt to publicly affront Merkel who criticised Orbán for his treatment of refugees. Nevertheless, Merkel also received support for the decision from her own party, the coalition partner SPD, the Green as well as the Left Party (Gysi, G. and Opermann, T. in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015).

In general, politicians praised the ‘Willkommenskultur’ and promoted Germany’s ability to manage the situation successfully. In this regard, values were often used to define the situation. The Green Party described the Germans’ willingness to help as a “September Fairy tale” (Göring-Eckardt, K. in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015, p.11614). Politicians did not hesitate to verbalize that they are ‘proud’ of their country – a statement that is highly unusual for German politicians (Göring-Eckardt, K. in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015; Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference, 2016). Also, considering the country’s history, Merkel appreciated the fact that people connected Germany to hope (Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). Furthermore, she boldly addressed her critics by saying that Germany would no longer be her country if she had to apologise for showing a friendly face in an emergency situation (Faymann, W., Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). In order to support her point of view, she visited a registration centre in Berlin while mingling and

taking selfies with refugees (Aust et al., 2015; ARD, 10.09.2015, 2015). Those selfies were picked up by the national and international Twitter community. In this regard, Merkel embodied the 'Willkommenskultur'. She did not stop repeating that Germany will be able to manage this situation (Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). During the budget week, the Minister of Finance supported her effort by indicating that Germany is able to master the situation without accumulating debts (ARD, 08.09.2015).

However, the parties were divided on the question whether the government followed a good path in regards to its asylum policy and crisis management. Increasing criticism came from the state ministers and communities. They felt blindsided by the government who decided to open the borders without any warning or preparation time (Lewntz, R. in Aust et al., 2015). Similarly, the leader of the Green Party criticized the country's unpreparedness. She accused the government of having overslept the last months, although the refugee influx was foreseeable (Göring-Eckardt, K, in ARD, 08.09.2015). She also pointed out that the government should be ashamed because it would never be able to manage the situation without the tremendous help of the civil society. In her view, the government found itself in a 'policy crisis' which was caused by the failure and sluggishness of the administrations (Göring-Eckardt, K. in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015). Thus, problem definition was often connected to negative policy evaluation.

On the European level, Merkel, Gabriel and Juncker, the President of the European Commission, provided policy evaluation to those member states who showed themselves unwilling to agree on a quota system. With the help of two-level games Gabriel indicated that open borders were the big economic advantage for Eastern European states; however, Germany would reconsider promoting open borders if the burden continues concentrating on only three countries (Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). In this respect, Merkel posed the crucial question of how Europe should operate when facing issues that concern human values. She expressed the need to define the 'European spirit' (Faymann, W., Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). In her argumentation, she received support from Juncker in his State of the Union speech on September 9. Without pointing fingers, he claimed that the Union is not in good shape. He also clarified that fear does not help, but that the EU should rather take determined, bold and concerted action. This, according to him, would be done best by a quick instalment of a fair quota mechanism. At this juncture, he provided several arguments based on values and comparison:

- 1) The EU should act according to historical fairness, as almost every member state had been experiencing refugees in the past due to war, religious or political persecution, dictatorship or oppression.

- 2) Europe is the most stable and wealthy continent.
- 3) The number of refugees is low in comparison to what other countries such as Lebanon receive.
- 4) The crisis will not be resolved in near future and desperate people will always overcome walls and fences (Junker, J.-C. in State of the Union speech, 2015).

When looking at what caused the policy window to open in this political decision, focusing events and indicators need to be considered. From the day on of the border opening, Germany faced a tremendous increase in refugees. Most of them left Hungary after Merkel had decided to open the borders (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Meanwhile, the BAMF was said to be “drowning in asylum applications”<sup>24</sup> (ARD; 10.09.2015, min: 00:04:45). At that point of time, 250.000 unprocessed applications were piled up which also meant that the people who filed applications were occupying spaces in the first-reception centres (ARD; 10.09.2015). Meanwhile, trains were bringing more refugees into the country. The Home Secretary expressed that the speed of the influx was too high and that deceleration is urgently needed (de Maizère in ARD, 11.09.2015). The City of Munich was concerned the most due to its geographic proximity to Austria. For days, the city was successfully coping with ten thousand refugees arriving on a daily basis, because of the many volunteers and improvisational measures. Its representatives addressed a direct appeal to the Chancellor and the other federal states to not leave Munich to itself (Blume-Beyerle in ARD, 06.09.2015). The mayor complained that it took too much time and effort to convince the other federal states to take on refugees (Reiter in ARD, 13.09.2015). For the weekend of September 12, the city expected 50.000 new arrivals (ARD, 11.09.2015). On this Saturday, Munich’s mayor sent an SOS indicating that the city’s capacities are reached and that Munich was about to face a collapse (Reiter, D. in ARD, 12.09.2015). This was the moment that opened the policy window (*see figure 14*).

---

<sup>24</sup> Informal sources indicated that the BAMF chef was hopelessly overwhelmed (ARD; 10.09.2015). An indication that this might be true could be his dismissal that followed on September 17<sup>th</sup> (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2015).

### Window of opportunity for decision No. 3




Figure 14: Window of opportunity in decision No. 3

#### 5.3.2. The Policy Stream

Once the policy window had opened, it only took the German government 24 hours to discuss, decide upon and implement decision No. 3, the instalment of border controls. After Munich's SOS call, the leading politicians were forced to act quickly. The Bavarian Interior Minister made the suggestion of temporary border controls (Alkousaa et. al, 2016; Seehofer, H. in Spiegel Online, 2015). Seehofer supported his suggestion and urged the Chancellor and her closest ministers<sup>25</sup> to execute (Hermann, J. and Seehofer, H in press conference, 13.09.2015). In this case, the Bavarian politicians served as policy entrepreneurs. The solution was supported by the head of the German federal police who had prepared implementation plans based on a former G7 summit that required border controls. He also favoured plans to seal the border by sending refugees back to Austria (Romann, D. in Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Merkel and her closest ministers agreed on the implementation of border controls, but the Chancellor insisted on the fact that asylum seekers could continue entering the country (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). At a later point of time, she would argue that it was impossible to close the borders. Otherwise, she explained, one would have to build a 3000-km fence around the county (Merkel, 2015). In general, this decision which was made in a few hours and only among a small circle of top politicians clearly reflects decision making in a crisis mode.

<sup>25</sup> The call was attended by Merkel, Seehofer, the Vice Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Spiegel Online, 2015).

On September 13, the Home Secretary announced that Germany introduces temporary border controls<sup>26</sup> with a focus on the German-Austrian border and immediate effect (de Maizère in Salloum, 2015). He also called on all European member states to adhere to the Dublin Rules. He justified the decision with several arguments. First, there was a clear need to limit the influx and allow administrations and the civil society to catch their breath. Secondly, Germany had to return to orderly procedures due to security reasons. Thirdly, the decision served as signal to Europe that burden sharing is extremely necessary (de Maizère, T. in press conference, 13.09.2015, 2015). Clearly, de Maizère engaged in communicative discourse by publicly justifying this decision to multiple parties.

It is important to consider that the decision was made one day before the EU Home Secretaries met in Brussels to discuss and vote on Juncker's plan to redistribute 160.000 refugees from Italy and Greece (ARD, 13.09.2015). The Bavarian Minister of Interior confirmed that the decision should also serve as political leverage for member states to accept Juncker's plan (Herrmann, J. in Salloum, 2015). Additionally, the EU and Germany confirmed that Merkel had consulted with Juncker on the border closing. Juncker's approval showed that he regarded the German policy decision as a strategic leverage for his own plan (ARD, 13.09.2015). Hence, two-level games can clearly be detected at this point in time.

On a German level, the Bundestag (which reunited after its summer break) attempted acting as a policy community by debating measures to solve the current situation. Besides the many long-term measures such as the need for integration laws and an increased budget for the municipalities, short-term solutions were being discussed. For instance, the government was asked to solve structural problems first, because volunteers might become tired and the national mood might shift (Gysi, G. in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015). The Green Party suggested employing more decision makers who could process asylum applications (Göring-Eckardt in Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015). In this respect, the CDU proposed to delegate people from the customs or the national employment agency to the BAMF (ARD; 10.09.2015). Meanwhile, Bavaria demanded that other federal states take on more refugees and that a second distribution post should be installed in Lower Saxony (ARD, 12.09.2015). However, those debated short-term measures were unable to prevent the city of Munich from collapsing. In the end, the defining decision leading to border controls was not being debated and agreed upon by a policy community. Instead, a small group of top-level politicians took the decision under enormous pressure as predicted by crisis literature.

---

<sup>26</sup> Note that the Schengen agreement allows for temporary border controls in situations when public order is severely threatened (Abé et al., 2015; Alkousaa et. al, 2016)

### 5.3.3. The Political Stream

In the light of the events, the political stream was heavily dominated by the influence of political parties, interest groups and the media who exerted policy evaluation and communicative discourse.

Parties and interest groups expressed a multitude of opinions on the decision to implement border controls. On the one hand, the Green and the Left Party criticized the decision. The Green Party claimed that the government used the decision to distract from its own failure to support the municipalities properly in terms of finances, accommodations and accelerated procedures (Göring-Eckardt, K. in Gathmann, 2015). They claimed that border controls do not solve the issues at hand, because refugees still need to be cared for. Rather, the root causes of flight need to be combated (Gysi, G. in Gathmann, 2015). The debates showed a clear form of negative policy evaluation.

On the other hand, the decision to implement border controls was supported by various participants. The governing parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, indicated that it sends an important signal to the EU (Seehofer, H. in Spiegel Online, 2015). Furthermore, it was reasoned that the decision allowed Germany to return to a rule-based system and that municipalities received a moment of urgent break (Bouffier, V. and Gabriel, S. in ARD, 14.09.2015). Also, the trade union of the police expressed their relief regarding the deceleration of the influx and the enhanced state of security (GdP in Spiegel Online, 2015). Eventually, the EU interpreted the decision as support for the Juncker plan. According to them, when even the strongest country reaches its limits, it shows that the burden cannot be distributed on just a few shoulders (Armin Staath in Tagesschau, 2015). In sum, many statements and opinions were expressed in the frame of communicative discourse.

In contrast, the media opposed border controls and advocated a humanitarian and solidary solution. Not only did they portray the implementation of border controls as a sign of powerlessness and government failure; but also, did they blame the government for an ineffective BAMF and for having left alone the municipalities for too long. According to the media, Schengen was an icon of the European idea and open borders had been praised as one of the most important accomplishments of the member states (ARD, 13.09.2015). A commentator stated that the current pictures showing border controls and barbed wires are “explosive devices for the freedom and the trust in the EU.” (Preiß, M. in ARD, 14.09.2015, min: 00:17:55). The media sent out a clear warning by indicating that the decision endangers the uncomplicated coexistence among neighbours (ARD, 14.09.2015). In this regard, the media clearly provided policy evaluation to the German government while entering the political dialogue with an own voice.

Moreover, the media took an equally negative stance on Hungary and the European Union. In respect to Hungary, they indicated that the country would treat refugees as criminals opposing Human values (ARD, 08.09.2015; ARD, 14.09.2015, 2015). Referring to the EU, the media stated that the union had not been seen that estranged for a long time (ARD, 09.09.2015). Also, the Commission was blamed, because it had not done a thorough job as guard of the contracts. According to the media, European politics should be created in Brussels first and foremost (Krause, R. D. in ARD, 09.09.2015). Thus, the media clearly engaged in policy evaluation on multiple levels.

However, the media reported positively on the culture of welcome. For days, they showed pictures of the many volunteers at Munich train station and at different places of the country (Aust et al., 2015; ARD, 05.09.2015; ARD, 06.09.2015). They also provided interactive maps with local initiatives in Germany and encouraged to participate in civil society activities (ARD, 07.09.2016). Eventually, they reported on pro-refugee demonstrations in Germany and all over Europe (ARD, 12.09.2015). Through their reporting, they nurtured the 'Willkommenskultur' and gave the impression of an overall refugee-friendly German public.

#### 5.3.4. Concluding political decision No. 3

The decision which included the introduction of temporary border controls and the retention of open borders for asylum seekers was of humanitarian and administrative nature. It reinforced the two decisions made before and illustrated the consequence of a path-dependent development. Refugees that felt mistreated in Hungary made use of the opportunity to travel to Germany without hindrances (policy decision No. 2). This led to the increase of refugees forcing the German government into decision No. 3. The main factors leading to the opening of a policy window included an increasing refugee influx to Bavaria, a slow distribution to other federal states and an ineffective BAMF which led to the eventual collapse of the city Munich. At this point, Germany officially found itself in a state of crisis. Once the severity of the situation was recognized, Bavarian politicians only had to 'push' their solution, the border controls, which was eventually agreed upon by Merkel and a small circle of top ministers. However, Merkel, for her part, made sure that the borders stayed open. In the days before this decision she had positioned herself towards a humanitarian solution by promoting and supporting the Willkommenskultur. Considering the policy stream, it is important to acknowledge that the policy communities had no effect on this decision. Rather, the decision was made under time pressure among a small group of top-level politicians. It was justified to the public in form of communicative discourse. Also, it served as leverage for a distribution quota on EU level and therefore clearly symbolized two-level games and multi-level

diplomacy. Participants in the political stream showed divided opinions on the decision. Especially the media expressed its criticism by engaging in policy evaluation. However, the decision was supported by the most important ministers, both coalition parties and the European Commission which made its deployment easier. Concluding, this decision was administrative, because it helped regulating the refugee influx; and humanitarian, because the borders of Germany stayed open for asylum seekers.




Figure 15: Political decision No. 3

## 5.4. Conclusion of the Findings Chapter

The findings chapter illustrated the results of the data collection which included the application of the Kingdon model to three important political decisions reflecting Germany's turn in its refugee policy. Now, several conclusions can be drawn in respect to whether the MSF explains the policy change in Germany. When addressing the research sub-question '*To what extent does Kingdon's MSF explain the change in Germany's asylum policy?*', the answer needs to be 'to a limited extent'. First, I will illustrate the strengths which are followed by the inconsistencies of the model when applied to the reality of this case study.

Clearly, the three political decisions that were taken in a three-week time span reflect critical junctures with path-dependent consequences as suggested by Capoccia & Kelemen. As elaborated above, critical junctures are moments during which the choices made by agents face a heightened probability to influence the outcome of interest. These choices usually evoke a path-dependent development. The first critical juncture reflected the accidental suspension of the Dublin system. Here, BAMF made an administrative decision that initiated the course of Germany's refugee policy leading to 890.000 registered refugees in 2015. This decision caused an increase of refugees making their way to Europe and eventually Germany. Other countries, such as Hungary chose a different course in the refugee crisis by trying to make refugees feel as uncomfortable as possible. In accordance with the overall value set of its citizens and the media, the German Chancellor had no other option than taking decision No. 2 – the absorption of the refugees of Hungary. This decision, being of humanitarian nature, was irreversible and opened Germany's border to many more to come. Even at the point of Munich's collapse and many critics complaining, the Chancellor acknowledged that closing the border is not an option. To ease her critics, she took decision No. 3 and implemented border controls; however, she decided to not seal the border and to grant entry to those in need. These three events heralded a substantial change in Germany's asylum policy from a policy of discouragement to an open-door policy. Consequentially, it led to 890.000 asylum applicants throughout 2015. Thus, it can be said that in crisis situations, policy change does not happen incrementally; but rather abrupt as described by Kingdon. In this case, we were able to observe how abrupt change manifests itself in a domino-like, irreversible development including more critical junctures along the way.

The MSF succeeds in serving as a tool which facilitates data collection in the field of agenda-setting and policy-making. In this regard, the problem stream is accurately described including its elements of focusing events, policy feedback and indicators. It provides a clear picture on how issues are

defined, turn into problems and reach importance on the agenda. Furthermore, policy window openings which facilitate political actors to enact change can be observed as well. Additionally, the model helps capturing an unsteady environment in which factors and actors within the three streams attempt to influence each other and the direction of policy change. However, the way Kingdon describes them to do so and the way he describes policy change to occur does not apply to the reality of this case study. In fact, the nature of the policy stream and the political stream differs to the original MSF. This is because Kingdon disregards certain circumstances which are present in this case study.

The first circumstance that is not addressed by Kingdon's MSF is decision making in a crisis mode. The three policy decisions of analysis confirm crisis management literature by indicating that decisions often need to be made under time constraints and under discretion. All three political decisions were made by (individual) actors under time constraints and discretion. This illustrates that three elements in the policy stream change their nature in comparison to the description of Kingdon's MSF. Firstly, the basic element of the policy stream, the policy communities, which develop and debate proposals that are picked and pushed by policy entrepreneurs, does not apply. Even if they are available, they might not be consulted. This is because in crisis situations, time and discretion force decision makers to adopt the role of policy entrepreneurs themselves. This relates to the second aspect which shows the need to regard policy entrepreneurship as a behaviour pattern, rather than a distinct characteristic. Thus, the nature of policy entrepreneurship changes. Thirdly, one needs to recognize that in crisis situations, decision makers are more powerful than originally stated by Kingdon. In fact, they are able to influence the direction of policy change the way Mrs. Merkel did in decision No. 2. This is a crucial difference to Kingdon who attributes this kind of power to the policy entrepreneurs behind the decision makers. Hence, these elements show that Kingdon disregards the special circumstances of decision making in a crisis mode in his model.

Secondly, another circumstance that Kingdon fails to include is the fact that decision making might be embedded into multi-level structures. In his MSF, policy solutions are produced domestically. This might be due to the fact that when he first published his model, globalization was not advanced yet and intergovernmental responses to global issues were less common. However, an issue that crosses borders such as the refugee crisis requires the response of several countries and/or an organ like the European Union. The research shows that the German, the European and the member states' agendas were closely intertwined. Additionally, political leaders framed problems and evaluated policies referring to and blaming each other. Therefore, institutional complexities that come with multi-level structures, as well as diplomatic complexities such as two-level games

need to be added to the MSF when applying it to a crossing-border issue. This influences the occurrences in the problem stream and changes the character of the policy stream.

Thirdly, Kingdon disregards the verbal power and interaction processes between political actors, the media and the public and the influence they might have on policy decisions. Crisis communication literature and the case study show that those three participants form a triangular relationship. Via this relationship, they share communicative discourse or policy evaluation content and influence each other. In this respect, it is important to highlight that the media are not just a shaper of messages as defined by Kingdon. For instance, the media took an open stance against the German government by criticizing the border controls. They also provided negative policy evaluation to the EU for their non-action. Additionally, the pro-refugee atmosphere the media and the public created was especially strong and even praised by the Chancellor. Merkel, for her part, was an extraordinary dominant political actor in the triangle. She did her best to adopt a leadership style which provided meaning to the crisis and represented the 'Willkommenskultur'. As suggested by crisis communication literature, she clearly tried to convince public opinion of her humanitarian crisis management approach. In return, she received support from the public which might have made her feel legitimized to pursue her actions as suggested by communicative discourse and the mobilization model. This clearly changes the original character of the political stream.

Yet, a rather unexpected finding was that the public form of information and opinion exchange between the three parties was present in all streams - so not only in the political stream. Policy evaluation and communicative discourse was found in the problem stream in form of problem definitions; in the policy stream in form of discussion of alternatives and in the political stream in form of evaluative statements of policies. Unfortunately, this research is limited and therefore unable to indicate a degree of influence these actors and processes have on policy decisions. However, this triangular relationship proved to be difficult to be applied to the MSF as it was constantly crossing the borders of the streams therefore connecting them. Hence, there is reason to assume that the streams do not run independently, but are being connected through the interaction of participants.

Concluding, although this case study reflects abrupt change, Kingdon's MSF is very limited in explaining the policy change in Germany. It is recommended to adjust the model when applying it to the contexts of crises and multi-level structures. Additionally, the verbal power and the effect participants of the triangular relationship have on each other and on the policy-making process

needs to be investigated further<sup>27</sup>. Here, especially the role of charismatic leaders should be analysed in-depth.

---

<sup>27</sup> For more research limitations, please have a look at Chapter 7.

## 6. | Chapter 6: Comparison of the German to the Dutch case

So far, I have answered the question to what extent the MSF explains the German change in asylum policy. However, in order to answer to what extent the MSF explains the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015, the German situation needs to be compared to the Dutch case which was researched by Lucia Overpelt.

At this juncture, it is important to remember the common point of departure - the circumstance that two relatively similar countries pursued a different asylum policy course in 2015. Despite the size, both countries seemed relatively equal in terms of economy, culture and geography while pursuing a similar discouraging migration policy during the past 20 years. However, when the refugees knocked on Europe's doors in 2015 turning parts of the continent into a crisis area, the common path of the Dutch and the German asylum policy started to divide. The Dutch continued their policy of discouragement leading to the reception of 59.100 refugees in 2015; while the Germans started pursuing an open-border policy leading to the reception of 890.000 refugees in 2015. In the hope to understand the driving forces of this development Kingdon's MSF was applied to both cases. This final section of the thesis will compare the results of both cases and eventually answer the research question: *'To what extent does Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015?'*

To start with, it is important to mention that in the researched time frame, both countries faced different policy-making conditions. Firstly, both countries found themselves at different levels of crisis. From July on, the refugee influx into Germany increased significantly which forced the German government as well as civil society to operate in a crisis mode. The amount and the pace of focusing events that caused a high amount of decisions which needed to be taken evoked an abrupt policy change. It manifested itself in the three decisive policy decisions analyzed in this paper. Those decisions opened the German border to 890.000 refugees in 2015. The Netherlands, on the other hand, perceived their country to be in a state of crisis; however, the crisis was on a much lower level than in Germany (Overpelt, 2017). This was due to the fact that the number of incoming refugees was comparatively low and decision makers still had the time to work out strategic patterns of action.

Another difference in policy-making conditions both countries faced is related to the degree of the citizens' government support. The German government's refugee-friendly actions found crucial support by the media and the public. In the Netherlands, however, the culture of welcome was not

as pronounced as in Germany. In fact, society was much more divided about the refugee question. This might have different reasons. First, the Dutch government avoided to undertake bold actions as the right-wing party, PVV<sup>28</sup>, which was part of the opposition mobilized and gained voters (Overpelt, 2017). However, in Germany, the right-wing party, AfD<sup>29</sup>, had not made it into parliament yet and was no factor of hindrance. The critics Merkel faced from within her own party had less effect since they did not deprive votes from her at this point of time. Second, Merkel adopted a more proactive leadership style in the refugee crisis than her Dutch counterpart, Mark Rutte. Not only did he wait a month before speaking out on the crisis but also did he decline parliamentary debates and assigned problem solving responsibility to the EU. This led to the fact that the Dutch public perceived their Prime Minister as invisible (Overpelt, 2017). Merkel, on the other hand, embodied a humanitarian refugee policy approach. Based on constitutional and Christian values she ‘instructed’ her country on how to manage the crisis. Other than Mark Rutte, she did not let herself being intimidated by opponents, but rather represented the ‘Willkommenskultur’. Her authenticity and charisma contributed to the country’s unity in this debate. Concluding, the different policy-making conditions both countries faced as well as the fact that one country experienced abrupt change and the other one stability question the relevance of the comparison.




Figure 16: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015

Nevertheless, even in those two diverging case studies, similarities were found when applying the Kingdon model. Concerning the strengths of the MSF, both studies concluded that the model is a valuable starting point for researching the policy-making process and a good tool to understand agenda setting. Considering the policy-making process, both studies found that the model captures an unsteady environment including a multitude of influencing factors and the connected ambiguity

<sup>28</sup> Partij voor de Vrijheid

<sup>29</sup> Abbrev: Allgemeine für Deutschland

(Overpelt, 2017). In regard to agenda setting, I claimed that the model facilitates understanding on how issues reach importance on the agenda. L. Overpelt (2017) indicated that it explains how attention increases in reference to an issue. Since agenda setting usually evolves from the problem stream, both studies experienced the problem stream to be accurately described by Kingdon. Hence, he correctly describes the circumstances which cause a problem to reach the political agenda and potentially change a policy.

However, we also found common inconsistencies when applying the MSF to the two case studies. Like in the German case, the MSF cannot fully explain the situation in the Netherlands. One of the main reasons is the fact that the MSF does not apply to policy-making in a crisis situation. Although the crisis in the Netherlands was much less advanced, it still posed similar policy-making patterns. In both countries, decision makers did not consult policy communities for possible solutions. For Germany, this was the case because decision makers had to work under time pressure and in discretion; for the Netherlands, this was the case because the government generally holds “the power of initiative” (Overpelt, 2017, p. 41). For this reason, both cases undermine the original nature of the policy stream. Similarly to Germany, decision makers in the Netherlands turned into policy entrepreneurs who pushed their favourite policy solutions (Overpelt, 2017). Hence, in both countries decision makers were able to influence the direction of policy change. This finding contradicts Kingdon by illustrating that decision makers possess more power than originally assumed and by showing that we cannot make a clear separation between policy entrepreneurs and decision makers. At this point it is interesting to mention that the German leaders made use of that power to radically transform the refugee policy while the Dutch leaders pursued the maintenance of stability. This could be due to the fact that the Dutch were still trying to control the crisis while the Germans, being unable to control, were reacting to the crisis. In sum, the need to adjust the MSF to decision making in a crisis mode becomes even more apparent after finding the same patterns in policy-making in the German refugee crisis compared to an even lower level of crisis in the Netherlands.

Another common inconsistency that was found when applying the MSF is the fact that Kingdon ignores multi-level structures. The refugee crisis began in the countries with EU outside borders. From there, it quickly advanced to becoming a crisis of the whole European Union as refugees forced their way towards the Western member states. Germany and the Netherlands, who experienced a significant increase of refugees in the summer of 2015, had to deal with the treatment of the crisis on a national and on a European level. While trying to find national solutions to the refugee influx, both countries engaged with, blamed and assigned responsibility to the EU

with different purposes. The German political actors made use of policy evaluation and two-level games in order to increase the pressure on the member states and the EU institutions to find a common solution; the Netherlands referred to the EU to justify its own reluctance to take action. In this respect, the national problem as well as the policy streams were being influenced by a crossing-border crisis and the institutional complexities that come with the treatment of it. Hence, multi-level structures need to be included into the MSF when policy-making concerns a crossing-border issue and requires an intergovernmental response.

Lastly, both case studies confirmed that the triangular relationship between the media, the public and political actors influences the policy-making process. In both case studies, the media were more influential than suggested by Kingdon. Also, the public opinion proved to be more powerful. It is assumed to legitimize (in Germany) or prevent (in the Netherlands) decisions of political actors. Therefore, political actors made use of policy evaluation and communicative discourse to influence and to enter into public dialogue with other political actors, the media and the public. Especially the German Chancellor made use of this public form of interaction in order to provide meaning to the crisis and to promote her crisis management approach. Merkel proved to be a dominant political actor and therefore strong participant in the triangular relationship. The Netherlands illustrate a good example for what happens when the political leader does not engage in this relationship. Not only did the other participants in the triangle criticize Rutte for keeping a low profile, but also did his absence offer Geert Wilders to adopt a more dominant stance and to hinder policy change (Overpelt, 2017). In my study, I claim that this triangular relationship operates in and connects all three streams. Unfortunately, both studies were unable to indicate how strong the influence of that triangular relationship is. This offers potential for an additional study.

Concluding, the lack of vital elements of context and interaction in the MSF makes it impossible to explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of the two countries. The two case studies turned out to be very different in nature, due to different levels of crisis and policy-making conditions as well as diverging degrees of policy change. However, the case study comparison was very relevant in order to clarify that even under different circumstances the MSF misses crucial elements that might influence policy-making and policy change. In this respect, the model lacks the inclusion for decision making in a crisis mode; policy-making in a multi-level structure and the inclusion of the influence the verbal interaction of the media, the public and political actors have on the policy process. This changes the original character of the policy and the political stream significantly. Therefore, the research question *'To what extent does Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the*

*Netherlands in 2015?* has to be answered as follows: The MSF does not explain the difference in asylum policy approaches because it lacks crucial factors of context and interaction both case studies are affected by.

## 7. | Chapter 7: Overall Conclusions

### 7.1. Conclusions

This paper aimed at investigating the extent to which Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework explains the difference in asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015. The point of departure was a remarkable difference in the way the Netherlands and Germany approached and handled the refugee crisis in 2015. Both countries pursued a similar discouraging migration policy during the past 20 years. However, when the refugee crisis reached Western Europe in late summer 2015, Germany decided to pursue an open-border policy under the leadership of Merkel while the Netherlands continued handling asylum with restriction. This led to the fact that Germany had accommodated 890.000 refugees and the Netherlands only 59.100 throughout 2015. In order to research the driving forces of this divergent development, Kingdon's MSF was used as a theoretical guideline and a backbone for the data collection. Since this research only included a case study on Germany, the data for the comparison with the Netherlands was retrieved from Lucia Overpelt who did a synchronic case study for the Netherlands<sup>30</sup>.

After reviewing the literature and collecting data with the process-tracing method and in accordance to Kingdon's MSF, the sub research question '*To what extent does Kingdon's MSF explain the change in Germany's asylum policy?*' had to be answered as follows: Although the German case illustrates abrupt policy change as favoured by Kingdon, the MSF was only able to explain the change of Germany's refugee policy to a very limited extent.

Various reasons explain this conclusion: The MSF accurately portrays the agenda-setting process in the problem stream. So, the circumstances which cause a problem to reach and move up the political agenda and potentially change a policy is correctly described. The model also adequately predicts that policy change occurs abruptly. Furthermore, it succeeds in capturing an unpredictable, ambiguous policy-making environment. Therefore, it provides scholars in this unsteady field with an opportunity to structure their data. However, the German case study shows that the policy and the political stream can be of different character than originally described by Kingdon. This is due to the fact that the model disregards important factors of context and interaction.

---

<sup>30</sup> L. Overpelt's research can be found in the archive of the University of Leiden under Overpelt, L. (2017). Explaining change and stability with Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) in the Netherlands and Germany during the 2015 refugee crisis. University of Leiden.

This case study shows that the MSF disregards two crucial contextual factors. First of all, the MSF does not include decision making in a crisis situation. The case study shows that in a crisis mode decision makers often develop and choose their own policy solutions, because they act under time constraints and discretion. This contradicts the MSF in two ways. On the one hand, decision makers do not consult with policy communities to find the right solution but rather draft a solution themselves. Thus, what Kingdon describes as the basic element of the policy stream, the policy community, does not apply. On the other hand, decision makers operate as policy entrepreneurs. Therefore, the term 'policy entrepreneurship' should rather refer to a behaviour pattern than to a characteristic as suggested by Kingdon. Additionally, decision makers acting as policy entrepreneurs have more power than expected by Kingdon. This is because they create and pick their own solutions and are therefore able to steer the direction of policy change. Another contextual factor Kingdon misses is policy-making in multi-level structures. The refugee crisis is a crossing-border issue demanding an intergovernmental response. Therefore, institutional and diplomatic complexities that come with external factors and players, such as the EU, need to be included into the problem and the policy stream.

Second, the MSF misses a crucial element of interaction. It disregards the influence of verbal power and interaction processes between political actors, the media and the public on the policy-making process. Those three actors form a triangular relationship in which they share communicative discourse and policy evaluation. In the German case, the three actors used this form of interaction in order to create and nurture the 'Willkommenskultur'. Especially the Chancellor was a dominant participant of the triangle. She adopted a proactive leadership style which provided meaning to the crisis and justified her humanitarian refugee policy approach. The open form of interaction of those participants does not only influence the policy-making process but also changes the original nature of the political stream and connects all three streams. Therefore, it is assumable that the three streams do not run as independently as indicated by Kingdon. In sum, this case study detected that the MSF misses crucial elements that influence or change the three streams. This makes an adequate application of the Kingdon model to the case substantially difficult. Hence, the MSF can explain the policy change in Germany to a very limited extend only.

After comparing those findings to the Dutch case, it became clear that the two case studies differ greatly due to unlike levels of crisis, policy-making conditions and degrees of policy change. Germany found itself in a crisis mode. Under the charismatic leadership of Angela Merkel and the influence of the 'Willkommenskultur' the country abruptly changed its refugee policy from a policy of discouragement to an open-border policy. The Netherlands, who experienced a crisis on a lower

scale, decided for stability and therefore pursued its policy of discouragement. Despite of these major differences, the comparison still disclosed major similarities in the application of the MSF. Both studies deemed the model to be a useful tool to research agenda setting and policy-making. However, both studies arrived at the findings that Kingdon misses crucial elements of context and interaction which change the original nature of the policy and the political stream. Context-wise, the MSF fails to include decision making in a crisis mode and policy-making in a multi-level structure. In respect to interaction, it disregards the influence of the verbal power and interaction of the media, the public and political actors have throughout the different streams and therefore on the policy process. Thus, the overall research question *'To what extent does Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015?'* needs to be answered as follows: The MSF fails to explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the Netherlands in 2015. This is due to the fact that the MSF lacks elements which are necessary to be included when researching policy-making and policy change in both case studies. Therefore, it is recommended to adjust the current MSF accordingly or to develop a new model for policy change that includes the missing elements.

## 7.2. Research limitations and recommendation for further research

Before clarifying the research limitations in detail, it is important to point out that this research discovered and highlighted some missing elements of the Kingdon model. Based on these elements, it recommends to adjust the Kingdon model or develop an entirely new model that includes these factors. However, as a limitation this research does not explain how an adjusted or a new model has to look like. Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that the MSF offers a broad spectrum of dimensions that can be explored. Therefore, this research needs to be limited at various points. I would like to highlight the main areas of limitation and provide recommendation for expansion possibilities of this research.

Firstly, considering the case study this research is limited in time. This research focuses on the three weeks in late summer 2015. I decided for this time frame because those were the weeks in which the crucial policy decisions were made that led to the 890.000 refugees in 2015. I am fully aware that the atmosphere in the country shifted later in the year and that the time period afterwards is influenced by different factors, such as e.g. the rise of the right-wing party AfD. To expand the research in time and to investigate if policy-making within the refugee policy field changes throughout time and under different circumstances (e.g. a non-crisis mode) seems to be a valuable extension of this research.

Secondly, I strongly recommend applying more case studies in regards to crisis situations and/or multi-levels structures building on this research. In that way, an adjustment of the MSF or an entirely new model for policy-making under those circumstances can be developed.

Thirdly, the role of the actors that are assigned importance to within this case study needs to be further explored. For instance, the role of Chancellor Merkel in the refugee crisis needs to be further researched. Here, it is recommended to consult leadership theories including Max Weber's type of charismatic authority (Weber, 1958). Furthermore, the exact influence of the media on this particular policy change needs to be further investigated. An elaborate media study is recommended. Additionally, the effect participants of the triangular relationship have on each other and on the policy-making process needs to be researched. This study explored that the triangular relationship exerts power on the policy-makers and the decisions to be taken; however, it does not prove to what extent it does so. Hence, further research is needed in connection to this particular case study. Findings of such additional research could then be included into similar studies with different cases.

Fourthly, another field that should be looked into is the role of framing in the policy-making process. This research arrives at the assumption that framing (done by various actors) could influence the policy-making process. However, this needs to be embedded in an own, most likely quantitative, research.

With this thesis, I hope that I contributed to an exciting field of research while raising new questions for the future.

- WORDCOUNT: 28.717 including in-text references -

## Bibliography

### Scientific Sources

- Ackrill, R., & Kay, A. (2011, 18). Multiple streams in EU policy-making: the case of the 2005 sugar reform. *Journal of European Public Policy*(1), 72-89.
- Ackrill, R., Kay, A., & Zahariadis, N. (2013). Ambiguity, Multiple Streams, and EU Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy* , 20(6).
- Alexandrova, P., Carammia, M., & Timmermans, A. (2012). Policy Punctuations and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda. *Policy Studies Journal*, 40(1).
- Baumgartner, F. R. (2015). John Kingdon and the Evolutionary Approach to Public Policy and Agenda-Setting. Retrieved December 10, 2015, from The University of North Carolina website: <https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/articles/Baumgartner-Kingdon.pdf>
- Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. (2009). *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (2 ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Bennett, A., & George, A. (2006). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Birkland, T. A. (1998). Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting. *Journal of Public Policy*, 18(1), pp. 53-74.
- Bochow, A. (2015). Social Media in Germany's New „Welcome Culture“. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from the Medizinehnologie website: <http://www.medizinehnologie.net/volunteering-and-social-media-in-germanys-new-welcome-culture/>
- Boin et al. (2005). *The Politics of Crisis Management*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boin, A., & t'Hart, P. (2003). Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission impossible? *Public Administration Review*, 63(5).
- Bovens, M., & t'Hart, P. (1996). *Understanding policy fiascoes*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Cairney, P., & Zhariadis, N. (2016). Multiple streams analysis: A flexible metaphor presents an opportunity to operationalize agenda setting processes. *Handbook of Public Policy Agenda-Setting*.
- Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, R. D. (2007). The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. *World Politics*, 59(3).
- Cobb, R., Ross, J.-K., & Ross, M. (1967). Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process. *American Political Science Association*, 70(1), pp. 126-138.
- Cohen, M., March, J., & Olsen, J. (1972). A Gabage Dan Model of Organizational Choice. *Administrative Science Quaterly*, 17, pp. 1-25.
- Corbett, A. (2005). *Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cram, L. (1997). *Policy-Making in the European Union*. New York: Routledge.
- Davison, P. (2016). Public Opinion. Retrieved February 2, 2017, from the Britannica website: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/public-opinion>
- Downs, A. (1972). Up and down with ecology - the 'issue attention cycle'. *The Public Interest*, 0(28).
- Dryzek, J. S., & Berejikian, J. (1993). Reconstructive Democratic Theory. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(1), 48-60.
- Exadaktylos, T., & Radaelli, C. M. (2012). *Research Design in European Studies*. Hampshire: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.
- Fischer, F., Miller, G., & Sidney, M. (2007). *Handbook of Public Polcy Analysis*. Boca Raton: Taylor and Francis Group.

- Hill, M. (1997). *The Public Policy Process* (3rd ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Hill, M. (2013). *The Public Policy Process* (6th ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2005). *The Politics of Attention*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Karakayali, S., & Kleist, O. (2015). EFA-Studie Strukturen und Motive der ehrenamtlichen Flüchtlingsarbeit (EFA) in Deutschland.
- Karakayali, S., & Kleist, O. (2016). EFA-Studie 2 Strukturen und Motive der ehrenamtlichen Flüchtlingsarbeit (EFA) in Deutschland. Berliner Institut für empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung.
- Katz, B., Noring, L., & Garrelts, N. (2016, September 18). Cities and refugees: The German experience. Brookings.
- Kehm, B. (2014). How Germany managed to abolish university tuition fees. Retrieved December 8, 2015, from The Conversation website: <http://theconversation.com/how-germany-managed-to-abolish-university-tuition-fees-32529>
- Kingdon, J. W. (2011). *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (2 ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Lindbloem, C. E. (1959). The Science of "Muddling Through". *Public Administration Review*, 19(2), pp. 97-88.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, P. J. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization*, 52, 943-969.
- Natali, D. (2004). Europeanization, policy arenas, and creative opportunism: the politics of welfare state reforms in Italy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(6), 1077-1095.
- Neuman, W. L. (2014). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (7th ed.). London: Pearson Education Limited.
- Overpelt, L. (2017). Explaining change and stability with Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) in the Netherlands and Germany during the 2015 refugee crisis. University of Leiden.
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International organization*, 42(3).
- Rosenau, J. N. (1995). Governance in the Twenty-first Century. *Global Governance*, 13, 13-43.
- Rosenthal, U., Boin, A., & Comfort, L. K. (2001). *Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas Pub Ltd.
- Rosenthal, U., Charles, M. T., & t'Hart, P. (1989). *Coping With Crisis: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
- Sabatier, P. A. (2007). *Theories of the Policy Process*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2008). Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 303 -326.
- Soroka, S. (1999). Policy Agenda-Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and Jones, and Kingdon. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 32(4), pp. 763-772.
- Stone, D. (2012). *Policy Paradox* (3rd ed.). New York: Norton.
- Timmermans, A., & Scholten, P. (2006). The political flow of wisdom: science institutions as policy venues in The Netherlands. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(7), 1104-1118.
- Toshkov, D. (2016). *Research Design in Political Science*. London: Palgrave.
- Walgrave, S., & van Aelst, P. (2006). The Contingency of the Mass Media's Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory. *Journal of Communication*, 56, 88-109.
- Weber, M. (1958). The Three Types of Legitimate Rule. *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 4(1), 1-11.
- Zafrini, L. (2016). Europe and the Refugee crisis: A challenge to our civilization. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from the UN website:

<https://academicimpact.un.org/content/europe-and-refugee-crisis-challenge-our-civilization>

Zahariadis, N. (2008). Ambiguity and choice in European public policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(4), pp. 514-530.

Zahariadis, N. (2016). *Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub.

## Empirical Sources for Data of Analysis

Abé et al. (2015). Merkel's Refugee Policy Divides Europe. Retrieved November 10, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-of-chancellor-merkel-divides-europe-a-1053603.html>

Aljazeera (Director). (2016). Germany's refugee crisis [Motion Picture]. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2016/03/germany-refugee-crisis-160302135618356.html>

Alkousaa et. al. (2016). The Makings of Merkel's Decision to Accept Refugees. Retrieved December 14, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-look-back-at-the-refugee-crisis-one-year-later-a-1107986-4.html>

Amann et al. (2015). Germany's Asylum System Struggles to Cope. Retrieved December 20, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-asylum-system-stretches-to-breaking-point-a-1052546.html>

Amann M. et al. (2015). Merkel Under Fire as Refugee Crisis Worsens. Retrieved November 25, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-under-fire-as-refugee-crisis-in-germany-worsens-a-1060720.html>

Amnesty International. (2015). Greece: Humanitarian crisis mounts as refugee support system pushed to breaking point. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the Amnesty International website: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/greece-humanitarian-crisis-mounts-as-refugee-support-system-pushed-to-breaking-point/>

Amtsblatt. (2016, June). Flüchtlinge in Freiburg. *Amtsblatt*.

ARD. (2016). Auftrag der ARD. Retrieved February 18, 2017, from the ARD website: [http://www.ard.de/home/intern/die-ard/Auftrag\\_der\\_ARD/322402/index.html](http://www.ard.de/home/intern/die-ard/Auftrag_der_ARD/322402/index.html)

ARD Archiv. (2015). Archiv. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from tagesschau.de Archiv: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/videoarchiv2.html>

ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15. (2015). Archiv. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from tagesschau.de Archiv: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/videoarchiv2.html>

ARD, 03.09.2015. (2015). DEUTSCHLANDTREND. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-395.html>

ARD, 04.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 04.09.2015 21:45 Uhr. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3933.html>

ARD, 04.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 04.09.2015 21:45 Uhr. Retrieved February 28, 2016, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3933.html>

ARD, 05.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 05.09.2015 23:30 Uhr. Retrieved February 28, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3935.html>

ARD, 05.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 05.09.2015 23:30 Uhr. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3935.html>

- ARD, 06.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 06.09.2015 23:14 Uhr. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3937.html>
- ARD, 06.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 06.09.2015 23:14 Uhr. Retrieved March 2, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3937.html>
- ARD, 07.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 07.08.2015 21:45 Uhr. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3875.html>
- ARD, 07.09.2016. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 07.09.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved March 05, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3939.html>
- ARD, 08.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 08.09.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved March 3, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3941.html>
- ARD, 09.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 09.09.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 28, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3943.html>
- ARD, 10.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 10.09.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved March 4, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3945.html>
- ARD, 11.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 11.08.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 2013, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3883.html>
- ARD, 11.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 11.09.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved March 3, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-10113.html>
- ARD, 11.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 11.09.2015 22:00 Uhr. Retrieved March 3, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3947.html>
- ARD, 12.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 12.09.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-10125.html>
- ARD, 12.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 12.09.2015 22:45 Uhr. Retrieved March 03, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3949.html>
- ARD, 13.09.2015. (2015). Brennpunkt Deutschland kontrolliert die Grenzen. Retrieved March 03, 2017, from the ARD Mediathek website:  
<http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Brennpunkt/Deutschland-kontrolliert-die-Grenzen/Das-Erste/Video?bcastId=1082266&documentId=30553136>
- ARD, 13.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 13.09.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved March 6, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-10141.html>
- ARD, 13.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 13.09.2015 23:25 Uhr. Retrieved March 03, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3953.html>
- ARD, 13.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 13.09.2015 23:25 Uhr. Retrieved March 03, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3953.html>

- ARD, 14.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 14.08.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9677.html>
- ARD, 14.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 14.09.2015 22:35 Uhr. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <http://auoh.ard-infocenter.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3955.html>
- ARD, 18.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 18.08.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved March 19, 2016, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3897.html>
- ARD, 19.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 19.08.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 2013, 2016, from <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9739.html>
- ARD, 19.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 19.08.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3901.html>
- ARD, 21.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 21.08.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9767.html>
- ARD, 22.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 22.08.2015 23:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 18, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3907.html>
- ARD, 23.07.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 23.07.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 10, 2016, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9309.html>
- ARD, 26.07.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 26.07.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9345.html>
- ARD, 27.07.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 27.07.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 10, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9367.html>
- ARD, 27.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 27.08.2015 21:30 Uhr. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from The Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3917.html>
- ARD, 27.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 27.08.2015 21:30 Uhr. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from The Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3917.html>
- ARD, 29.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 29.08.2015 23:33 Uhr. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3921.html>
- ARD, 29.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 29.08.2015 23:33 Uhr. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3921.html>
- ARD, 30.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 30.08.2015 23:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3923.html>
- ARD, 31.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 31.08.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved March 19, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3925.html>
- ARD; 03.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 03.09.2015 22:30 Uhr. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3931.html>

- ARD; 10.09.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesthemen 10.09.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved March 4, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3945.html>
- ARD; 29.08.2015. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 29.08.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9903.html>
- Armin Stauth in Tagesschau. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 13.09.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-10141.html>
- Aust et al. (2015). Herbst der Kanzlerin. Geschichte eines Staatsversagens. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Welt website: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article148588383/Herbst-der-Kanzlerin-Geschichte-eines-Staatsversagens.html>
- Baczynska, G. (2016). EU proposes scheme to share asylum seekers. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from the reuters website: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-asylum-idUSKCN0XV13G>
- Bade, K. J., & Oltmer, J. (2005). Flucht und Asyl seit 1990. Retrieved April 20, 2017, from the bpb website: <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/56443/flucht-und-asyl-seit-1990>
- BBC. (2016). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. Retrieved November 19, 2016, from the BBC website: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>
- BBC. (2016). Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum? Retrieved November 2015, 2016, from the BBC website: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286>
- Becker et. al. (2015). Juncker Proposes Fixes to EU's Broken Asylum Policies. Retrieved December 20, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/refugee-crisis-in-europe-exposes-asylum-policy-shortcomings-a-1051481.html>
- Behörde für Arbeit, Soziales, Familie und Integration. (2016). Ehrenamtliche Hilfe für Flüchtlinge. Retrieved November 18, 2016, from <http://www.hamburg.de/hh-hilft/4384088/hamburg-hilft/>
- Bild. (2015). Der Tweet, der Deutschland zum Zufluchtsort machte. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the Bild website: <http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/twitter/kurznachricht-die-deutschland-zum-zufluchtsort-machte-42642974.bild.html>
- Borstel, S. v., & Michler, I. (2016). Deutschland fehlen Zehntausende Lehrer und Polizisten. Retrieved November 17, 2016, from the Welt N24 website: <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article151459678/Deutschland-fehlen-Zehntausende-Lehrer-und-Polizisten.html>
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. (2015). Asylgeschäftsstatistik für den Monat Juli 2015. Bundesministerium des Innern. (2015). Rücktritt des Präsidenten des BAMF . Retrieved March 6, 2017, from the Bundesministerium des Innern website: <http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2015/09/ruecktritt-des-bamf-praesidenten.html>
- Bundesministerium des Innern. (2015). Weitere Maßnahme im Rahmen des aktuellen Aufklärungskonzepts. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the Innenministerium website: <http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2015/08/rueckfuehrung-westbalkan.html>
- Bundesregierung. (2016). Zuwanderung als Wirtschaftsfaktor. Retrieved November 29, 2016, from the Bundesregierung website: [https://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Beauftragte fuer Integration/geschichte/zuwanderungWirtschaft/\\_node.html](https://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Beauftragte fuer Integration/geschichte/zuwanderungWirtschaft/_node.html)

- Bundesregierung, P. u. (2015). Flüchtlinge: Solidarisch Lösungen finden. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Reiseberichte/2015-08-27-westbalkankonferenz.html>
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. (n.a.). Die soziale Situation in Deutschland.
- Clayton, J., & Holland, H. (2015). Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from The UNHCR website: <http://www.unhcr.org/5683d0b56.html>
- Cockburn, P. (2015). Refugee crisis: Where are all these people coming from and why? Retrieved November 9, 2016, from the Independent website: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/refugee-crisis-where-are-all-these-people-coming-from-and-why-10490425.html>
- Council of the European Union. (2015). Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council, Brussels, 22 September 2015. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from the European Sources Online website: <https://www.europeansources.info/showDoc?ID=1206853>
- Creutzberg, D. (2016). Tausende neue Stellen – öffentlicher Dienst rüstet auf. Retrieved November 18, 2016, from the faz website: <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/fluechtlingskrise-tausende-neue-stellen-oeffentlicher-dienst-ruestet-auf-14008655.html>
- Damon, A., & Smith-Spark, L. (2015, September 3). Europe's migrant crisis: Chaos as trains are stopped in Hungary. Retrieved from the CNN website: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/03/europe/europe-migrant-crisis/>
- de Maizère, T. in press conference, 13.09.2015. (2015). Begrenzt aufnahmebereit. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from the Spiegel online website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/grenzkontrollen-in-deutschland-begrenzt-aufnahmebereit-a-1052723.html>
- Dernbach, A. (2015). Deutschland setzt Dublin-Regeln für aus Syrien Flüchtende aus. Retrieved February 22, 2016, from the Tagesspiegel website: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wende-in-der-asylopolitik-deutschland-setzt-dublin-regeln-fuer-aus-syrien-fluechtende-aus/12229884.html>
- Deutscher Bundestag, 09.09.2015. (2015, September 09). Stenografischer Bericht 120. Sitzung. 18(120). Berlin.
- die Welt. (2015). CSU nennt Entscheidung für Flüchtlingsaufnahme falsch. Retrieved March 19, 2016, from the Welt website: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article146073720/CSU-nennt-Entscheidung-fuer-Fluechtlingsaufnahme-falsch.html>
- Dimroth, J. (2015, September 2). Regierungspressekonferenz vom 2. September. Retrieved February 23, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/09/2015-09-02-regpk.html>
- DNHK - A. (2017). Aktuelle Entwicklung. Retrieved April 5, 2017, from DNHK website: <http://www.dnhk.org/niederlande/fakten/aktuelle-entwicklung/>
- DNHK - B. (2017). Actuele Ontwikkeling. Retrieved April 5, 2017, from DNHK website: <http://www.dnhk.org/nl/niederlande/fakten/actuele-ontwikkeling/>
- Domokos, J. (Director). (2015). We walk together: a Syrian family's journey to the heart of Europe [Motion Picture]. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/sep/10/we-walk-together-a-syrian-familys-journey-to-the-heart-of-europe-video>
- Dreyer, M. (2015, August 30). Bericht aus Berlin. (T. Hassel, Interviewer)
- ef-magazin. (2016). Politisch meinungsbildende Zeitungen und Zeitschriften in deutscher Sprache. Retrieved January 31, 2017, from the ef-magazin website: <http://ef->

- magazin.de/2016/08/02/1761-uebersicht-politisch-meinungsbildende-zeitungen-und-zeitschriften-in-deutscher-sprache
- Engler, M. (2016). Auf Einladung der Kanzlerin? Retrieved April 6, 2017, from Flüchtlingsforschung website: <http://fluechtlingsforschung.net/auf-einladung-der-kanzlerin/>
- European Council. (2015). European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions. Brussels.
- European Council. (2016). Timeline - response to migratory pressures. Retrieved November 2015, 2016, from the consilium.europa website: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressure/history-migratory-pressure/>
- European Union (Director). (2016). Migration crisis - the inside story [Motion Picture].
- Faigle, P., Polke\_Majewski, K., & Angeloudis, E. (2015). Sie halten nicht mehr lange durch. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the Zeit website: <http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-07/griechenland-fluechtlinge-krise>
- Faymann, W., Merkel, A. in press conference. (2015). Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem österreichischen Bundeskanzler Faymann. Retrieved March 03, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/09/2015-09-15-merkel-faymann.html>
- Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. (2015). Politbarometer August 2015. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from [http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer\\_2015/August\\_2015/](http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2015/August_2015/)
- Freedland, J. (2015). Mama Merkel rückt das Bild vom „hässlichen Deutschen“ in die Vergangenheit. Retrieved November 29, 2016, from the guardian website: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/15/mama-merkel-hasslichen-deutschen-vergangenheit>
- Gabriel, S. & Merkel, A. in press conference. (2015). Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und Bundeswirtschaftsminister Gabriel am 7. September 2015. Retrieved March 2, 2017, from the Bundeskanzlerin website: <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/09/2015-09-07-merkel-gabriel.html>
- Gabriel, S. (2015, August). ARD Sommerinterview. (R. B. Tina Hassel, Interviewer) ARD.
- Gathmann, F. (2015). Begrenzt aufnahmebereit. Retrieved March 3, 2017, from the Spiegel Online website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/grenzkontrollen-in-deutschland-begrenzt-aufnahmebereit-a-1052723.html>
- Glass, S. (2015). Video: tagesschau 31.08.2015 20:00 Uhr Sendung: tagesschau 31.08.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 23, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9929.html>
- Glass, S. in Tagesschau. (2015). Sendung: tagesschau 31.08.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 23, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-9929.html>
- Grant, H. (2015). UN agencies 'broke and failing' in face of ever-growing refugee crisis. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from the guardian website: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugee-crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing>
- Grossmann, P. (2015). Dispatches: Why Afghans are Leaving . Retrieved November 2014, 2016, from the Human Rights Watch website: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/16/dispatches-why-afghans-are-leaving>

- Haselberger, S., & Monath, H. (2015). Sigmar Gabriels Gratwanderung vor dem Parteikongress. Retrieved December 20, 2016, from the Tagesspiegel website: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/die-spd-und-die-fluechtlingskrise-sigmar-gabriels-gratwanderung-vor-dem-partiekongress/12432560.html>
- Hassel, T. in Tagesschau. (2015, September 03). Sendung: tagesthemen 03.09.2015 22:30 Uhr. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3931.html>
- Heckmann, F. (2012). Was bedeutet "Willkommenskultur"? europäisches forum für migrationsstudien.
- Heißler, J. (2015). Die Geschichte einer Einschränkung. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from the tageschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/asyl-chronologie-101.html>
- Herm, U., & Kubitzka, M. (2015). Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Zuhause. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from the BR website: <http://www.br.de/nachrichten/inhalt/kriegsende-bayern-heimatvertriebene-100.html>
- Hermann, J. and Seehofer, H in press conference, 13.09.2015. (2015). Asyl - aktuelle Entwicklung, Sofortprogramm. Statement von Horst Seehofer. Retrieved from the youtube website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HANmW4w1uUQ>
- Hollande, F. and Merkel, A. in press conference. (2015). Flüchtlingshilfe: Pressekonferenz von Angela Merkel und Francois Hollande am 24.08.2015. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the phoenix profile on the youtube website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oU7y4ie2ELE>
- Human Rights Watch. (2015, January 27). Turkey: 400,000 Syrian Children Not in School. Retrieved 2017, from the HRW website: (Kingsley, 2015)
- Independent, the. (2016). Rise of AfD is about more than the refugee crisis, but Angela Merkel is no more secure for that. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from the Independent website: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/rise-of-afd-is-about-more-than-the-refugee-crisis-but-angela-merkel-is-no-more-secure-for-that-a6931376.html>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2016). Iraq IDP Figures Analysis. Retrieved January 27, 2017, from the IDMC website: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/figures-analysis/>
- Junker, J.-C. in State of the Union speech. (2015). State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity. Retrieved March 3, 2017, from the European Commission website: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-15-5614\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm)
- Kálnoky, B. (2015). Die Nacht, in der das Tor nach Deutschland aufbrach. Retrieved February 2017, 2017, from the Welt website: <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article146068106/Die-Nacht-in-der-das-Tor-nach-Deutschland-aufbrach.html>
- Kamann, M. (2015). Viele Deutsche helfen, haben aber auch Angst . Retrieved November 28, 2016, from the Welt website: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article150200411/Viele-Deutsche-helfen-haben-aber-auch-Angst.html>
- Karnitschnig, M. (2015). Why Germany needs the far right. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from the politico website: <http://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-afd-fills-a-far-right-void-refugee-crisis-anti-immigrant-voters/>
- Kasperek, B., & Speer, M. (2015, September 07). OF HOPE. UNGARN UND DER LANGE SOMMER DER MIGRATION. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the bordermonitoring website: <http://bordermonitoring.eu/ungarn/2015/09/of-hope/>
- Kingsley, P. (2015). Refugee crisis: apart from Syrians, who is travelling to Europe? Retrieved November 14, 2016, from the guardian website:

- <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/10/refugee-crisis-apart-from-syrians-who-else-is-travelling-to-europe>
- Kingsley, P. (2015). What caused the refugee crisis? You asked Google – here's the answer. Retrieved November 9, 2016, from the guradian website:  
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/09/what-caused-the-refugee-crisis-google>
- Knobbe, M. et. al. (2015). Locals Step In to Help Refugees in Need. Retrieved November 10, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-encounter-willing-helpers-in-germany-a-1048536.html>
- Lautenbeck, R. in Tagesschau. (2015, August 31). Sendung: tagesthemen 31.08.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the Tagesschau website:  
<https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3925.html>
- Maizère, T. d. (2015, August 30). Bericht aus Berlin. Bericht aus Berlin. (T. Hassel, Interviewer)
- Maizière, T. d. (2015). Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Thomas de Maizière zur Flüchtlingsprognose am 19.08.2015. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the phoenix section on the youtube website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7E1Fnel68c0>
- Martinez, M. (2015). Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don't. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from the CNN website:  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/09/world/welcome-syrian-refugees-countries/>
- Marx, R. K. (2015, August 30). Interview in Tagesthemen. Sendung: tagesthemen 30.08.2015 23:15 Uhr. (C. Miosga, Interviewer)
- Merkel, A. (2015, October 10). Merkel bei Anne Will: "Ich habe einen Plan" . (A. Will, Interviewer)
- Merkel, A. (2015). Merkel-Auftritt verpasst? Das sind die zehn wichtigsten Aussagen der Kanzlerin. (A. Will, Interviewer) Focus.
- Merkel, A. (2015, August 31). Sommerpressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website:  
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html>
- Merkel, A. (2015, August 16). ZDF-Sommerinterview 2015. (B. Schausten, Interviewer) ZDF.
- Merkel, A. in speech in Austria. (2015, August 27). Dankesrede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel bei der Überreichung des Großen Goldenen Ehrenzeichens am Bande durch den Bundeskanzler der Republik Österreich am 27. August 2015. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the Bundeskanzlerin website:  
<https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Rede/2015/08/2015-08-27-bk-wien-dankesrede.html>
- Merkel, A. in summer press conference. (2015, August 31). Sommerpressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website:  
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html>
- Merkel, A., & Hollande, F. (2015). Flüchtlingshilfe: Pressekonferenz von Angela Merkel und Francois Hollande am 24.08.2015. Retrieved February 13, 2017, from the phoenix profile on the youtube website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oU7y4ie2ELE>
- Merkel, A., Fayman, W., Vučić, A., Mogherini, F. in press conference. (2015). Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, dem österreichischen Bundeskanzler Faymann, dem serbischen Ministerpräsidenten Vučić, und der Hohen Vertreterin der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und Vizepräsidentin der Europäischen Kommission Mogherini anl. der Konferenz zum westlichen Balkan am 27. August 2015. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website:  
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-27-wien.html>

- Merkel, A., Sommaruga, S. in press conference. (2015, September 3). Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und der Schweizer Bundespräsidentin Sommaruga. Retrieved February 36, 2017, from the Bundeskanzlerin website:  
<https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/09/2015-09-03-pk-bern.html>
- MovingEurope. (2016). March of Hope. Retrieved February 23, 2017, from the MovingEurope Website: <http://moving-europe.org/march-of-hope-3/>
- Oezcan, V. (2004). Germany: Immigration in Transition. Retrieved November 29, 2016, from the Migration Policy Institute website: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-immigration-transition>
- Orbán, V., Schulz, M. in press conference. (2015, September 03). Joint press point by Martin SCHULZ, EP President and Viktor ORBÁN, Prime Minister of Hungary: following their meeting. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the European Commission website:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I108058>
- O'Sullivan, F. (2016). The Unequal Burden on Cities in Germany's Refugee Crisis. Retrieved November 12, 2016, from the Atlantic Citylab website:  
<http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/09/cities-unequal-burden-in-germanys-refugee-crisis/500969/>
- Phoenix. (2015). Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Thomas de Maizière zur Flüchtlingsprognose am 19.08.2015. Retrieved December 20, 2016, from the youtube website:  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7E1Fnel68c0>
- Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (06.09.2015). (2015). "Wir haben eine akute Notlage bereinigt". Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website:  
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2015/09/2015-09-05-einreise-fluechtline-ungarn.html>
- Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (28.8.2015). (2015). Merkel zeigt sich erschüttert. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundeskanzlerin website:  
<https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2015/08/2015-08-27-fluechtlinge-tote-lkw-oesterreich.html>
- Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung -C (27.8.2015). (2015). Flüchtlinge: Solidarisch Lösungen finden. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website:  
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Reiseberichte/2015-08-27-westbalkankonferenz.html>
- Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung-A (27.08.15). (2015). Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, dem österreichischen Bundeskanzler Faymann, dem serbischen Ministerpräsidenten Vučić, und der Hohen Vertreterin der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und Vizepräsidentin der Europäischen Kommission Mogherini anl. der Konferenz zum westlichen Balkan am 27. August 2015. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundesregierung website:  
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-27-wien.html>
- Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung-B (27.08.2015). (2015). Keine Toleranz bei Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from the Bundeskanzlerin website:  
<https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2015/08/2015-08-26-merkel-besucht-fluechtlingsheim-heidenau.html>
- Pro Asyl. (2017). Asyl in Zahlen. Retrieved April 20, 2017, from the Pro Asyl website:  
<https://www.proasyl.de/thema/fakten-zahlen-argumente/>
- Querner, E. i. (2015, September 05). Sendung: tagesschau 05.09.2015 20:00 Uhr. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Tagesschau website:  
<https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-10001.html>

- Rüger, T. in Tagesschau. (2015, August 31). Sendung: tagesthemen 31.08.2015 22:15 Uhr. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt-3925.html>
- Reimann A. et al. (2016). Fakten zur Flüchtlingskrise. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-und-einwanderer-die-wichtigsten-fakten-a-1030320.html#sponfakt=2>
- Rinke, A. (2015, September 1). "Wir lieben Deutschland". Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the manager-magazin website: <http://www.manager-magazin.de/politik/deutschland/a-1050954.html>
- Salloum, R. (2015). Refugees Still Set on Germany Despite Border Controls . Retrieved November 10, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-introduces-border-controls-to-slow-refugee-influx-a-1052840.html>
- Schmidt, H. (2015). Die wichtigsten Nachrichtenmedien: Internet überholt Zeitung, TV führt weiter. Retrieved January 31, 2017, from the Netzökonom website: <https://netzoekonom.de/2015/12/06/die-wichtigsten-nachrichtenmedien-internet-ueberholt-zeitung-aber-fernsehen-fuehrt-weiter/>
- Schulz, J. (2014). Tuition Fees in Germany. Retrieved December 8, 2015, from the AICGS website: <http://www.aicgs.org/issue/tuition-fees-in-germany/>
- Seiffert, L., & Wormann, H. (2016). Beleidsoverzicht 2015 - Migratie en asiel in Nederland. Europees Migratienetwerk.
- Sly, L. (2015). As tragedies shock Europe, a bigger refugee crisis looms in the Middle East. Retrieved November 9, 2016, from the Washington Post website: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/as-tragedies-shock-europe-a-bigger-refugee-crisis-looms-in-the-middle-east/2015/08/29/3858b284-9c15-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/as-tragedies-shock-europe-a-bigger-refugee-crisis-looms-in-the-middle-east/2015/08/29/3858b284-9c15-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html)
- Spiegel Online. (2015). De Maizière verkündet Einführung von Grenzkontrollen. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from the Spiegel Online website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-thomas-de-maiziere-verkuendet-grenzkontrollen-a-1052724.html>
- Spiegel Online. (2015). München warnt vor Kollaps bei Flüchtlingsaufnahme. Retrieved March 3, 2017, from the Spiegel Online website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-muenchen-beklagt-ueberlastung-in-der-asyllkrise-a-1052635.html>
- Spiegel Online. (2015). Seehofer wettert gegen Merkel - und lädt Orbán ein. Retrieved March 4, 2017, from the Spiegel Online website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-wettert-gegen-angela-merkel-in-fluechtlingsspolitik-a-1052455.html>
- Spiegel, der. (2015). Germany's Asylum System Struggles to Cope. Retrieved November 10, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-asylum-system-stretches-to-breaking-point-a-1052546.html>
- Spiegel, der. (2015). Juncker Proposes Fixes to EU's Broken Asylum Policies. Retrieved November 10, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/refugee-crisis-in-europe-exposes-asylum-policy-shortcomings-a-1051481.html>
- Spiegel, der. (2016). 2015 kamen 890.000 Flüchtlinge nach Deutschland. Retrieved November 19, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-2015-kamen-890-000-schutzsuchende-nach-deutschland-a-1114739.html>
- Statistica. (2016). Ranking der Top-20-Themen in den TV-Nachrichten in Deutschland im Jahr 2015 nach Sendeminuten. Retrieved December 1, 2016, from the Statistika website: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/173197/umfrage/top-10-themen-in-den-tv-nachrichten-im-jahr-2010/>

- Statistika. (2016). IVW: Anzahl der Visits (Online + Mobile) der Nachrichtenportale in Deutschland im Dezember 2016 (in Millionen). Retrieved January 31, 2017, from the Statistika website: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/154154/umfrage/anzahl-der-visits-von-nachrichtenportalen/>
- Statistika. (2016). Verkaufte Auflage der überregionalen Tageszeitungen in Deutschland im 4. Quartal 2016. Retrieved January 31, 2017, from the Statistika website: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/73448/umfrage/auflage-der-ueberregionalen-tageszeitungen/>
- Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty years of multi-level governance: 'Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?' *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(6).
- Stern. (2015). Wie Deutschland wirklich über Flüchtlinge denkt. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the Stern website: <http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-umfrage-zu-fluechtlingen--mehrheit-sieht-deutschland-als-einwanderungsland-6378898.html>
- Szijjártó, P. (2016, September 03). „Das EU-System ist kaputt und ineffizient“. (E. M. Manuel Bewarder, Interviewer) *Welt N 24*.
- Tagesschau. (2016). Zehn Millionen gucken täglich die Tagesschau. Retrieved January 31, 2017, from the Tagesschau website: <http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/tagesschau-zuschauer-zahlen-101.html>
- Tagesspiegel. (2015). Deutschland setzt Dublin-Regeln für aus Syrien Flüchtende aus. Retrieved February 2017, 2017, from the Tagesspiegel website: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wende-in-der-asylopolitik-deutschland-setzt-dublin-regeln-fuer-aus-syrien-fluechtende-aus/12229884.html>
- UNHCR - A. (2016). 2016 ist tödlichstes Jahr im Mittelmeer. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from the UNHCR website: <http://www.unhcr.de/presse/artikel/e363ccffe4379e85be785accbc1f3a29/2016-droht-toedlichstes-jahr-im-mittelmeer-zu-werden.html>
- UNHCR - B. (2016). Europe. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from the UNHCR website: <http://www.unhcr.org/europe.html>
- UNHCR - C. (2016). Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2015. Geneva: UNHCR.
- UNHCR - D. (2016). Refugees/Migrants Response - Mediterranean. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from the UNHCR website: <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83>
- UNHCR - E. (2017). Sea arrivals monthly. Retrieved February 18, 2017, from <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>
- United Nations. (2015). Alarmed by Continuing Syria Crisis, Security Council Affirms Its Support for Special Envoy's Approach in Moving Political Solution Forward. Retrieved January 27, 2017, from the UN website: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12008.doc.htm>
- Verseck, K. (2015, August 31). Die Verzweifelten von Budapest. Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlinge-in-ungarn-verzweifelte-lage-in-budapest-a-1050648.html>
- Vornbäumen, A. (2015). <http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-umfrage-zu-fluechtlingen--mehrheit-sieht-deutschland-als-einwanderungsland-6378898.html>. Retrieved February 10, 2016, from the Stern website: <http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-umfrage-zu-fluechtlingen--mehrheit-sieht-deutschland-als-einwanderungsland-6378898.html>
- Weiland, S. (2016). Da haben sich zwei gefunden. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from the Spiegel website: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-und-pegida-da-haben-sich-zwei-gefunden-a-1093081.html>
- Welt N24. (2016). Eine Chronologie. Retrieved November 8, 2016, from the WELTN24 website: [https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa\\_nt/infoline\\_nt/thema\\_nt/article157912462/Eine-Chronologie.html](https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/thema_nt/article157912462/Eine-Chronologie.html)

- Welt N24. (2016). Eine Chronologie. Retrieved November 8, 2016, from the WELTN24 website: [https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa\\_nt/infoline\\_nt/thema\\_nt/article157912462/Eine-Chronologie.html#](https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/thema_nt/article157912462/Eine-Chronologie.html#)
- Wenzl, A. (2015). Verfahrensregelung zur Aussetzung des Dublinverfahrens für syrische Staatsangehörige. Nürnberg.
- Zeit. (2015). Ungarn will Flüchtlinge mit Grenzzaun aufhalten. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from the Zeit website: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-06/fluechtlinge-ungarn-grenze-zaun-serbien>
- Zeit Online. (2015). CSU verärgert über Merkels Asylpolitik. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from the Zeit online website: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-09/fluechtlinge-ungarn-csu-merkel-kritik>
- Zeit Online. (2015, August 26). Gauck lobt Engagement gegen "Dunkeldeutschland". Retrieved February 26, 2017, from the Zeit website: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-08/fluechtlinge-joachim-gauck-fluechtlingsheim-berlin>

## Appendices

### A. Additional literature

#### a. Policy windows

Another important debate around MSF model addresses the question how policy windows are being opened. According to Kingdon, policy windows open due to a new problem capturing attention or because of a change in the political stream, such as a change in the national mode, a political turnover or a change in administration (Kingdon, 2011). However, the political decisions mentioned in the situation analysis indicate that certain actors might be able to influence the opening of a window. This theory has first been expressed by Natali who argued that policy entrepreneurs are able to help open windows (Natali, 2004). Further, the idea has been developed by Cram (1997) and Corbett (2005). Cram argues that one key skill of policy entrepreneurs is to facilitate the emergence of a window. At this juncture, she especially refers to the European Commission which does not just passively wait but actively engage in encouraging a window emergence in order to push its preferred proposal (Cram, 1997). Corbett claims that within the Commission policy entrepreneurs are able to open policy windows. He, therefore, locates policy entrepreneurs in higher levels of government than Kingdon does (Corbett, 2005). In this regard, the distinction between policymakers and policy entrepreneurs becomes blurred (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). I will elaborate more on this in the discussion of the policy stream.

#### b. Framing

What exactly composes verbal power? One possible way is to evaluate symbolic devices in politics. A symbol is anything that represents something else. Its meaning depends on the way people interpret, respond to and use it. Symbols are fundamental features of political discourse. In problem definition, they function as strategic weapons in a way that politicians can attract support and persuade doubters by shaping their perceptions and suspending criticism. Hence, they are means of control and influence. They are collectively generated, maintained and changed (Stone, 2012). Moreover, symbols have emotive and cognitive functions while transmitting a clear but simplified message (Elder and Cobb, 1983, in Sabatier, 2007). Symbols that derive from a nation's core identity are more likely to trigger an emotive political discourse rather than a rational one. In general, the construction of identity summarized in symbols serves as an important political action guide. (Zahariadis in Sabatier 2007).

Political symbolic devices are stories, synecdoche's and metaphors. Narrative stories serve as principal means for the definition and contestation of policy problems. The most common story themes are change and power. Stories of change include stories of decline and rise. Stories of power include stories of helplessness and control (Stone, 2012). Especially in times of crises, policy makers want to tell stories of control (Boin et al., 2005). Stories of decline which foster anxiety and stories of control which communicate hope are often woven together as in the story of decline setting the impetus for the story of control. Synecdoche's are figures of speech that represent typical cases of larger problems. Metaphors which compare two things on the surface often imply a prescription for action and a larger narrative story (Stone, 2012). Concluding, those symbolic elements are common features of framing.

Another feature of framing is ambiguity. Zahariadis claims that the MSF implies policy-making under ambiguity (Sabatier, 2007). Ambiguity is a feature of the human condition which describes the state of thinking in many ways about the same phenomena or circumstances (Feldmann, 1989, in Sabatier, 2007; Stone, 2012). It enables decision makers to clothe their actions in different meanings. It is often better suited than precision, because being ambiguous about intentions facilitates a policy maker with room to wiggle in the future. Furthermore, "the ambiguity of symbols helps transform individual strivings into collective decision." (Stone, 2012, p. 182). Zahariadis adds that manipulation, by providing meaning, identity and clarification, is the effort of controlling ambiguity. Political manipulation is regarded to be more than identity construction and persuasion. It includes the generation of facts to change minds (Zahariadis in Sabatier, 2007). In this respect, Stones claims that facts are socially constructed and interpretative. They are used by political actors to strategically achieve their interests (Stone, 2012). Zahariadis concludes that the application of a framing strategy combined with institutions and policy windows change the meaning, context and policies over time (Zahariadis in Sabatier, p. 70). He, therefore, clearly states that framing can put weight on the streams which eventually might lead to policy change.